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In November of 1985. Ferdinand Marcos, President of the Republic of
the Philippines, announced that he would hold a "snap" Presidential election.
This election took place on 7 February, 1986, in a highly charged atmosphere
of partisan politics marked by intimidation, widespread poll irregularities
and intense domestic and foreign scrutiny. The United States official
position remained fluid in an attempt to balance U.S. strategic and economic
national interests with those of the Filipino people. The essential Philippine
national interest at stake was the viability of the democratic process as an
expression of the will of a free people. Following a hotly disputed count the
incumbent President Marcos claimed victory, a move similarly taken by his
opposition opponent, Mrs. Corazon Aquino. The resulting civil strife
threatened peace in the Philippines and posed significant questions lor US.
foreign policy, specifically, the relative priority of democratic values vis a
vis strategic interests and the role of the United States in mitigating the rise
of a communist insurgency there. This is a case study of the development of
that election and tl*e role that the United States did and could have played in
it. Additionally, it examines the national interests of both countries as
expressed during and after the election.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A new era in international relations was embarked upon at the end of
World War II. Security arrangements that had been based upon preexisting
economic, colonial, and social orders were no longer operative; in their place
the United States sought to initiate a series of mutual defense treaties and
arrangements that would take advantage of the undisputed leadership of the
West, and the strength of the American economy. This transformation was
particularly necessary in the Western Pacific because many of the small
nations of the region were either newly independent or were in the process
of becoming so as a result of the war's end. In that crucial period of time
between the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Korean
War—and the Cold War—one of the nations that became independent was
the Republic of the Philippines.
As the only colony that the United States ever had, the Philippines
held, and holds, a special place in our national conscience. When
independence was declared on July, 4, 1946, the Philippines was envisioned
as an Asian success story, steeped in democratic ideal and protected by the
might of America. As the world changed, so changed both countries. Despite
Philippine nationalism the special relationship that had eiisted before
independence continued, and through successive administrations the United
States continued to observe in the Philippines an aspiring student of
American- style democracy. Elections were regularly held, and the 1935
Constitution remained in force. Combined Filipino and American action in
the 1950s led to the defeat of the Hukbaiahap threat 1 , and once again the
road to development appeared substantially clear.
After the untimely death of President Ramon Magsaysay in 1957 in an
airplane crash, the electoral process produced presidents of less popularity
within policy centers in the United States; nevertheless the government of
the Philippines remained essentially stable and decidedly anti-communist.
Charges of corruption within the government tainted Presidents' Garcia and
Macapagal, and in 1965 a candidate arose that caught not only the
imagination of the Philippines, but also of knowledgeable Americans.
He was Senator Ferdinand E. Marcos, and he brought with him his
beautiful and disarming wife, Imelda. They were at ease in any social
setting, and seemed precisely the breath of fresh and vibrant air that
diplomatic circles needed. Both President Johnson and Secretary General
Brezhnev fell to imelda's charms, and as President Marcos spoke of his
country's problems and needs he was listened to both within his country and
in economic centers around the world. His ardent stand against corruption,
the traditional oligarchy, Philippine criminality and communism earned him
the widespread support of American legislators and policy- makers.
The deepening American involvement in South Vietnam led to
intensification of efforts to avoid the loss of other peripheral Asian nations to
communism, and to grateful appreciation of those allies supporting us in the
war. The sending of the PHILCAG troops to Vietnam, with then- Major Fidel
iOften used in it's abbreviated form, Huk, Hukbaiahap is itself an
abbreviated form of the Tagalog phrase, Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon, or
People's Anti-Japanese Army. After 1946 it became the People s Liberation
Army, and took up arms in association with the National Peasant Union, PKM,
in revolt against landlord abuses and tenancy problems. It's leader, Luis
Taruc, surrendered in May 1954 during the Magsaysay administration, and
this marked the end of the movement's power.
8
Ramos second in command, went a long way in cementing U.S. support of
President Marcos. In 1969 the Niion Doctrine was announced, and in the
Philippines Marcos was reelected—the first Filipino president to achieve such
status.
During the ensuing two years conditions within the country
deteriorated both economically and seemingly spiritually. Criminality
increased to alarming proportions and firearms were much in evidence in
many strata of society, often openly. In 1971 the writ of habeas corpus was
suspended following a bombing at a rally, and on September 21. 1972.
martial law was declared by President Marcos. The catalytic incident was an
alleged attempt on the life of the Defense Minister. Juan Ponce "Johnny'
Enriie. International business had become increasingly wary of the volatile
situation in the Philippines; the imposition of martial law was greeted with a
sigh of relief. Likewise, within the country many saw the collection of guns
and the dismemberment of criminal associations as the first step on the road
to normalcy. Surely after life returned to law and order the president would
revoke martial law and life would return to it's previous simplicity.
In December of this same year President Marcos instituted the
barangay structure2
, and this added to what became a growing
institutionalism of one-man rule. A plebiscite was held for a new form of
parlimentary constitution, and the presidential power of decree was
2The barangay. a word taken from the Malay, was instituted by President
Marcos as the lowest level of governmental structure, replacing the barrio.
It was proposed to enable the "voice of the people" to reach the national
government, but instead became a vehicle for the consolidation of political
power at the grassroots level. Barangay captains that very often had
significant monetary backing from Manila were elected in poor rural areas
where a few pesos, or demonstrations of the ability to bring about
improvement, were all that was necessary to bring votes.
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assumed. Although the early Seventies did see signs of economic growth and
restored confidence in the Philippines by investors, the combination of
government policies and the world oil crisis hit the country hard after 1973.
Nevertheless. United States support for President Marcos and his strong anti-
communist stand continued unabated, and in January of 1979, a new
package of U.S. economic and military assistance was agreed upon. Though
martial law was ended by proclamation on January 17. 1981. opposition to
both it and its instigator had become entrenched.
Calls for an end to the regime grew in strength and number, and one
of the loudest critics was Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. After being
imprisoned by President Marcos for seven years, he was allowed to travel to
the United States for medical treatment. While in exile in the U.S. he
continued to speak out against the Marcos regime, and returned to the
Philippines in 1983. On August 21st of that year "Ninoy" Aquino was
assassinated at the airport upon debarking from his plane. The Aquino
assassination, and the murky conditions under whicn it occurred, brought
the collective national displeasure to a head, and swelled the ranks of the
opposition.
Following mounting international criticism of his regime, on November
3rd. 1985. on U.S. national television. President Marcos announced that he
would hold a so-called "snap" presidential election to validate his legitimacy.
The opposition scrambled to find a concensus candidate. After several
abortive attempts the ticket of Mrs. Corazon Aquino, Ninoy s widow, and
Salvador Laurel was formed. The election was held on February 7th, 1986 in
the glare of international attention and acute U.S. interest. The result of the
election has been the rebirth of the, democratic ideal in the Philippines. The
story of that rebirth is critical in understanding the direction that the
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Filipino people have taken and in judging their chances for meaningful
improvement in the standard of living in the Philippines. It is also critical in
assessing the role the United States played in the transition from one
government to another, and in assessing our future relationship with a
traditional friend.
During the period February 1-16, 1986, I was privileged to be in
Manila on an observation trip. In May I returned for ten days to assess the
first 100 days of the new government. This thesis is a documentation of that
critical time, and the people that made it happen. It is a personal
recollection, taken from the unique perspective of one who had access to
both the incumbent and the opposition points of view. It is my hope that it
will shed light on the motivations for actions taken and words spoken, and
that it will explain in human terms what was a very human experience.
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II. THE MARCOS ERA-FROM PROMISE TO TURMOIL
The Soviets have a useful phrase to describe the elements of a
particular military and political situation: the correlation of forces. What was
the correlation of forces that resulted in the unprecedented popular
overthrow of a leader that had ruled his country for over 20 years? How
had this man. who had come into office so full of hope and strength, of moral
rectitude and indignation, arrived at the boarding ladder of an American
military jet. to be spirited out of his country in the early morning hours of
darkness. And who were the people who's names ail of America came to
know from the television and newspapers: names so well known in the
Philippines, but hithertofore known only in the United Slates to a small
group of Filipino exiles, State and Defense Department policymakers, and
academics. Ask the average American about personalities in the Philippines
and you would probably get but two names—Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos.
So completely had the President assumed the persona of the country that he
seemed to speak and act for it in toto. Now. however, we were hearing about
others making headlines in the Philippines—less generally known perhaps,
but central to developments in the small island country. Economic
heavyweights like coconut baron Eduardo Cojuangco. and sugar principal
Bobby Benedicto are talked about as the infamous Marcos "cronies ". There
are also many new. and often unfamiliar names that have become important.
Cory Aquino exemplifies this group, and her people, both in and out of the
campaign machine, are now the luminaries on the Philippine political scene.
Who is Cory Aquino, and what has brought her to the highest office in
the Philippines? We know she is a widow, wife of a slain and martyred
Filipino politician, we know she is a mother of five, and has been educated in
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American schools. We read too of her deep religious convictions, and her
quiet sense of justice. But these things alone are insufficient to bring
political success. Something brought about the correlation of forces that
catapulted this quiet 53 year old housewife to Malacanang 1 . The essence of
what had transpired is easy to identify. President Marcos had lost
legitimacy, he had lost the ability to govern effectively, and he was faced
with a population which was no longer content to accept the crumbs that
were left them. What started as coffeeshop rhetoric became the potent force
termed People Power. Beyond this essence there is the convoluted, confused,
and remarkable story of personal greed and ambition at the top. This
portion of the story starts in earnest at the imposition of martial law.
By the early 1970s there were serious strains within Philippine
society. Leading the way was the growing rivalry between groups of elites.
The traditional oligarchy had existed in the Philippines since the Spanish,
and as long as it consisted of primarily landed families there were well-
defined boundaries. The rapid increase in industrialization in the 1950s and
1960s, however, fueled competition between the elites. The policies of
decontrol and devaluation gave an economic edge to those involved in
exporting, and producers of items for domestic consumption suffered by
comparison. As the government sector involved itself more and more in
business and the economy, the currying of favor of those who controlled
licensing, quotas, and contract awards grew accordingly. Bureaucrats
became wealthy by means of the influence they wielded, and a new elite
structure was born.
1 Malacanang Palace, on the banks of the Pasig river, is the Filipino White
House. President and Mrs. Marcos lived in the palace, and it served as the
presidential office as well. Mrs. Aquino has refused to live in it's opulence as
long as so much of the country is in poverty.
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Another growing problem was the restiveness of an ever -increasing
opposition. Not only were students rebelling against the inequities they saw
between the rich and the poor; the rural population which composed the
majority of Filipinos, the Muslims in the southern Philippines, and urban
industrial workers were all becoming vocally disenchanted with the status
quo. Demonstrations, strikes, and anti-government rallys became
commonplace during 1970, and there were major student clashes with police
in which several deaths occurred. The extremes in lawlessness and
disobedience came from three major sectors: the highly organized criminal
networks which controlled activities outside Subic Bay Naval Station. Gark
Air Base, and inside Manila; the communists—including the Maoist New
Peoples Army (NPA-the armed wing of the Communist Party of the
Philippines, the CPP), and the Muslim rebels in the South. Each posed a
distinctly different threat, but in total presented the government with a
volatile challenge.
Furthermore, there was the threat to President Marcos' government
posed by the legitimate opposition. There were many pretenders to the
throne, but the most creditable and politically dangerous opposition leader
was Senator Benigno 'Ninoy'" Aquino, Jr. Benigno Aquino was born to a
political family. His grandfather. Servillano, had been a general during the
Insurrection, and had fought both the Spanish and the Americans at the
close of the 19th century. His father was a Senator, a Cabinet Minister, and
the Speaker of the Assembly. Despite these advantages in a poor country,
Ninoy was determined to make his own way. and began working at age 1 5 in
his brothers truck building factory. He started as a blacksmith, lathe
operator, and carpenter; within two years he had gotten a job as a copyboy
on the Manila Times . Quickly working his way up he became a reporter; in
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1950 he became the youngest war correspondent in Korea. His involvement
with crisis reporting led him back to the Philippines, and he went into the
mountains as both correspondent and emissary of President Ramon
Magsaysay, and secured the surrender of Huk leader Luis Taruc. Aquino
was decorated by the government for his role in luring the intractable
guerrilla down from the mountains. Following in his father's footsteps, he
seized the opportunity that his notoriety provided and went into politics. He
became the youngest mayor ever of his home town, Concepcion, and followed
up this victory at age 28 by becoming the governor of the province of Tarlac.
During his term as governor, on October 11, 1954, he married Corazon "Cory'
Cojuango, the cousin of latter-day Marcos coconut-crony Eduardo Cojuango,
and daughter of the owner of Hacienda Luisita. The hacienda, an 18,000 acre
sugar-cane plantation in Tarlac, is still the Aquino family home.
At age 34 Ninoy ran for and won a seat as a senator. Again he was the
youngest in the nation's history. His political career was increasingly
successful, and he worked hard at building his public image. A spot on the
Liberal party ticket as a presidential candidate in 1973 seemed assured.
Aquino's opposition to the Marcos administration was well publicized and
non-negotiable. In March 1971 Senator Aquino made a fiery speech to the
Philippine Congress in which he accused President Marcos of diverting 26
million pesos intended for essential public services to supportive and
friendly congressmen. On August 21, 1971, at a rally for Liberal Party
candidates at Plaza Miranda, an attack with hand grenades left over a
hundred persons killed or wounded, including candidates Sergio Osmena, Jr.
and Jovito Salonga. President Marcos told the nation that the attack was the
work of communists, and Senator Aquino took it upon himself to campaign
for the injured. The Liberals did extremely well in the election. The
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opposition was gathering real political strength, and the threat that they
posed to the continuation of President Marcos' power was very real. The
stage was set for martial law.
The alleged catalyst for the announcement of martial law was an
assassination attempt on Defense Secretary Juan Ponce "johnny" Enrile on
September 21, 1973. Following a spate of bombings in Manila during the
months preceding this attack (many of which occurred in bathrooms).
Secretary Enrile's car was allegedly struck by a fusillade of bullets, none of
which hit him. Senator Aquino warned the nation that martial law would
soon be declared by President Marcos. Aquino had been leaked a document
known as Oplan Sagittarius. This document purportedly described the
implementation of actions which would secure the country by government
forces. It had been delivered to Aquino by a military officer who alleged
that his patriotic duty was to his country first, and his government second.
In fact, much of the scenario foretold in Oplan Sagittarius, and its subsequent
refinement, Double-Strike ', did come to pass/
On Saturday morning, September 23. 1972, Presidential Proclamation
1081, martial law, was implemented. Political risks across the country were
rounded up, and one of these was Senator Denigno Aquino. His crime was
that of being labeled a communist sympathizer, though there was no
concrete evidence of this. Undoubtedly, it resulted from his position as the
most vociferous and outspoken opponent of the proclamation s author. He
received the news via a telephone call from a Colonel Romeo Gatan while he
was at the Manila Hilton working on the House-Senate Conference
Committee. The Colonel relayed the news that he had a letter for the Senator
from Defense Secretary Enrile. In the letter the President had signed the
order for Aquino s arrest.
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The following morning he was escorted to Camp Crame (where
ironically, Enrile and General Ramos took refuge when they defected from
Marcos on 23 February 1986). From this morning forward Aquino spent
seven years and seven months imprisoned in solitary confinement in
military forts. He was not alone in his predicament. Other noted dissidents
were also brought in. such as Sergio Osmena. Jr.. the opposition presidential
candidate in 1969, and Teodoro Locsin, Sr.. father of the Aquino
administration Minister of Information, and publisher of the popular and
outspoken Philippines Free Press. One thorn in Marcos side who escaped
detention was noted opposition leader Raul Mangiapus. It happened that he
was on his way to the United States the day that martial law was proclaimed,
and rather than return to sure imprisonment he stayed. His wife has told
me that escaping from her own country with her children, via Mindanao, was
the most frightening experience of her life. From the United States former
Senator Mangiapus organized and ran the Movement for a Free Philippines.
He returned home following Marcos' departure.
From the viewpoint of the President and his loyalists, martial law was
vital to turn the country away from lawlessness and to fight the growing
strength of communism. In particular, said the President, the NPA was
gaining in popularity in remote rural areas. The NPA was then measured in
hundreds. The political aims of martial law were left unspoken. Defense
Secretary Enrile headed the planning staff for martial law, and then-
Presidential Eiecutive Assistant Alejandro Melchor implemented it. At the
time, there was a wide spectrum of support for the President's action.
Criminality was rampant. The carrying of firearms had progressed far
beyond the reasonable, and many parts of the Philippines resembled the
American Old West. In the provinces local warlords* had established
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private armies to protect their master's territories and do his bidding,
usually to the detriment of the local residents. The communist threat was
there too, but it was minimal in comparison to what would come later.
A key issue in the selling of martial law to the public was the
presidential desire to strip influence and wealth away from the traditional
oligarchs, the supposition being that it would then be redistributed to benefit
the less well off. Though many family names come to mind--Osmena,
Soriano, Ayala, Araneta. and Elizalde for instance—the family that best
typified the struggle between the "Old Society" and Marcos' "New Society
'
was the Lopez family. The fact that Fernando Lopez was Marcos vice
president only added to the irony. The Lopez family owned huge tracts of
sugarland. They had also become deeply involved in cement, insurance, the
media, and above all, utilities. They were an old. established family, with
land holdings that went back to the Spanish days. In the Philippines, where
to this day family and station are all important, theirs was a position of great
socio-political power.
At the imposition of martial law President Marcos declared to the
nation that a Mew Society was now underway, and that the old established
order would have to make way for the "revolution of democracy".
Systematically, and with great efficiency, the Marcos government proceeded
to strip the Lopez family of their assets. Much was placed in the guise of
government-run corporations, but the men in charge of those corporations
were handpicked by the President, and in what was to be the future under
martial law, a new set of oligarchs replaced the old. Eugenio Lopez. Jr. was
placed under arrest by the President, and held with Sergio Osmena, III.
After years of bargaining away more and more of their assets in attempts to
win his freedom, in 1977 American brother-in-law Steve Psinakis
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engineered a daring jaiibreak in which the two detainees successfully made
their way to the United States.
The Lopez story is symptomatic of what happened throughout the
Philippines following martial law. As mentioned, a new oligarchy succeeded
the old. These became known as crony capitalists. Cronies ranged from
powerful associates such as Eduardo Cojuangco and Bobby Benedicto to ei-
Marcos intimates such as Herminio Disini and Antonio Floriendo. Disini won
his infamy for his role in the Herdis-Westinghouse deal for the Bataan
Nuclear Power Project, a project started in the mid-seventies that has yet to
produce a watt of energy. Disini now lives in reported comfort in Europe.
Floriendo, who was a close personal friend of the Marcos', received his initial
break when he was allowed to lease property on the Davao Penal Colony for
his banana plantation, the Tagum Development Corporation. He then became
involved in sugar refinement, banking, finance, oil and shipping. The
stranglehold on the Philippines two biggest industries, sugar and coconuts,
was held by Benedicto and Cojuangco. respectively. Their control over these
vital agricultural sectors was all-inclusive. Finally there are the assets of the
Marcos and Romualdez families themselves, and perhaps no one will ever
know the true extent of their holdings. Estimates now run as high as 10
billion dollars. At any rate, the immense wealth represented by these few
was in stark contrast to the increasing poverty felt throughout much of the
country. As the level of poverty, the national debt, and the number of
presidential proclamations grew, so grew the numbers in the NPA. Until the
very end of the Marcos time in power it was widely held that he created
more communists than he killed.
An equally disturbing pattern in most minds was the slow erosion of
constitutional authority from the system of checks and balances inherited
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from the United States to a virtual one-man rule. The constitution in force at
the end of the 1960s was the 1935 Constitution which was inherited from
the era of American administration. One of its provisions was that the
president was allowed only two terms in office. In 1970 the Constitutional
Convention, or Con-Con, was called into being, and it convened in 1971.
Originally mandated as a nonpartisan body, it quickly became extremely
partisan, and bitter months were spent hammering out a draft constitution.
This was accomplished in November of 1972. The draft constitution called
for a parlimentary system, in the British style, with a prime minister who
would speak for the majority bloc of the national legislature. The president's
powers would be sharply curtailed, and be would assume a much more
ceremonial role. Two actions negated the effect of this intention, and much
to the contrary, strengthened the presidency. The first was the addition
after martial law was pronounced, of Article XVII. the Transitory Provisions.
Within the Transitory Provisions were procedures for the creation of an
interim National Assembly (Batasang Pambansa) that would sit until
elections could be called for a regular body. The interim Batasang was to be
composed of the incumbent president, vice president, the members of the
1935 Constitutional bicameral legislature that desired to remain, and the
Con-Con delegates that voted for Article XVII. Where the opposition really
split was over the provisions regarding the presidency. The Transitory
Provisions specified that the president would retain his existing powers
under the 1935 Constitution as well as assuming the powers of both the
president and the prime minister under the (new) 1973 Constitution. Added
to this clause was one which gave the president the ability to henceforth rule
by decree. Such decrees were to be law, and were not limited to the period
of martial law. The opposition members of the Convention had long feared
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the direction that the new constitution might take. As early as September of
1971 they had proposed and fought through (161-25) a clause which would
eliminate the possibility of Marcos or any member of his family from holding
the presidency under the new constitution. During the next year Marcos
mustered all of his considerable forces, and under strong pressure from
Malacanang the Con-Con did away with their ban-Marcos clause, 155-31.
The creation of the barangays. by decree, on December 31. 1972
provided a means of greater control of popular expression from the top. On
January 7. 1973. the following questions were put to the barangays for
discussion and subsequent voting:
• should the draft constitution be ratified?
• did the provisions of martial law have popular support?
• was the New Society the will of the people?
• should the interim National Assembly be convened?
• was Marcos running the country in a manner they approved of?
• should national elections scheduled for November 1973. be held?
• should the draft basic law be adopted?
• should martial law remain in force?
In referring these questions to the barangays the president superseded a
national referendum which was to have been held on January 17th. The
barangay review process took place between January 10th and 15th. At the
end of the "consultative" period, which of course was also a lobbying period.
a "vote" was taken by means of a show of hands at the barangay level of ail
citizens older than 14. The approval of these measures was announced on
January 17th by President Marcos. He proclaimed that a clear and
overwhelming majority of the citizenry had backed his proposals and so
declared the draft constitution passed and ratified. Additionally, however.
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he stated that the will of the people had revealed that they did not desire
the interim National Assembly to convene, that martial law should be
continued, and that elections should be suspended until 1981.
He had in effect legally'* assumed all constitutional authority. What
the president offered the people was a society with renewed discipline,
stability, and enhanced economic development at the cost of reduced
personal and political freedom. For many this seemed a fair bargain. The
opposition was forced underground, the jailed were largely voiceless, and the
silent majority was just that. A major casualty of the change was the media.
The Philippine press had a long record as the most active and colorful
in Asia, but it soon degenerated into a predictable set of government
mouthpieces. The same was true of television. Channel Four became the
govenment station, administered by the Office of Media Affairs, and the
others were owned by cronies of the President. In the days following
Marcos' departure newsmen came forth with stories of copy either sent
directly from the palace, or written elsewhere, but pre-approved by the
president prior to release. In the months preceding the election of February
1986, as international scrutiny became more and more intense, opposition
press did emerge, and above it all the voice of the Catholic radio station.
Radio Veritas, carried the opposition viewpoint. The power of this
"alternative" press cannot be overemphasized. The opposition papers were
sold out every day after printing, and often foreigners desiring copies would
have to search for blocks.
So for 14 years the Philippines existed under the autocratic rule of one
man and his wife. Imeida became both the Governor of Metro Manila and
the Minister of Human Settlements. Son Ferdinand. (Bong-Bong) became a
provincial governor, daughter Imee a member of the National Assembly.
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reinstituted in December 1977 after a plebiscite, and Imeldas favorite
brother Benjamin (Kokoy) became the Philippine Ambassador to the United
Slates.
True to his word the President did oversee improvements, and during
the early 70s the Philippines was the talk of Southeast Asia. Lawlessness
did drop dramatically, and thousands of privately owned firearms were
turned in. Foreign debts were restructured, and import substitution policies
gave way to flashy marketing schemes for indigenous eiport items. Non-
traditional exports such as Filipino handicrafts were encouraged, and a
young electronics industry was launched. The commodity markets for
copper, copra and sugar were good, and an increasing number of sought-
after Filipino workmen were repatriating hard currency from the middle
east. Marcos pushed for the green revolution in new hybrids of rice and
within a few years the country had become self-sufficient in rice. The
national government centralized more and more services and built
infrastructure. Dams, roads and rural electrification were meaningful
projects that had valid intentions.
Martial law was not all good. Lesser men found ways to subvert the
positive public good for private gain, and eventually this greed reached
Malacanang. On top of this the world energy crisis of 1973-74, disastrous
market prices for both sugar and copra, and runaway borrowing combined to
produce the economic chaos of the 1980s. There is no doubt that all of the
ills of the Philippine economy and culture cannot be laid at Marcos s
doorstep alone. Responsibility is another thing. Having taken on the
absolute constitutional authority to personally direct government, he had
also taken on the responsibility for it's progress. The lavish lifestyle of him
and his cronies increasingly served as an irritant to a public whose slice of
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the pie was getting ever smaller. It was this simmering inequity that
provided the fuel for peaceful revolution. The spark was the assassination of
Ninoy Aquino.
Aquino had been in prison for five years when a military tribunal
sentenced him to death in 1977. He had survived fasts—one of them for 40
days—and he survived his death sentence too. After the announcement of
the sentence the public outcry, in the Philippines and around the world, was
such that President Marcos saw that Aquino received a reprieve. On March
19, 1980, he had a heart attack. After deliberation. President Marcos
allowed Aquino to travel to the United States for heart surgery. Prior to
leaving he signed a statement which promised his return to the Philippines
following surgery, and to abstain from making political statements. He went
to the Baylor Medical Center in Dallas with Cory and the family, and the
triple by-pass operation was a complete success. He accepted fellowships at
Harvard and M.l.T. and considered his position. For approximately three
months he remained silent, but eventually his convictions overcame his
sense of responsibility to Marcos and he re-emerged as the leading
opposition voice.
On the basis of conversations he had had with Filipinos in exile, and
opposition members in the Philippines he constructed a speech, delivered on
August 4. 1980, in which he warned Marcos of an incipient revolution. The
speech made headlines in the Philippines and provoked an immediate
response from a scathingly derogatory President Marcos. He derided the
idea that urban guerillas were in being and that the situation in the
Philippines was at all tense. In the end he questioned Aquino's sanity.
Within a month a timed series of bombings had occurred in Manila,
claimed by the April 6th Movement. The movement was named for a day in
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1978, one day prior to the national election for the interim National
Assembly. In this stage-managed election' Aquino was allowed by the
president to run as the leading candidate from his own party, the LAB AN2
party—albeit from his prison ceil. As a last minute sop to the American
press, which was beginning to criticize the obviously flawed election. Marcos
allowed Aquino to face government commentators in a live television debate.
Public support of Aquino s performance was widespread. On April 6th, the
night prior to the election, the opposition staged a noise barrage--a dramatic
signal to the government that all was not well. For a short while anyone
dissatisfied with the status quo had a forum, and Manila resounded with the
cacophony of herns, firecrackers, pots and pans—whatever was available to
make noise. To no one s surprise the president's party candidates won across
the board the following day.
In 1981 President Marcos lifted martial law, stating that it's goals had
been achieved. Others saw no improvement in the condition of the country,
which was still plagued by the same old problems, some of which were now
worse. Mrs. Aquino states that her husband never wavered in his desire to
return to the Philippines. I will never forgive myself if I did not at least
try', he said. His intent had been modified by conditions in the Philippines
and by reports of the president s failing health. Aquino saw the possibility
of convincing Marcos that he should normalize now and return the country
to democracy.
He returned on 21 August 1985, traveling with an entourage of
reporters and friends, including his brother-in-law, reporter Ken
2LABAN, meaning fight, is an acronym for the Tagalog phrase Lakas ng
Bayan. This left of center party was strengthened by Lorenzo Tanada, who
became one of Cory's chief supporters.
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Kashiwahara. They routed their flight through Singapore and Taipei in an
effort to avoid attention, but Philippine Airlines had alerted the Taiwanese
security forces of his presence, so it was obviously known that he was on his
way. There had been much high level discussion of his return, including a
meeting in New York with Imeida in which she allegedly offered him a
million dollars to set up a business if he would settle anywhere but the
Philippines. He was repeatedly warned that there were assassination plots
against him and asked not to come. More significantly he was told by
Imeida that the President was no longer in control of all factions of the
government. Whether this was a warning that his safety could not be
assured or the truth is unclear.
There was speculation that the military leadership was in fact gaining
independent strength. On July 31st the President reinitiated the death
sentence, and on August 2 Defense Minister Enrile cabled Aquino saying that
there was definite evidence of a plot on his life and asking that he postpone
his trip for a month. Aquino agreed to this; it appears now that the month
may have been utilized by Marcos to obtain a kidney transplant. The trip
did occur on August 14. flying from Los Angeles to Singapore. He arrived in
Taipei via Hong Kong on August 19. spending the next two days in his hotel
room being interviewed. On the final leg he donned a bulletproof vest. It
did him no good when he was fatally shot once in the head within minutes of
landing in Manila.
The shock and furor over his death rocked Manila, and was felt
throughout the world as well. Outrage in the Philippines reached an all-time
high, and the government mandated the Agrava Commission to examine the
circumstances of the death. Over the months that the Commission was in
session they listened to hundreds of witnesses, and examined video and still
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photographic evidence. Their findings clearly implicated the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, and specifically General Fabian Ver, the Chief of Staff and
Marcos' closest ally. Marcos immediately claimed no knowledge of the
assassination plans and expressed grief. During a private interview that I
had on February 5, 1986, with a woman on the Presidents personal staff.
she told me that she was present when the news of Aquino s shooting was
received by the President, and that he was indeed shocked by it. According
to this eyewitness, the President immediately picked up the phone and
called a military subordinate, who he "chewed out" for allowing such a thing
to happen. When he hung up he allegedly had tears in his eyes. In light of
other statements made by the interviewee, many of which turned out to be
verifiable, I have little doubt that she was telling the truth. Whether Marcos
was a talented actor or truly not involved in the shooting remains to be seen.
The findings of the Agrava Commission were disregarded when the courts
aquitted all of the indicted. A short while later the President reinstated Ver
as the Chief of Staff. Now there may never be a definitive answer. At the
time it didn't matter. Ninoy had been killed.
In the wake of the death the country mourned, placing the
responsibility for the crime on the Marcos regime. The government
scrambled to find a way out of it's predicament, and a widow's resolve began
to harden. The confrontation was not to take place for three more years, but
the event itself led to the direct involvement of millions of Filipinos in the
politics of their country.
Over a million marched to the funeral, starting down the fateful path
that would lead directly to the gates of Malacanang.
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III. THE OPPOSITION SOLIDIFIES
Following Ninoy's assassination "the opposition" became less a
platform for disaffected politicians and more of a popular front. In the
months that followed the funeral the MetroManila area was the scene of
huge demonstrations and rallies against the Marcos regime. The killing was
the catalyst that drove the nation to assert its anger against the economic
stagnation, corruption, and human rights violations that they had borne in
silence. Aquino, a very human politician, was killed; a martyr was born. His
every word became prophecy, the creed and testament of a new movement.
"People Power " was created by this single national tragedy.
On May 14, 1984, the country held national legislative elections. A
plebiscite held on January 27, 1984, had voted into being two constitutional
amendments. The first replaced regional representation in the National
Assembly with provincial. This was an effort to minimize friction between
different provincial groups that might live within the same region. In the
past, the vote of a particular assemblyman might affect provinces
differently. It also eliminated block voting, in which a citizen voting by
party would automatically vote for every candidate on the ballot in that
party. Secondly, the amendment created the office of the Vice-President,
and a rule of succession in which the Speaker of the Assembly would
succeed the Presidency should it become vacant prior to the 1987 election.
President Marcos allowed these amendments to pass in an effort to show
reform, and because they were unlikely to make any inroads on his power.
The opposition put forth two major coalitions. One was Ninoy's
LABAN. In 1982 a new party was formed, the Philippine Democratic Party.
It's founders were Luis Jose and Aquilino Pimentel, a well-known politician
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from Mindanao. Their honorary leader was also Tanada; five months after
it's creation the PDP and LABAN merged to form the PDP-LABAN.
By far the most organized party, and the most centrist in nature, was
the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO). UNIDO had it's roots
in the 1980 Covenant for National Freedom alliance, a group of 72 nationalist
leaders who signed a covenant calling for:
1
)
the end of the Marcos dictatorship.
2) the end of martial law, and subsequent free and fair elections.
3) the rectification of national economic self-sufficiency, human rights and
dignity, and social justice.
4) national reconciliation (primarily with respect to the Moro question).
5) "liberation and protection of our country and people from ail forms of
foreign domination".
In 1981 they had petitioned the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) for an
extension of the campaigning period to 120 days from 55, for equal access
to the media, a verification of the accuracy of the voter registration rolls, and
for a reconstitution of the COMELEC itself along truly non-partisan lines.
When these measures were not forthcoming they boycotted the election. In
April 1982, under the leadership of Assemblyman Salvador H. (Day) Laurel,
the UNIDO acronym was reassigned to a coalition of some dozen disparate
parties. In the new organization a moderate alternative to Marcos was
proposed, with a platform emphasizing freedom in the electoral process, the
curtailment of presidential authority, and the freeing of political prisoners.
Senator Aquino was a vice-president for External Affairs, and Raul
Manglapus was the vice-president for Foreign Affairs. Though the Laurel
and Aquino factions had their differences, in June 1983, just prior to Ninoy's
death, they reconciled in preparation for the national elections.
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Campaigning for the National Assembly seats was vigorous, and the
opposition put up a momentous struggle for support. On the other hand, the
Marcos' political machine seems to have underestimated the necessity for
effort on their part. In particular. Imeida's territory. MetroManiia, was a
bitter pill to swallow when the opposition candidates swept ail but one of the
seats. When viewed against the backdrop of her own keen sense of
organization this showing was doubly embarrassing. After the dust had
settled the opposition had put over 60 of the 183 contested seats in office;
49 were UNIDO and 6 were PDP-LABAN. This was far in excess of the 25-30
seats that the President's intimates had estimated and a serious threat to the
President s powerbase. the New Society Movement.
The inspiration for the creation of LABAN had been the 1 978 creation
of Marcos' own KBL 1 party. It attracted the remnants of the Nacionalista
Party, under whose banner he had come into office in 1965, as well as
descendants from the traditional Liberal Party. The Machiavellian brilliance
of it's inception is difficult to fault. As members, Marcos sought those who
would owe their first allegiance to him. and he excluded no one desirous of
the new affiliation. In concert with the barangay structure the new party
further solidified the government's close hold on public opinion, services,
disbursements, and above all organization. In short order the KBL had
branches throughout the government bureaucracy. The Nacionalista and
Liberal party names were no longer in vogue.
Meanwhile the opposition was forging a competitive realignment of
it's forces. When the Liberal Party divided in two. one branch was led by
Eva Kaiaw, who ran for Vice President in the 1986 election against Laurel
and Arturo Tolentino. The other, and more viable of the two was that led by
^lusang Bagong Lipunan, or New Society Movement.
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ex-Senator Jovito Salonga. He had remained active in political life following
the grenade attack at Plaza Miranda in 1969, although he was wounded and
subsequently lost an eye. Following the imposition of martial law he went
into exile in the United States. In 1981, after a bombing at a convention of
the American Association of Travel Agents in Manila, Salonga, although in
the United States, was one of 30 opposition leaders for whom President
Marcos issued arrest orders. Salonga joined the opposition. So did Jose
Diokno, who, in spite of his strong stand against the U.S. bases in the
Philippines, was also in the United States for treatment of his medical
problems. As the need for unity against Marcos became critical after the
snap election was proposed, Diokno might well have been a serious candidate
had he not been fighting brain cancer.
The radical left was reflected politically in the Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan (Bayan) Party. It was primarily through the members of BAYAN
that the stinging indictments of the "U.S.- Marcos Dictatorship" came, and key
issues of theirs were the U.S. bases and nuclear policy. On the basis of these
two issues Tanada was influential with Bayan. Their political power was
centered in the central Visayas and Mindanao, and it was hoped that they
could be persuaded to back Cory as a result of Tanada's closeness to her.
This would greatly widen her power base, which was primarily in Makati
(the business section of Manila), Tarlac, her home province, and in Cebu.
Between May 1984, and November 1985. the opposition took strength
from it's better-than-expected showing in the National elections, and from
increasing U.S. criticism of the Marcos regime. During hearings before the
Subcommittees on East Asian and Pacific Afrairs of the Committee on Foreign
Relations of both the Senate and the House of Representatives in September
of 1984. the Subcommittee Chairmen. Representative Stephen J. Solarz and
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Senator Frank H. Murkowski, delved deeply into Philippine affairs and U.S.
interests. Their witnesses included noted academics and governmental
officials knowledgable of the Philippines. The questioning was prompted by
concern on two levels: one, was the growth of the NPA a precursor to
communist destabilization of the country and the potential loss of the U.S.
bases there, and two, how best were U.S. interests served vis a vis President
Marcos and political conditions in the Philippines.
As eipected, the testimony ranged from the realpolitik of the Defense
Departments Richard Armitage to the optimistic and hopeful Professor David
Joel Steinberg of Brandeis University. What was significant was that this
high level body was concerned with conditions in the Philippines and put
forth extraordinary effort in ascertaining the answers to their questions.
There is no doubt that from an Administration viewpoint the communist
insurgency and the growth of the NPA was the most alarming condition.
The role of the U.S. bases at Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Station
in protecting our vital national interests made such a priority natural. But
interestingly, as the testimony went on. and the subcommittee became
expert on the Philippine situation the emphasis changed. In no one was this
more evident than in the House Chairman. Stephen Solarz. Over the neariy
two year period that he was gathering testimony he became a leading and
outspoken critic of President Marcos. His primary focus shifted from U.S.
national security to the promotion and survival of Philippine democratic
institutions. He took particular affront at the wealth and lifestyle of the
Marcos" and diligently sought evidence that this wealth was related to U.S.
aid disbursements.
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In March 1985, testimony was given before the subcommittee
pertaining to Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Years 1986-87. As he
opened the testimony on March 6, Chairman Solarz commented:
The deteriorating situation in the Philippines is a cause of deep
concern. A discredited leadership, a declining economy, and a growing
communist insurgency have placed the future of the Philippines, a
nation with which the United States has had a long and historic
relationship, in jeopardy.
The United States must be careful to avoid falling into another
Iranian or Nicaraguan situation, where our support for undemocratic
and repressive regimes ultimately led to the demise of our formerly
close relationships with both countries and the coming to power of
successor governments which, in many respects, were even worse
than those they replaced.
I fervently hope, both for our own sake and for the sake of the
Filipino people, than (sic) we can do better now than we did in those
two previous unfortunate and tragic situations.
During the day's testimony Dr. Claude Buss of the Naval Postgraduate School.
was asked for his assessment of the opposition's attempts to unify and
whether the opposition could field a single presidential candidate should
Marcos call early elections. In his answer he was careful to establish his
caution with regard to UN1DO. emphasizing that it was a coalition, not a
party. He posed the possibility of a Pimintel- Aquino or a Laurel-Kalaw
ticket, and with prescience made the point that Mrs. Aquino was a "powerful
unifying influence', and "persuasive and highly respected ". Dr. Buss' final
reflection was that the theme of the opposition was "First, Get Marcos Out",
but that that might not be good enough to win a national election. As the
ensuing months were to prove, that was nearly the case.
During a live television interview with Sam Donaldson and
conservative columnist George Will on November 4, 1985. President Marcos,
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apparently irritated at pointed questions about his policies and support,
suddenly announced that he would hold a "snap" election on 17 January
1986, well ahead of it's scheduled 1987 date. He added that the vice-
president would be decided at the polls as well, but that the final decision on
the election would be determined by the national assembly. More vexing to
the opposition was his contention that he would remain in the presidency
through the election, an action that was in conflict with the constitution.
In the minds of the opposition the early election posed two problems:
the first and most obvious was the credibility of the whole affair. The
national assembly was still two thirds KBL and could easily negate the
proposed polling until the scheduled 1987 date, thus giving Marcos a
publicity bonanza in his willingness ' to take on all comers without any real
danger of losing. Secondly, the opposition had to take the announcement
seriously from the first if they were to mount any kind of a campaign. To do
that they had to first field a single candidate who could win. If more than
one candidate emerged from the opposition Marcos would have a virtually
unopposed—and hence legitimate— mandate to remain in Malacanang. In
attempting to achieve unity the opposition had formed the National
Unification Council (NUC) which had as it's membership the major opposition
party leadership and candidates. In November of 1985 the NUC was under
the leadership of retired Supreme Court justice Celia Munoz-Palma, and all
accounts were that the most probable and effective ticket would be a
combination of Laurel, with his experience, and Aquino, with her personal
magnetism and popular appeal. As Justice Munoz-Palma attempted to steer
the Council through the options open to it—and there were many—she found
herself torn between Cory's self-effacing hesitation to run and Laurels
overwhelming desire to run. She quit in anger after a tiff with presidential
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aspirant Laurel, and the NUC found itself virtually unable to function.
Clearly, settlement would have to come from a source outside the
political realm. The answer was the Roman Catholic Church. In a country
which is 85% Roman Catholic-- practicing Catholics- -the church is a potent
force in people's lives. The head of the church in the Philippines is Jaime
Cardinal Sin. Archbishop of Manila. Cardinal Sin has been a long time critic
of the excesses during the Marcos years, although he sought to couch his
critique in terms of suggested reforms while urging moderation to the
opposition. Over the last five years, however, he had become more and more
outspoken in his criticism. Under his leadership the so-called "Jesuit Mafia"
in Manila, headed by Ateneo de Manila University president Father Joaquin
Bernas. had begun preparing for the possibility of an early chance at
elections. Father Bernas was close to Cory Aquino, and she grew to trust and
depend upon his advice. Eventually the church was convinced that she
offered the best alternative to Marcos, and she in turn chose Bernas as one of
her closest advisors, a member of her "inner circle".
Cardinal Sin met with both Cory and Doy Laurel during the tense pre-
election period when each was unsure of the best course of action. For
Laurel this was the raison d' etre of his entire professional life. In training,
temperment, and family background he was prepared to assume the
Presidency. There might never again be such a confluence of factors
favoring him, and so the internal pressure to remain free to campaign was
tremendous. For Cory it was totally different. This was not a role she
sought, nor was she convinced that she offered the best choice for her
people. She recognized the lack of training that she brought with her and
dreaded the loss of privacy that campaigning would bring. She early
stipulated that she would only run if a petition campaign came up with a
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million signatures in support of her presidency; this was accomplished with
no difficulty. Beyond the church, Cory had the support of the Manila
business community, which had become an extremely vocal and powerful
force in the moderate opposition. Her primary booster in Makati was Jaime
Ongpin, president of the Benguet Corporation and brother of Bobby Ongpin,
one of President Marcos staunchest allies.
The longer the unification process continued the more apparent it
became that she was the only candidate acceptable to everyone—except Doy.
Others that had stepped aside in their own aspirations, Salonga, Pimentel,
and Dioknofor example, would accept her as a presidential , but not a vice-
presidential candidate. The reconciliation between her and Laurel see-
sawed back and forth throughout the last half of November and the early
part of December. On December 2 President Marcos signed into law the bill
passed by the National Assembly making February 7 the election day. The
official campaign period was set at 57 days, and the pressure to field a
candidate was really on. December 7th saw reports from the Aquino camp
that "unity has been achieved", and Laurel stated, We will make a very
important announcement as to who will be the official candidate of the
united opposition...to topple this unwanted and repugnant regime.
"
2 It was
reported that Cory expressed surprise at this statement, and offered only
that she would wait until Sunday the 8th. By the time Sunday had arrived
things were as unsettled as ever. Early that morning Laurel had announced
that unity talks with Mrs. Aquino had broken down, and the primary
obstacle seemed to be one of party affiliation. Mrs. Aquino had indicated her
desire to run for the presidency under the Laban ng Bayan party banner,
with Laurel as vice-presidential candidate running under UNIDO. Laurel
2Monterev Peninsula Herald. 6 December 1985.
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criticized this proposal, pointing out that under electoral law in such an
arrangement a vote for one would not automatically be a vote for the other.
Mrs. Aquino's answer was to extend an offer to form a 'grand coalition"
under which they could both run. Though both spoke of the need for
personal sacrifice in achieving their goal, neither was able to find the right
combination. Meanwhile international observers became increasingly
skeptical of the opposition's commitment. Because unification seemed an
impossibility, the KBL was smug.
On Tuesday, 10 December Salvador Laurel registered as a candidate
for the presidency, saying that there was now no chance that he would run
as Mrs. Aquino s vice-president. At this point Cardinal Sin stepped in to
mediate. He met with each candidate separately and then together. They
hammered out a compromise in which Laurel would accept the number two
position, but both would run under the UNIDO banner. On the following day
Laurel and Aquino arrived at the COMELEC office an hour prior to the end of
the filing deadline and registered their candidacy. In answer to reporters
Mrs. Aquino said of Laurel, "I'm very grateful today for this very great
sacrifice.' For his part Laurel affirmed that, "It means that I am
subordinating personal interests to national interest. "3 Across the country
the opposition began to see the faint chance of victory.
At Malacanang, President Marcos had been running through his own
vice-presidential options. The most often speculated was Imelda, his wife,
but she allegedly did not want the nomination, and would refuse. Other
candidates mentioned as possibilities were Defense Minister Enrile. Prime
Minister Cesar Virata, or Labor Minister Bias Ople, but at least Enrile and
Ople had previously made statements to the effect that they would certainly
3Monterev Peninsula Herald. 12 December 1985.
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entertain consideration as future KBL presidential candidates post- Marcos.
Then too, they are strong-willed and capable men, and not the type for
Marcos to have crowding him. The best candidate would be one that didn't
pose a threat, brought in voters from territory Marcos did not traditionally
hold, and gave an indication of reform without any real substantive change.
On Wednesday, 1 1 December he arrived at a choice which seemed to
fit the bill. Arturo Tolentino. 74, was a former Foreign Minister who had
been fired by Marcos in February of 1985 for his oft publicly stated views in
opposition to those of the President. In answer to the question. What are
the qualifications needed for your successor?", he replied, He must never
disagree with the president. " His past stance had called for reduction of the
president's decree making powers, a repeal of Marcos family immunity, and
ironically, for cancellation of the snap election on the grounds that it was
unconstitutional. Not surprisingly, after his nomination he called off his
scheduled fight of the election's constitutionality in the Supreme Court. He
was the only KBL assemblyman who had won in MetroManila in the 1984
election and hence could buoy up a weak Marcos region, and he was viewed
by those in the KBL as a reformer ". Finally, at 74 there was little likelihood
that he could oust Marcos after the presumably successful election.
The two tickets were set. The election was now only 27 days away
and the campaigning had to begin in earnest. The road show was on.
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IV. THE CAMPAIGN
Whenever I think of the campaign that, eventually brought Cory
Aquino to power I will always remember yellow. Her party's color since
Ninoy's fateful homecoming, yellow became the symbol of the cause, the
campaign and the candidate. While Doy Laurel and his family stuck to the
green color which was symbolic of UNIDO, everyone around Cory adopted
her characteristic yellow...t-shirts, streamers, posters, bumper stickers et ai.
By the time I arrived to observe the election she was wearing yellow dresses
and yellow eyeglass frames. The people loved it.
To call her crowds enthusiastic is simply a gross understatement.
They were euphoric, hopeful, optimistic, feisty, and concerned. Rather than
being totally swept up in the fiesta- like atmosphere, they listened intently to
the statements, the promises, and the arguments. Having been denied real
democratic access since 1972 they were not about to take anything for
granted. In rally after rally she spoke to the crowds from truckbeds,
impromptu stages, basketball courts, and open places along the roadside. In
typical Filipino fashion her rallies were more than just political forums: they
included some entertainment, occasionally fireworks, and the opportunity to
mingle and talk with neighbors about hope and the future.
The President put on more elaborate productions. He hired the most
famous personalities, singers, and comedians to warm up the crowd,
splashed the area with huge banners and signs, and in what had always been
heretofore acceptable political behavior, provided compensation for
attendance. Perhaps rice, perhaps some always-needed pesos. The meager
assets of the Aquino-Laurel coffers couldn't be spent in such a manner, but
surprisingly, this time it wasn't necessary. The people came in droves on
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their own, to see Cory, to be a part of an historic movement. If they were
too poor to afford one of her t-shirts they dyed one of their own. One
woman I saw had made her top out of a yellow bathtowel.
It was on the campaign trail that Cory really came into her own. She
wound her way throughout the provinces, went up into Pangasinan, and
down to Cebu and Mindanao. She grew a little during each stop. As she
witnessed the people coming out to see her, to hear her. often in streaming
rain, she began to become the real center of the campaign. She had started
as a symbol of her dead husband, as the "anyone but Marcos" candidate.
Now she had become the one person needed to rally support, and Ninoy had
become a symbol. As she grew she learned.
In early January she made the mistake of telling supporters in Baguio
City that she would allow communists to participate in the government,
when she meant to say participate in the political process. Marcos leaped at
this gaffe, pointing to it as evidence that she was soft on communists and
would encourage the insurgency to grow. She countered with a press
conference in which she corrected her earlier statement, saying. "So long as
Communists renounce ail forms of violence, we welcome them into the
government...all Filipinos who sincerely desire to help the government and
the country are very welcome. I would like to assure everybody here that I
will not appoint a Communist to my Cabinet." 1 Her theory was that the vast
majority of insurgents were driven by economic and social deterioration, and
estrangement from the political process. While not suggesting that opening
up free dialogue would eliminate the hardcore, she sought to undermine
their non-ideological support and lessen the degree of military involvement
in the solution.
iNew York Times. 7 January 1 986.
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To counter Marcos' charges that she had no platform, that it was a
proposed government without programs, she began to outline them at major
speeches. On January 6, while speaking before some 700 persons at a joint
meeting of various business and management associations, she outlined her
economic program. On the 16th she presented the social program in Davao,
and finally on January 23 she delivered the speech Tearing down the
Dictatorship. Rebuilding the Democracy to the joint Rotary Clubs of
MetroManila. In this description of her political platform she carried on a
theme which her strategist, Mark Brown, had introduced at a huge rally in
Mindanao—that Marcos was a coward. This tact was so effective, and so
crucial towards demonstrating her position as a person of strength, that I
have reproduced the text of the Mindanao speech:
I am here in Mindanao in the midst of the violence and devastation
that Mr. Marcos has wrought. And I am not afraid to be here. But Mr.
Marcos is.
I accuse Mr. Marcos of cowardice because he has not come to
Mindanao in the past 10 years to see for himself the horrible effects of
his greed, his brutality and his ignorance.
I accuse Mr. Marcos of cowardice because he will not stand before
me and dare to hurl his charges in my face and let my answers be
heard.
1 accuse Mr. Marcos of cowardice because he needed over 2,000
troops to kill one man—Ninoy Aquino. And he has the gall to say he
fought off hordes of Japanese soldiers at Besang Pass. What a laugh.
I accuse Mr. Marcos of cowardice because he whimpers about a
little scratch in his hand and ignores the hole that his people blew in
the face of Jeremias de Jesus and the mangled bodies of the Opposition
after the grenade attack he launched at them in Plaza Miranda.
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I accuse Mr. Marcos of trying to cover up his cowardice with a
salad of military decorations none of which he ever earned in the field
of honor.
I challenge Mr. Marcos to stand up like a woman and answer my
charges of his cowardice with truth— if he dares.
From here on she pounded away at this theme, and there was little Marcos
could do to counter it. His illness made travel difficult. Furthermore, there
were areas of the country where he could not travel in safety. The McCoy
article on his medals came out and received wide coverage in the opposition
press and in the United States. Cory steadfastly refused uniformed security
forces around her, relying instead upon family members and a couple of
unarmed plainclothes security men. Marcos was carried through the crowds
on the shoulders of security men that were initially labelled as enthusiastic
supporters, and uniformed law enforcement personnel were much in
attendence. By contrast, I only saw one uniformed policeman at any of
Cory's rallies or assemblies, and he was busy putting an Aquino-Laurel
bumpersticker on the stock of his M- 16 Armalite.
The remainder of this story will have a personal cast to it, for I
arrived in the Philippines on 3 1 January to observe the election. Following
the story via the news service in the United States had prepared me with
certain biases, of which I quickly disabused myself. One such presupposition
was that the level of pre-election violence in the Philippines was fairly high,
another was that there was a significant degree of anti- American sentiment
in Manila. Nothing could have been farther from the truth. I stepped off
the Philippine Air Lines 747 into Manila and found it predominately the
same as remembered, but with an important difference. The difference was
in the political excitement generated by the people—all the people.
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Those things which struck me as being the same are best represented
by impressions:
• the distinctive humid, warm feel of the air, and the unmistakable odor
that is Southeast Asia.
• the noise of unrestricted traffic. Mufflers long since dead, but
unburied; horns blaring and the continual dialogue of competing
drivers communicating imminent disaster avoidance by means of
those horns.
stopping for a red light; the cab I'm in is beseiged by fatalistic, but
undaunted gum, cigarette and newspaper hawkers. A bedraggled,
lone woman begging at the window, an obviously well-fed
baby on her hip.
• the well dressed and successful Filipino riding in air conditioned
insularity behind tinted windows in shining, late-model cars that
somehow remain undented in the chaos that surrounds them.
• the lilting, happy patter of Tagalog between a little girl and her father
upon her sighting a calesa, or horse-drawn carriage, on this warm
evening along Roias Blvd. Little girls and horses obviously share a
universal bond.
• a free concert in Jose Rizal Park draws a mildly appreciative crowd
who giggle appropriately at the slapstick antics of the MC and a
comedian. The Three Stooges are alive and well in Manila tonight.
• concern by every cabbie that 1 not while away precious hours of this
short life without "a partner ". The rejoinder that I am happily
married with a wife in America brings swift assurance that America is
a long way away.
And yet, as familiar and reassuring as these images were, there was a
palpably different spirit in the city, and the reason for it was only a week
away. While Americans were consumed with grief and intrigue over the
tragic loss of life in the space shuttle disaster, Filipinos were united in
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preparation for the February 7 Presidential Snap election. There were few
vertical surfaces in the city not festooned with political posters or stickers of
one side or the other, and it would take an army of MetroManila Aides 2 and
half of the bay to wash them away afterwards, a prospect that perhaps only
I was concerned with.
To get a feel for the political climate upon arriving, I took a highly
suspect and unofficial poll of waiters, cabbies, bellmen, masseurs and the
like; the following political views were expressed:
• the outcome is totally uncertain " at this point, (but Marcos will win)
• Aquino/Laurel offer the most hope for the most people
• 20 years is too long for any leader in any country (sorry FDR, you
were mentioned too...)
• sure the election process will have irregularities, but the Philippines is
not the only country in which this is so....
• one of those sampled was openly for Marcos/Tolentino (though he
asserted with assurance that Mrs. Aquino would actually receive the
vote of the majority).
• when asked to place themselves as the neit President and present
their first actions as such, not one person asked would venture a
reply. Is there an American cabbie alive who doesn't have a ready
opinion on the salvation of the Union?
• the New People's Army is strong in the provinces and growing overall.
• when I asked if Marcos did win, fairly or otherwise, would there be
trouble, the answer was yes. The respondent then sagely assured me
that if Aquino won, fairly or otherwise, there would be trouble.
2A program started by Imelda Marcos, the MetroManila Aides are general
sanitation-type workers who keep the main boulevards of Manila swept and
clean. They are recognizable by their straw, wide-brimmed hats, their
yellow shirts, and red bandanas.
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Traveling around the city one certainly felt a sense of excitement and
an almost carnival atmosphere. The Aquino/Laurel constituency was very
upbeat, with their bright yellow ribbons, banners, and bumper stickers very
much in evidence. While there didn't seem to be a distinct differentiation in
partisanship along economic lines—at least to the casual observer -there was
an obvious split along private and public sector lines. The public display of
Marcos materials on state-controlled agencies and corporations, and in
Marcos/crony businesses (such as the Manila Hotel) was blatant, while the
Cory campaign materials were usually found on private, middle class
properties and automobiles.
The media too was absolutely split along party lines, and there were
apparently no local media, either print or film, which were middle of the
road. Marcos controlled most of the newspapers, such as the Daily Ei press
and the Bulletin Today, and all of the television except the U.S. Armed Forces
Far Eastern Network (FEN), which is only receivable with a cable converter.
Channel 4 was an actual government station, and the others were owned by
cronies. The opposition found an outlet through the so called opposition
press such as the New Manila Times and the Malaya. It's primary wide
spectrum voice was the Catholic church radio, Radio Veritas (RV).
The savvy Mr. Marcos used every election campaign trick in the book.
Daily 2-4 full page ads in the newspapers recounted the various social
advances made under his administration; a 10% pay hike and cost-of-living
bonuses announced on February 1 for all government employees (including
the military) were retroactive to 1 January. There were headlines of NPA
terror squads coming into Manila, and government actions to save the
citizenry from them. A reprint of a February 2, 1944 article by Benigno
Aquino. Sr. appeared in the Tribune, praising (out of context) the Japanese
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occupiers and those Filipinos working with them. President Marcos signed
into law in a public ceremony a bill insuring that slum residents of over ten
years duration would not be evicted in order to expedite development of
such areas (a previous government program). Then there was the
announcement of various reform packages and a call for constitutional
change towards limitation of Presidential powers (no date given);
announcement of a new survey showing Marcos and the KBL well in the lead,
and so on.
The Aquino/Laurel statement was made most eloquently by its total
absence in most of the traditional media. The neit morning I went for a walk
around the Luneta Park area, taking in the Sunday picnickers and families
together on a day of holiday. There was a Marcos rally getting sorted out at
the grandstand. I took lots of pictures. There was also an ABC film crew out.
The rally seemed to really be a motorcade, and it was well organized. Many
CB radios, everything new, lots of police about. Interestingly enough, there
were no spectators, just participants. After getting the feel of the pro-
Marcos forces (who seem committed to me) I went to my companion's hotel.
Dr. Claude Buss and 1 were to do this trip together, and like me he was ready
to get at it. On the plane over he had sat next to Ditos Bondoc, the ex-
president of the Philippine Export-Guarantee Bank. Ditos was a key element
in an 8 million dollar transfer between Philippine businessman Vincente
Chuidian and Marcos. As a result of the publicity that the deal generated in
the States he was currently on the downside of Presidential favor, but still in
their employ. He had indicated that the President would most likely see Dr.
Buss the next day, and he would let him know if he heard. He also passed on
in conversation that the President was furious that none of his advisors or
Ministers had any specific solutions/ recommendations for reforms. This
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was certainly not what Marcos was putting out to the press. The party line
was that a comprehensive reform package was ready to be unleashed as
soon as he had the "mandate of the people".
The following day our first stop was the Soiidaridad Bookstore in
Ermita. It's near the corner of Mabini St. and Padre Faura, and is somewhat
of a landmark in the reform movement because of the stand of it's owner,
author Frankie S. Jose. Upon reaching the store we met Frankie's wife Tessie
on the street, and after warm greetings she informed us that Frankie had
gone to the Manila Hotel to meet with Stan Karnow. Upon our arrival at the
famous old hotel that had housed General Douglas McArthur, we first
proceeded to the Fourth Floor, where I had discovered the U.S. Embassy
Press Center. We met the USIA press coordinator. Mary Cariin; she was very
nice, and extremely helpful. She gave us the first look anyone had had at
the composition of the U.S. observer team headed by the chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.). I
gathered up a ton of press handouts and dropped them in my room and
headed for the lobby, to find Stan and Frankie. We did indeed meet them in
the lobby bar, and after I'd been introduced around we sat down to talk--a
rambling talk that lasted four hoursi Joining the table as the afternoon went
on were:
• Dr. Guy Pauker. the Rand Corporation, and a great Indonesia scholar.
• Drew Pearson, the producer of the Philippine documentary that Stan
Karnow is making.
• Edith Coliver. ex- of the State Department and now the head of the Asia
Foundation in the Philippines.
• Marty Pisner. Warren Wytophski, and Murray Edelman of the CBS News
Election Polling section.
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The conversation was fascinating, a blend of where-have-you-beens, what-
have-you-been-doings, have you seen s . and of course the election.
Interestingly enough, the three pollsters were very sure that cheating was
not possible, that NAMFREL. the National Movement for Free Elections,
would guarantee the double-checks necessary. No one else at the table held
this belief, Stan Karnow least of all. It was all he could do to keep his temper.
The three newsmen then owned up to the fact that it was not only their first
time in the Philippines, it was also their first time in Southeast Asia. This got
a knowing nod from the crowd, but the three remained firm in their belief.
Time would tell. Eventually hunger got the better of everyone and we broke
up for dinner. 1 was invited out with the rest of the group, an invitation I
wouldn't miss for the world. The conversation was fascinating, covering all
of Asia, and during dinner we were joined by Terence Smith, the CBS News
correspondent. On the walk back to the Manila Hotel. Stan Karnow and I had
a very interesting conversation on the current situation in Kampuchea, a
subject upon which he is very well informed. The presence of distinguished
and learned people such as this would make this more than just observation,
it would be a learning experience par excellence.
The paper the next morning was the same old Marcos propaganda, but
in a hotel owned by the Marcos' I guess you can't expect them to slip an
opposition paper under the door to your room each morning. After
breakfast I went to the Ristorante Roma in the hotel, for this morning, the
Third of February, was to be the first anniversary of the Kapihan ng Manila-
-an informal weekly breakfast club of the movers and shakers in Philippine
government and business. I sat down at an empty place that a man kindly
offered me and he turned out to be Carl Mydans, the famous Life magazine
(now working for Time) photographer. His son, Seth, is the New York Times
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correspondent covering the election. Carl introduced me to Mr. Jaime Lava,
the Minister of Education. Then Mr. Butch Millena, the Executive Assistant to
Prime Minister Caesar Virata joined the table. He was very charming, and
very sure that the President didn't have a worry in the world in the election.
The people are solidly behind him with the exception of a few malcontents.
"
It is at this encounter that I got my first taste of questioning the Marcos true
believers without letting my own ideological predictions get in the way of
"meaningful dialogue". I quickly found that my best line of questioning
came from asking a general question, such as what do you think ought to be
done with the economy?, and then just listening. Often what they didn't say
was as important as what they did say.
When Carl had to leave to do a "shoot" of Prime Minister Virata his
place was taken by a Mr. Chris Sherweil. of the Financial Times in Singapore.
He is well spoken and quite intelligent. He in turn introduced me to Mark
Fineman. who apparently had just recently gotten a job with the Los Angeles
Iimei edging out Guy Sacerdoti of the Far Eastern Economic Review .
Congratulations were the order of the day. At about 9:00 it became apparent
that little else of import was going to occur (the rumor that the First Lady
would show up turned out to be false).
By now we were agreed that it was about time to get together with
the opposition, and our contact there was Teddy Locsin. Jr.. Cory Aquinos
speechwriter. ( In the new Aquino government he is the Minister of
Information). I had met Teddy in a Southeast Asia seminar and was looking
forward to seeing him again. His father had been the publisher of the
Philippine Free Press, a famous and popular periodical prior to the Marcos
years, and it had taken an opposition stand during the beginning of the
Marcos excesses. When martial law was proclaimed in 1972. Teddy Locsin
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Sr., the publisher, was imprisoned. Since freed, he is living in Manila with
his wife. Teddy Jr. had started republishing the Free Press from the States,
where he is a lawyer, and Dr. Buss had been a consultant from the beginning.
It was upon his urging that Teddy decided to put the third issue out from
Manila. Now it had led to this.
Our taii driver took us to the only Aquino headquarters that he knew,
but this was the Makati area headquarters, and we were told there that we
wanted the Media Headquarters, in the Cojuangco Bldg.. in Legaspi Village.
In the first headquarters we were struck by the youth and the enthusiasm
of the volunteers. The place was teeming, and there was yellow everywhere.
They were suspicious of us at first, but on finding out that we really did
know what was going on in their country, and were not lined up on the
Marcos side, became extremely friendly and helpful. Upon arrival at the
Cojuangco Bldg. we immediately ran into Teddy, who was incredibly busy.
but looked totally involved, with the glow that that brings.
The action for the day was a speech that Cory was giving at the Hotel
Intercontinental for the combined American-Philippine Chambers of
Commerce. Teddy urged us to come along—as if anything could have
stopped us. The Intercon was an absolute madhouse, and we arrived at the
same time Cory did. This was the first real look at her movement up close,
and it shaped the way I saw them henceforth. The emotional outpouring
here was astounding, and very, very real. There were tickets available for
perhaps 500 persons, and yet there were at least 3000 there. The entire
lobby, mezzanine, bar. and stairways were jammed. We couldn t even get
close to the room in which she was speaking, and that was with her
speechwriter!
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We took a spot which was close to a closed circuit TV monitor. We
were all literally shoulder to shoulder, and I prayed that there was no fire,
or cry of fire! Once Cory started speaking I'm not sure even a fire would
have moved the crowd. I was hemmed in on all sides by ladies and as I
listened to the speech I was struck by how completely politicized these
women had become. They listened to every word, and nodded in silent
agreement to Cory's call for attention to the homefront prior to working on
foreign policy. This had the complete support of the crowd, and I later
congratulated Teddy on his tactic. Another speech element that had broad
appeal was the analogy she made of Marcos to a pharoah. "Let my People
go! Let the Filipino People go!", she cried, and the crowd began chanting.
Coreee, Coreee, Coreee!!!" Those that said that this 53 year old housewife
had no charisma were very wrong, and I suspect that among them were
those that were advising President Marcos. It was at this point that I first
began to change my mind about Mrs. Aquino. I had arrived from the States
convinced that she was a candidate of convenience, and that the voters
would be voting for anyone-but-Marcos. But after listening to her. and
watching the people in the audience, I became convinced that &he_ was the
candidate, and that she had become larger than herself; the housewife had
become lost within the candidate. Later Teddy agreed to this assessment,
saying that the change took place during the Mindanao rally, when almost a
million showed up in the rain to hear her. That clicked something inside of
her, and she became the leader, and the undeniable focus of the opposition.
Following the speech we made our way inch by inch to the lobby, and
found Teddy, who filled us in on some elements of the speech. He didn t
listen to the delivery, and was amazed that she had used the Pharaoh
analogy, saying that she hadn t liked it when it was first presented to her.
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He went on to say that she had become very independent about what she
says in public, often rewriting speeches, or deleting lines at will. This was a
big change from the beginning of the campaign, and further evidence that
she was growing ever stronger.
As we talked she came right by us, surrounded by well-wishers, and a
couple of staff. She looked tired, we all agreed, but was smiling happily, and
the public exposure was obviously good for her. Teddy mused that she was
very down on security, would allow no armed men around her, and no one in
anything looking like a uniform. She had refused bulletproof vests, armored
podiums. and any kind of special vehicle. This caused her security chief, a
retired colonel, recurrent nightmares, but she maintained that if they killed
her it would only mean that she would join Ninoy a little earlier. Point in
fact, to be seen with overt security then would have defeated the Marcos- as-
coward scheme. As this discussion was going on Teddy informed us
confidentially that Steve Psinakis, the rabidly anti- Marcos opposition figure
in the States, had informed them that there was a hit team on the way over
to kill, "one woman and four men", in the Aquino camp, and that they were
members of the Beowulf and Devil's Disciples gangs. After some consultation
the decision was made to go to the Embassy and relate the problem to the
Defense Attache. In this way he would be alerted, and could possibly offer
some advice.
On the way to the Embassy we stopped back at the headquarters and
met with Mark Brown. Mark is a Britisher who works for The Economist ,
and was allegedly in Manila on a leave of absence to help in the campaign as
a strategist. Some days later, at a dinner between the two of us he confided
in me that he was on the payroll of the D. H. Sawyer public relations firm in
New York, as well as being on the staff of The Economist, and that the firm
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had been hired to provide some expertise in campaign strategy. This made
much more sense, but throughout the campaign he stuck to the other story
to everyone else. Curious. Remember it was Mark who came up with the
Marcos-as-a-coward strategy; he is extremely sharp. While there we also
met Lupita Kashiwahara, Ninoys sister, who with his brother, serves as
Cory's campaign manager. Lupita is a television director in civilian life, and
is extremely competent in the management of the media.
Having finally gotten all the principals together we headed to the
Embassy where we had a private meeting with the Defense Attache. Colonel
HaJley. and the Regional Security Officer (RSO). To my amazement the
discussion—on an impending assassination attempt—was all very matter of
fact, and I realized that I had made another quantum leap in realpolitik.
This level of consideration is really no different than any other, and one
accommodates to it rapidly. Other than informing the Embassy, and alerting
their intelligence for possible corroboration this meeting struck me as being
pretty useless. The attache had no specific recommendations to make that
were acceptable, since Cory would not countenance any visible security
enhancements. Ail present agreed that a sweep of the area for explosives
must be made, and a request by Cory's security chief for metal detectors
brought assurance from the RSO that no such technology was available in the
Embassy, and that he would have to do a visual search himself were he in a
similar situation. The Aquino people made a plea for some smoke grenades
in case an emergency get away from tomorrows mass rally became
necessary for Cory. Col. Halley indicated with some exasperation that he had
no direct access to smoke grenades, but would see if he could get some
through the U.S. Navy at Subic Bay. Plainly he thought it a superfluous
request, as did I. but he was willing to play ball with them, if only to
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appease their sense of need. One concrete suggestion that Colonel Halley and
Dr. Buss had in common was that these threats be made known to
Malacanang Palace, the thought being that if the government was alerted
publicly they automatically assumed some responsibility for Cory's
protection, and if something did happen they couldn't say, well we can't be
held responsible, we didn't even know." The last thing the RSO said before
he left the meeting (plainly thinking that this was a bunch of amateurs
messing in his bailiwick) was that the rally tomorrow was not the likely
place for a hit, too many logistical problems. He would concern himself more
with her daily comings and goings, and in particular her home on Times
Street. With that the meeting ended.
I agreed with him.
My last impression of the meeting was that even in something as
fantastic as this, commonsense takes one a long way.
Before calling it a day I stopped for a nightcap in the Tap Room bar
and saw J. V. Cruz, the Philippine Ambassador to Great Britain. I'd been
introduced to him by someone at the breakfast meeting and stopped by his
table to say hello. He was very cordial, and obviously did not remember
who I was. Probably thought I was a journalist, and he was at his most
charming. The Ambassador was in Manila to campaign for the President,
and had temporarily "given up" his post for the privilege of working for the
President he believed in. Pardon me for cynicism, but this was a man
working for whom he believed would emerge the victor, and from whom he
could expect a reward. At any rate, he was very charming, and had been out
of the country so long that he has lost almost all his accent. Too bad that he
is so readable, he.would make a real asset for his country were he interested
in the country first and foremost.
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The following day was to be Cory day! After meeting Dr. Buss for
breakfast we headed to the U.S. Embassy to meet with Captain Dennis
Fowler, USAF, a Naval Postgraduate School graduate, and the Assistant Air
Attache. Dennis is sure that his time at NPS was well spent and that he has a
far better handle on things than he would have had he not attended. He in
turn introduced me to Captain Gilroy, USN, the Naval Attache.
Following our meeting 1 went to the Cojuangco Bldg. and met Teddy to
march to the Aquino rally. We would go from Makati. the business center, to
Luneta Park, a distance of probably 8 kilometers. There were to be no
buses, a Marcos ploy and logistical requirement, as the Aquino people could
not afford them. Instead there were five routes and everyone would march
and converge on the park. If it were a success there would be around a half
million people.
Prior to our setting out Teddy had some last minute things to settle
with Cory, and 1 waited in the Media "inner sanctum", a place with which I
was to become very familiar. I introduced myself to two very attractive
ladies who were providing screening inside the door; there was one of the
ubiquitous blue- uniformed armed security guards outside the doo-*. The
ladies were Lane and Babette Aquino, cousins of Ninoy. Both were typically
Filipina upper class in that they have lived abroad extensively, speak
Spanish, Tagalog, and English, are extremely well-spoken and at ease in any
social setting. It took very little time in Babette's company to establish that
she is independent, a businesswoman, and used to being escorted to social
affairs by the likes of Ambassadors, or at least Consuls General.
In telling this I do not mean to imply that all of Cory's supporters
were the upper class oligarchy. Most would probably have fallen in the
middle to lower middle class range, but family is another matter, and the
55
importance of family in Filipino politics cannot be overstressed. During the
hour or two that I had to wait for Teddy to wrap up things with Cory and get
ready for the march I had the opportunity to meet and talk with a Mr. Sidri,
a Muslim convert to the Cory camp. His case was special for several reasons,
and he was in the media room to be exploited, at least in a news sense. Mr.
Sidri is not only a Muslim from Mindanao, he is also lmelda Marcos s
nephew. Beyond that startling fact he is also a founding member of the
Moro National Liberation Front, the MNLF. which in the Philippines is like
saying in Belfast you were a founder of the IRA. Mr. Sidri told me he was a
banker by trade, and although he was somewhat hesitant to expound on his
recent endeavors he did tell me that he had split with the MNLF when their
methods began to favor terrorism. His contribution in its inception was the
arrangement of financing from Libya. Surprisingly. I did not find him anti-
U.S.. at least not on a personal basis. His conversion to the Aquino cause
could have a very positive effect on the tricky question of Muslim
separatism should Cory achieve the Presidency, and that is a question that
will face her.
When Teddy returned from his meeting with Cory he was
accompanied by "Chito" Ayala. who when introduced assured me he's not
thai Ayala— Ayala being one of the big (read rich) names in the Philippines.
Rich, however, is a relative term in the Philippines, and it turns out that he is
a Davao plantation owner and has extensive holdings— as well as a private
security force. A very charming man. but with the unmistakable bearing of
a man who is used to being obeyed. I have met this mans type before—in
Admiral's stripes.
After gathering the various and sundry people who are the last to
leave the headquarters we finally boarded a bus that would take us a couple
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of blocks to the official Makati rally starting point. By the time we arrived
there was a sizeable crowd, and the holiday atmosphere of a happening. It
was like Woodstock in yellow, as the Cory t-shirts, posters, streamers and
signs seemingly came out of the woodwork and onto the street.
As we gathered and started to march I found that we were at the
head of the procession. With Teddy, Chito. and me were the Aquino ladies
and the middle level organizers. Cory and Doy Laurel would, of course, join
the rally in progress for security's sake. As we marched through Makati I
was struck by the intense emotion of the onlookers, and by the youth and
vitality of the Aquino supporters. Every block more and more people
walked off the sidewalk and into the marching throng. By the time we
arrived at the Luneta Park there was a solid mass two miles long behind us.
It was a heady feeling. I didn't have anything to relate it to. It must be like
being at the head of a victorious army. The people did everything but strew
flowers in our path. There wasn t a single building that didn't have cheering,
flag waving supporters hanging out of windows, or the characteristic yellow
confetti streaming down.
1 am sure that it will be years until there are sufficient copies of the
yellow pages available in Manila, for most of them seem to have been cut
into 1" squares. The kids were bright-eyed and eicited, and the young
adults equally so. I only saw one dissenter, and she was an ancient and
withered old woman who for some reason took incredible affront at the
youth, the enthusiasm and the sway of the crowd. At one point, after she
had engaged in a small shouting match with an indulgent group of marchers,
she actually attempted to pull down one of their Cory signs. A staunch
Marcos supporter if there ever was one!
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The crowd was too happy to do anything but laugh at her
disbelievingly and then she was left behind. Neighborhood after
neighborhood was waLked through and still the people joined in. As we
turned on to Roxas Boulevard the snaking column became more visible, and
it really impressed me until the park came into sight and I saw the
convergence of all the lines. My god, I'd never seen so many people, never
mind been in the middle of them. Everywhere there was yellow, and
laughter, and smiles. It was as we passed the U.S. Embassy that I saw the
Metro policeman putting the Cory bumpersticker on the stock of his Armaiite
M-16. I yelled to him to give me a picture and he proudly held his weapon
up, the yellow sticker prominant. So too was his nametag. A very brave or
not very prudent man. I titled the picture, Changing of the Guard".
The only way to get the whole crowd in one picture was to get up high
and I could see people up on the roof of the Manila Hotel. I pushed through
the crowd with Teddy (a 30 minute job), said goodbye and walked around
the perimeter of the park to the hotel. After bluffing the floor manager with
the story of my journalistic needs he assigned a subordinate to escort me up
to the roof and I joined the professional press corps. The television cameras
of CBS, NBC, ABC, CNN, and Japanese, Scandanavian, German and Australian
networks were set up, as were both microwave transmission antennas and
satellite links. The big earth station satellite dish was down on the ground,
and it's my understanding that the various networks were timesharing to get
the all-important images home. Below us was an evershifting carpet of
yellow. Estimates ranged from an absurdly low 125.000 to a high of 2
million.
The high was given by Lupita ICashiwahara, who with her customary
defiance had braved this Marcos bastion to come up and take a look at her
58
handicraft on behalf of Cory. No one seemed to know who she was. so I
walked over and said hello, and asked her for her assessment of the
numbers in the crowd. It was at this point that she laughingly asserted that
there were at least 2 million. It took only a couple of questions until the
news persons around us realized that she must be a someone, and instantly a
crowd formed. Suddenly she was in a forest of microphones, tape recorders,
and there was a video camera in her face. She took it all with great aplomb
and deftly charmed the press with her humor and confidence. At one point
she looked over the edge, 17 stories down, at the immense crowd and said to
the newsmen. "Look at the people! It's the same everywhere, we ve won
already..." My estimate was 400. 000 and it was later called half a million in
the opposition papers.
Back down in the lobby it was very quiet, and I had a very distinct
sense that the huge crowd just outside the hotel grounds made the
managment somewhat uneasy. In the lobby I ran into Reynaldo Gregorio.
whom I'd been introduced to a day or so before. Ray is a Stanford alumnus,
an ex-student of Professor Buss, and like all of us, a Buss enthusiast. He was
the Eiecutive Vice-President of the Land Bank of the Philippines, and a
Marcos man, although it must be said that he was very aware of the
problems within the country. It would probably be more accurate to say he
was a Government of the Philippines man. The Land Bank was associated
with land reform efforts—which he admitted had been scarce—and the
granting of housing assistance to the poor. Ray seemed a committed man,
and felt strongly that reform was very necessary, but told me he was
desirous of achieving that reform through the institutions presently in place.
His work fell under the purview of the Ministry of Human
Settlements, and that was Imelda Marcos' baby. In fact, she headed the
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Ministry. Along with Ditos Bondoc, Ray was another example of what Imelda
was later to describe to me as, "her boys". Ray was very relaxed and eager
to hear what my observations were from the afternoon's march. It was
difficult to come down from the high of the crowd, and the sense of being on
the side of truth and justice, but in deference to him I made it as factual as
possible. One of the conclusions that I came up with as the two weeks went
by was that even if Cory should somehow emerge victorious, there were
going to have to be allowances made for the many legitimate and involved
people in the present governmental structure. Ray Gregorio seemed a
typical example of this mid-level man.
At a breakfast interview the following morning we met with Hezel
Gacutan. the Deputy Executive Director and Director for Research in the
President's Center for Special Studies, the Office of the President. A very
impressive business card. I must say. Hezel (pronounced Hey-zei) is an
erudite and warm individual, and talks primarily of things academic. The
most consistent message 1 heard was that he was most anxious to get back
into "pure'' academia, specifically a Philippine- American Studies Program.
He would particularly like to return to the States for study. I couldn't help
but think that perhaps Hezel was looking to a future in which some
government employees might be out pounding the pavement. The showing
that Cory made at her rally, called the "miting (meeting) de avance" had
made it into the front page of the paper, though not television, and there was
no denying that there was more than a new political breeze blowing across
the land.
As the hundreds of thousands took to the streets in protest of one-
man rule the President vowed a rollback of oil prices to domestic markets
and signed seven more Presidential Decrees, including such measures as a
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reduction in the price of urea fertilizer and a definition of government
corporations and their roles in national development. It was apparent that
the President's tenor was changing. Perhaps this victory would not be as
simple to pull off as first thought. Of his opponent, whom he had initially
spoken of as causing him embarrassment by making him run against a
woman—and he had gone on to stipulate that women belonged in the
bedroom~of her he now said,
Ideally the nation's business should have been at the front and
back of our minds throughout this campaign. But this is, you see, a
free country; and we cannot force anyone, not even a candidate for the
highest office of the land, to discuss the issues intelligently, when she
prefers to gossip and overact instead.
Now, lest any one of you jump on that last remark as an indictment
of the other sex, let me say that I am referring only to the tendency to
gossip and hysteria of my opponent in this campaign, who is
incidentally a woman.3
After Hezel departed for his office, we left for the Soiidaridad
Bookstore. Upon arrival we made the three story climb up to Frankie's
sanctum sanctorum, where he welcomed us warmly and immediately
launched into a no- holds-barred political discussion. He was dismayed by
the concerted effort that Marcos was making in the campaign and feeling, I
think, the cold hand of reality moving up behind him. It was obvious that he
felt that worse days were ahead. He was sure Marcos would "win'' the
election, and having done so would reinstitute harsh measures, cracking
down on his foes.
This might have been widespread and easy, since the election had
really polarized people into easily discernable camps. Frankie was sure he
would be one of the first to be picked up, and had already made
3Bu lletin Today (Manila). 5 February 1986.
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arrangements for his wife to take their granddaughter to Hong Kong over the
next critical days or weeks. He was really into a radical litany for a short
while, fervently asserting that the "stinking moorings of a stagnant society
must be cut", and that only revolution would provide the profound change
that was necessary. After a time he settled back into his chair and smiled at
us, perhaps embarrassed at his own fervor. What was remarkable was that
this mild and intellectual man. who apparently likes nothing better than
writing his novels of Philippine life—often the seamier side—had become one
resigned to revolution. It became apparent to me for the first time that
revolution can be a quiet thing in many ways.
As 1 headed home the Marcos rally was getting organized, and by the
time I walked from Mabini Street to the Luneta the crowd was getting quite
large. There were a couple of easily discernabie differences between this
rally and Corys yesterday. First was the unbelievable number of buses that
were in use for the transportation of rally attendees. This practice is so well
organized, and is such a common political tool that there is even a name for
the people who use the buses. They are known as "hakots ", from the Tagalog
verb for "to haul, or carry in". The number of buses lined up along Roxas
Boulevard must have numbered in the hundreds. There were indeed many
people, most of them sporting new red. white, and blue Marcos/Toientino t-
shirts.
In order to be fair and non-judgmental I took essentially the same
route that I had taken the day before. I skirted the park, walked through
the crowd, and went to the top of the Manila Hotel to take pictures of the
throng. One immediately noticeable difference was the lobby. It was
jammed! The place was jumping—wall to wall with red. white, and blue-clad
Marcos supporters. As I circulated, and observed people, it was obvious that
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this was not a cross-section of the masses. iNo indeed, these were the
privileged, those with a stake in the status quo. After my rooftop look I
descended to ground level, and went into the bar for a San Miguel beer. The
bar, like most of the ground floor, was full, but there was one table free, and
I collapsed into the deep upholstery, tired and hot. To my right Ambassador
Cruz was doing his thing with a foreign journalist, who sounded American.
At the next table there were eight young Filipino men, all with short hair,
and all very serious. Beyond them was a table of seven girls, excited,
giggling, playful, and really decked out in Marcos gear. T-shirts, bumper
stickers on their shirts, headbands, hats, jackets.
As I drank my beer and watched the actors, a woman in her mid-to-
late twenties came into the bar, and stopping by the table of girls had a word
with them, obviously a confidante and soul- mate. There was no room lor
her at their table and she looked around for someplace to light. The only
open seat in the bar was now opposite me, and she looked at it briefly, and
shyly. An American gentleman first and foremost, I rose and offered her the
spot, which after a moment's hesitation she accepted gratefully. She wanted
nothing to drink, really I think she just wanted a place to get off her feet for
a while. As I had done since arriving in the country. I began to sound her
out on the election, and my questions were simple and innocuous enough.
Who do you think will win. what are the chances for cheating, would the
President step down if Mrs. Aquino should win. etc.
She answered the first hesitantly, and began some routine banter with
me and it was obvious to me that she was trying to get me off of the subject,
but 1 was fired up by the week's events and assumed that anyone in this
crowd would eagerly hold forth on the joys of Marcos. If she wasn't surely it
must be that she didn't really think 1 was interested. I pressed on until she
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was almost forced to answer me, and reluctantly she did so, saying of course
President Marcos would win.
1 began to notice that while she was answering me she was looking
over my shoulder, and I glanced back to see at whom. It was one of the
group of serious young men. and he was watching us very closely. He turned
his gaze on me for a second, which I met. and his interest was definitely not
friendly. Turning back to the girl, who introduced herself as Meila. I pressed
on to get her assessment of the potential election fraud--a subject which,
after all. was on everyone's lips. She became plainly uncomfortable with
this, and while keeping her eyes on the table at my back, leaned forward to
talk to me very softly. "I can't talk about these things here... those men are
soldiers from the Palace, and they are listening to me", she said.
I asked her if she would talk to me in my room, or elsewhere in the
lobby. She said it would have to be in the room, for the lobby wasn t safe,
and I gave her the number. Then she asked me to leave first, and I did so in
my best 007 manner, loudly telling her how nice it was to have met her.
Then goodbye. This was really getting strange, but nothing ventured.
nothing gained. I headed to the elevator. After a few minutes she came out
of the bar and to the elevators. She did not acknowledge me. and taking her
cue. I ignored her. Sure enough the nosy soldier came out of the bar and
looked in our direction. Ignoring her completely I looked right by him as if
he wasn't there, and he returned to his companions.
At the correct floor she followed me off the elevator and then was
silent until we entered the room. She told me the men in the bar listening
were the personal bodyguards of the President's son. Bong-Bong. She told
me since she had been a clerk /secretary in the Palace for sii and a half
years she is watched very carefully. She told me that all of the girls at the
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other table were also from her group at the Palace; they work directly for
the President.
I asked her to be certain that she wanted to talk, because I didn't
want to cause her any trouble. She replied "O.K. ". She consented to notes on
the recorder, but would not give me her last name or let me take any
pictures. What ensued was a freeflowing, three hour long interview during
which she unloaded story after story of pre-election fraud, campaign
payoffs, buying of rally members, votes, and sympathy. Following the taped
portion she continued with allegations off the record. As I remember it. she
claimed:
• the President's son, Bong-Dong, is actually dead, murdered by the
brother of a girl he raped during a "date". The man standing in is
Imelda's nephew, who has changed his hair, clothing, and mannerisms to
suit his predecessor. This can be proven with photoanalysis, since the
"new"' Bong-Bong is four inches shorter than the original. She had
detailed information on the condition of the body, the method of
transport, and burial, as she was called in from home at night to assist,
then sworn to secrecy. The reason for the charade according to her was
the shameful way in which he died.
• soldiers routinely brought bales of marijuana to the Palace basement
after drug interdiction missions, and guarded it 24 hours a day. She had
been to the basement once, out of curiosity, and was shooed away
quickly and forcefully. Her impression was that the Presidential Security
Guard was selling it.
• Mrs. Marcos routinely carries a small pistol in her purse, and both she
and the President wear custom made bulletproof vests.
• contrary to press reports from the Palace, the President is very ill, and
the staff was under instructions "not to notice*. She said that even after
walking across the office he had to stop for many minutes and catch his
breath.
• the five New York properties currently being examined for evidence
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of linkage to the Marcos' are in fact theirs, and that there is also a Swiss
bank account that is regularly used.
• the President did not know of the Aquino assassination plans ahead of
time. She saw him with tears in his eyes when he was informed, and that
everyone that works at the Palace knows when he is faking emotion and
when he is not. Following the word of the death she observed him calling
an unidentified military officer and chewing him out personally for not
taking adequate care so that this wouldn't happen.
• Mrs. Marcos' closets outdid a Hollywood set, with a motorized belt and
hat rack that descends from the ceiling, gallons of perfume, incredible
jewelry, and hundreds of pairs of shoes. This information had all been
garnered during open house days that the President periodically had for
the staff. (The whole world has now seen the pictures which corroborate
these descriptions.)
Finally, she related to me a story of some compassion, and I can see
how the Marcos won loyalty amongst the inner circles. It seemed that her
grandmother had had a serious heart attack, and after arriving at the
hospital was told that she would only survive if she had a bypass. There
was, of course, no way that this could be accomplished financially, and so the
grandmother resigned herself to death. Mella went to Mrs. Marcos and
explained the situation to her, asking if there was anything that could be
done. In response the First Lady picked up the phone and had the operator
ring her hospital. The orders were given over the phone, and within ten
minutes the surgeon and operation scheduled. The operation took place, the
80,000 peso bill was paid by the Palace, and five years later the
grandmother was still very much alive.
After she told me this story I asked her about her feelings of
responsibility towards them, and her ability to willingly tell me, a stranger,
about all the corruption she had witnessed. Her response was that she
thought the Marcos' were very nice personally, but that the Filipino people
were suffering, and that Marcos had been bad for the country Even after ail
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our discussions, however, she still maintained her original stance, that she
would vote for Mr. Marcos because she wanted peace for her two babies, and
thought it would initiate street warfare if he lost.
It had become apparent at this juncture that press passes would be of
great use, and so we set out to obtain them. This required a letter from the
Embassy Press Office, which Mike Anderson provided on the spot, and then
a run over to the Manila Hilton to the Government of the Philippines Office of
Media Affairs temporary press office. There we were informed we needed
pictures, which could be obtained in the basement. Down we went, and with
a few pesos (as we used to say in Olongapo, he was showing his peso-nality).
we got them while we waited. By the time we got back upstairs the staff
workers had found out that we had ties to the Palace, and were very eager
to be of assistance. It must be said that they were completely professional
when we were just a couple of "newspapermen", but now the girls are ail
smiles and warmth.
Another pass needed was to the NAMFREL headquarters. NAMFREL
is the National Movement for Free Elections, and was the civilian watchdog
group which not only monitored the election for compliance with the election
code, but also made their own count. This was a very important element of
the unfolding tableau, as it was their count which put Cory ahead, and by
which she laid claim on legitimate victory. To get our NAMFREL passes we
went to their headquarters, which were at La Salle University in Green Hills,
a suburb of Manila.
When we arrived at Green Hills, which is how everyone referred to
the headquarters, we found that the International Observer Team was there
getting an orientation. I sat in on part of it. and they were very attentive to
the procedures, asking good questions. Ex-President of Colombia. Misael
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Pastrana was the head of the group, and was taking copious notes. After
getting a quick tour of their facilities, which included substantial personal
computers and radio equipment, we moved to the Aquino headquarters.
Upon arrival we found that Teddy Locsin was out, and instead we had an
interesting conversation with Raul Contreras, Cory's media coordinator.
About this time Teddy returned and expedited our obtaining Aquino press
badges. Before the end of the trip they would prove useful in gaining
entrance to closed press conferences.
The mood around the Cojuangco building was markedly different this
day. the day before the election. Teddy was wondering aloud who would
head the revolution if Cory lost, and he was deadly serious. There were
comments on possible secondary governments, perhaps operating from Cebu.
This was serious stuff, and it was sobering to be with people who were
actively planning a revolution. Teddy told us that the warlord types that
were leaning towards Cory, (referring to the plantation owners in the
provinces), were already leaving for Hong Kong, that they had opened their
arsenals, and their people were armed and ready for the revolution if it
became necessary. As we left for Teddy's parent's house so that he could get
some extra clothes--he was going up to Tarlac with Cory overnight where
she would vote in her home province the next day--he continued speaking in
this vein. I'd never seen him like this, he was really sure of violence, and for
the first time I was hearing that even if Marcos did not start it, there were
elements in Cory's circle that would. It seemed inevitable then, and I had a
whole different attitude towards the situation. These people were all in a
very precarious position.
Teddy's father, Teddy. Sr., took tremendous pleasure in taking me into
his library. He lovingly took down an old volume and opened it to show me
68
James Joyce's signature inside. The library that he had before World War II
was his pride and joy, and one of the best private libraries in the Philippines,
but the Japanese burned it. When asked how he felt after seeing it all go up
in flames. Teddy Sr. is said to have replied. "At last I am free!"
Following merienda, the traditional Filipino mid -afternoon drink and
snack, we went back to the headquarters to drop Teddy Jr. off and then off
to get some opposition newspapers and finally back to the Manila Hotel. As
we arrived at the hotel there was a group of Senator Lugar's Observation
Team setting out for their observation points election day. I met John Finiey
of the State Department, and Larry Niksch of the Congressional Research
Service. Inside we ran into Rey Gregorio, who introduced us to Mrs. Emma
Benedicto Valeriano. She is a very vivacious woman, and we learned that
her son by a first marriage. Gregorio Araneta. is married to Irene Marcos,
one of the President's two daughters. Emma's second husband was General
Napolean Valeriano, who was famous as a Huk-fighter under President
Magsaysay. Emma is a woman that has been in higher social circles all of her
life. Dr. Guy Pauker joined the group, and with his old world manner was
the perfect counterpoint to Emma.
After goodbyes Rey and I decided to have dinner at the hotel to
continue our discussion of the economics of land reform and urban housing
for the poor. A couple of tables down Senator Lugar was having his dinner,
and somewhere around coffee and dessert Rey introduced me to Adrian
Cristobal, press secretary to President Marcos, (his Larry Speakes), as well
as a newspaper columnist. He struck me as very tired, somewhat cold, and
detached. As I retired that night I turned on the television to Channel 4. the
government station and there was Cristobal, doing his best to make the
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President look good, and talk Cory down. He still looked tired, even through
the makeup, and showed the strain of pre-election maneuvering.
The next day. February 7, was the day of reckoning. The Philippine
nation would choose between the aged and ailing dictator and the
inexperienced, but fresh housewife. Little could the occupants of either
Malacanang or the White House suspect the chain of events that the
presidential election would unleash.
The scene was set, and the actors in place.
What was unknown was that the audience would take the stage.
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V. THE ELECTION
The saying that hope springs eternal could have been born in Manila
on election day. While people would often tell you that Cory didn't really
have a chance from a practical standpoint, they would also hasten to add a
few words about the great feeling that working for her gave them. They
loved to talk about the positive things that would occur if she could
somehow win. Nothing could have stopped them from voting their
consciences. The level of observable commitment in the face of potential
serious backlash was inspiring.
There is a misperception in the United States, at least among the
general public, that whatever the Filipinos were doing over there, it wasn't
really holding an election. Perhaps the media coverage was responsible for
this more than anything else, with their need to immediately grab the
viewer with a memorable image, or the reader with a glaring headline. Most
opinions at home favored some version of the poor benighted Filipinos
naively casting their votes without the benefit of an adequate electoral
process.
Nothing could have been further from the truth. The practice of law is
extremely popular as a profession in the Philippines; legal argument and
jurisprudence are practiced throughout the society. Though the Marcos
presidency had taken many of the constitutional checks and balances out of
government, the idea of law is very much a part of the fabric of Philippine
society. Clearly, this extended to the election procedures, which were the
subject of lengthy critiques in both the domestic media and whenever two or
more people got- together. The National Assembly published the Omnibus
Election Code of the Philippines of 1985 and distributed it freely. The
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appointments to the Commission of Elections were followed closely, and
COMELEC procedures were a running discussion in the press. The COMELEC.
established in accordance with the 1973 Constitution, consists of nine
members, appointed by the president, who serve for seven year terms.
Acting in both administrative and judgmental roles they oversee ail election
laws and disputes. They have the responsibility of accrediting political
parties and insuring that the electoral procedures are carried out in a lawful
manner. In doing so they are empowered to call out the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (with the consent of the president). Their charter includes the
registration of voters, the designation of the principal opposition party,
which has the right to field election observers in the polling places, the
preparation and distribution of ballots, polling and counting procedures, and
the settling of disputes. As an adjunct to these responsibilities they may
empower citizen arms, such as the National Movement for Free Elections.
NAMFREL, to assist in monitoring the election.
Two facts became immediately obvious: 1 ) the COMELEC should have
ensured that ail of the fraud that was being anticipated was averted, and 2)
the president had an extraordinary amount of control over what should have
been a completely nonpartisan body. In fact, as of late January there were
only seven of the nine positions filled, and of those seven there was only one










all claimed to be absolutely nonpartisan, there was an insistent call from the
opposition for the president to appoint two additional members who would
be acceptable to them. As the commission often works in three panels of
three members each, it was hoped that the three "opposition members" could
each sit on a panel, and act as watchdogs for inpropriety. Prior to the
election President Marcos did make moderate appointments. Still, the
COMELEC never attained a clear and unbiased reputation.
The Catholic Church made a statement in a pastoral letter read in
Manila churches on 1 January, in which Cardinal Sin and six bishops un?ed
the Commission to count the votes "honestly". In seeming retribution the
COMELEC ruled that priests and nuns were prohibited from participating in
political activities. This brought an immediate response by the opposition in
which it was pointed out that such a ruling was unconstitutional as it
violated the rights to free speech, suffrage, and free exercise of religion.
Furthermore they pointed out that the ruling specifically applied to Catholics,
and disregarded the Iglesas ni Kristo church, which had come out strongly in
support of President Marcos. Ironically, what the COMELEC took exception to
was the pastoral letter in which the bishops instructed their parishioners to
pray and work for a free, orderly and honest election. In other words just
what the COMELEC was tasked to do.
Nonetheless the procedures were refined. Ballot boxes were procured
which had a transparent side to allow for verification that no ballot stuffing
had occurred (although there were only enough for appoximately 1/3 of the
90.000 polling places). NAMFREL was accredited as the official watchdog
citizens group, and rules concerning the election-day activities of
international observers promulgated. After making the statement that any
and all observors were welcome in the Philppines to verify the honesty of
73
the upcoming election. President Marcos was apparently taken somewhat
aback by the response. Aside from the foreign press, which numbered about
a thousand at it's peak, there were pre-observer inspection teams, the
official U.S. observers headed by Senator Lugar, and the International team
sponsored by the National Democratic/Republican Institutes for
International Affairs. In a palace statement issued January 26 President
Marcos said. "The eyes of the world are already focused on us. In fact, there
are already meddlers and interventionists in our midst*"
It struck me that he was using a tried and true formula: if things are
not optimal yet. buy time by creating a common enemy. This tactic of trying
to deflect animosity to foreigners didn't ever take hold however.
Everywhere I went throughout Manila the people were happy to talk.
expressive of their appreciation that the press coverage in America likely
had a lot to do with whatever honesty there was to be. The image of puppet
Marcos and his American puppetmaster seemed to be limited to the tiny
rallies that occured once or twice outside the embassy. Even these were
obviously stage directed. As I moved through one of them taking photos and
recording the chants the participants were friendly and joking. One young
man of perhaps 15 or 16 told me that they had been paid by the KBL. He
did not know why.
The next morning Ditos Bondoc invited us to come to Paranaque while
he and his wife voted. The COMELEC's 50 meter buffer zone around polling
places which the foreign observers were to remain outside of was a paper
restriction. There were no guards or police, and no one was at the entry to
the school. It was a real festival atmosphere, and though it was just eight in
the morning the school was jammed. Each classroom in the two-story
building was teeming, each a distinct precinct. There were lines everywhere,
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and everyone was being very patient. All ages were represented, and we
settled into a group of Ditos' aquaintances. They were a mixture of Cory and
Marcos supporters, and were having what were essentially good-natured
arguments over the merits of one candidate over the other.
The leading Marcos man was Mr. Castro, the ex-viiiage leader of his
neighborhood (his son now fills the generally unwanted position). It seemed
that Mr. Castro's brother-in-law was close to Marcos. The leading opposition
spokesperson was Mrs. Dei Pin, who was outraged at anyone who could
lightly laugh away what she saw as the dictatorial excesses of the Marcos
regime. As she movingly made her points known her husband applied those
subtle marital communicatory gestures— a press of the knee, a tap of the
foot— to let her know that she might be going too far. Plainly, he was a man
who was thinking that he would still have to live around Mr. Castro if and
when Marcos won (which everyone was expecting). It was also obvious that
much of the fervor with which they spoke was for our benefit. There had
been so much anticipation of foreign observation and journalism that any
Caucasian, especially one with a camera, like me, or with senatorial white
hair, like Dr. Buss, was assumed to be on an official mission.
On the whole the polling appeared to be quiet, orderly, and with
sufficient safeguards present. There were at least five women I saw wearing
NAMFREL volunteer smocks. NAMFREL. which had been utilized in the 1984
national elections and was thought to have been largely responsible for the
success of the opposition in achieving office, was established in 1983. This
election it was expected that there would be over half a million volunteers.
The first indication we had of cheating turned out to be the overriding
national election fraud. While we stood in this group and talked, four people
came up complaining of not finding their names on the registration. They
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were furious at not being able to vote. It took now-Minister of Finance
Jaime Ongpin five hours to find his name on the register. The daughter of
one of the women talking approached her mother to tell her that when she
went to vote she found she had already voted! Sure enough, her signature
was even on the registration. Or at least it was someone's signature of her
name. This tactic, in areas of strong Cory support, and even of known Cory
sympathizers, resulted in the nationwide disfranchisement of up to sii
million voters. No one will ever know how many really were cheated out of
their votel
After an hour at the first polling place we visited some other areas of
the city. We went through Camp Bonifacio in an attempt to see whether the
army was on any type of alert. The huge camp was practically deserted.
Either the troops had been told to stay indoors, or they were deployed
somewhere else. After driving through the camp we went to Malacanang
Palace. Here too it was very quiet. Except for a relaied group of soldiers at
the gate, it was dead. The barbed wire barricades were up on the street by
Mendiola Bridge, but this had been normal since the imposition of martial
law. A drive by a couple of other polling places showed the scene to be
peaceful and orderly, and so we returned to Ditos house for lunch. He lives
in Forbes Park, a very exclusive compound in Manila, and the homes would
do quite well in Beverly Hills, or Hillsborough, or any area you would care to
name. During a family lunch Ditos discussed his involvement with the Prime
Minister, Caesar Virata, whom he worked for in his connection to the Export-
Guarantee Bank, and the First Lady, through the Ministry of Human
Settlements. These two were at odds, making Ditos the man in the middle.
In those pre-election days he was having a tough time trying to keep
everyone happy.
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After lunch the driver took us back to the Manila Hotel, and while Dr.
Buss talked with some people in the lobby I ran up to the Press Office to get
a copy of the speech that Senator Lugar had given to the Chamber of
Commerce the day before. The speech wasn't ready for distribution yet. but
Mary Carlin was listening to a VHF radio in the office. Reports of election
cheating and violence were wide open. One hotspot was in Makati, so we
hopped a cab to the Aquino headquarters. Upon arrival we met with Teddy
and Mark Brown, and found the situation to be in an uproar.
From the relative peace we had felt in our look around in the morning
they had gone to an intensely dour view of things. There was terrific
concern in the headquarters, and almost a sense of hopelessness. This
resulted primarily from a statement that Senator Lugar had made earlier in
the day that so far the elections had looked substantially, "...clean and fair..."
The reeling at the Aquino headquarters was that this was the beginning of a
whitewash by the U.S., that the Reagan administration wanted her to accept
a Marcos victory and reconcile. According to Teddy. Cory was ready to
personally lead demonstrations at the U.S. Embassy in protest.
Both Dr. Buss and I felt that this was premature, and did our very best
to counsel patience and some faith. We could not believe that the Lugar
mission, with it's distinguished personnel, would allow a whitewash. After
about a half hour of cooling off, Teddy went up to assuage Cory's feelings.
Guy Pauker arrived; he had similar information, and while we were talking
further reports of vote fraud at the polls came tumbling in. The Aquino
coordinators were looking for a foreign journalist to go to one particular
precinct, in the hopes that a pale face and a camera would force compliance
with the rules. Of course we went!
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As we drove the woman in the front passenger seat was really
incensed. She kept telling us she was for Marcos, but that she wanted a fair
election, no matter who won. These women were like so many that we met.
They had become totally politicized in this campaign, and were willing to put
their time, money, effort, and ultimately their lives on the line. You simply
had to respect them.
Upon arrival at the Palanan precinct it is was a quarter after five. The
polls closed nationwide officially at 3:00 PM. but here they had closed just as
we arrived. In one of the precinct rooms on the second floor they were
starting to count ballots. There was a young man there, about 25 I would
guess, who approached me desiring that I document the anomalies in the
system. He was concerned on several counts: first, that the voting had
continued after the official polling closure, second that the NAMFREL
volunteer had left, and third, that the representation required at the ballot
count was not present. There was supposed to be a representative of each
party, the KBL and Unido. as well as a non-partisan poll watcher. There was
no poll watcher, and the "Unido" representative was a very young girl in a
yellow t-shirt. She had no identification, and could not give any kind of
information about her organization.
When 1 moved in to take photographs of the ballot counting, they
started over and recounted. This alone elicited a rise from the watching
crowd, and the man intimated to me that it was only my presence that
brought about the recount at all. When I asked him if he would give me his
name for a report, as a witness, he was not at all hesitant. He told me he was
simply a concerned citizen. It seemed that there were many such people,
and I again wondered to myself if Marcos had not badly underestimated the
will of the people.
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As we left we were the object of some very hostile stares and
muttering from a group of men across the street from the school As I
attempted to take their picture they all turned away. Back at Cory's
headquarters I filled out a report of election irregularity, using my witness
name, and then it was time for a press conference by Rene Saguisag, Cory's
press spokesman. He provided the first returns which showed Cory ahead,
and then went on to read a group of election irregularity reports. The
assembled journalists were most interested in these, and as he read areas
where violence had been reported several of them took off to find it.
Following the press conference Guy thought that the Makati Municipal
Hall was the place to be, as that was where municipal level ballot collection
was taking place. When we arrived there we found the entire area full of
people. The Municipal Hall is a large building, with an open courtyard in the
rear, and a small ampitheatre at the far end of the courtyard. At the center
of the courtyard there was a semicircle of tables set up, and at each table a
number of precincts from within the Makati municipal area were
represented. After the ballot boies from those precincts were trucked in
they were opened and the tally sheets removed. The tally sheets are a hand
tabulated count of the ballots within a particular ballot box. The tally sheets
were then canvassed, or gathered and collated, at a second group of tables
that was manned by members of the Commission for Elections. There were
copies of the tally sheets for both COMELEC and NAMFREL. and a copy stayed
in the ballot box.
After the ballot boxes were opened, the tally sheets removed and
canvassed, the boxes with their ballots still inside were taken behind the
ampitheatre to a small prefabricated building, where they were to be stored
until after the final election results had been posted. It was this storage that
79
caused the most fear. After sunset, the area was lighted by many electric
lamps, and many people come to watch what was happening. At one point
there was a sudden rush of bodies around the ampitheatre. towards the
shed. Word of a crisis spread like wild fire, and in one poignant moment a
boy of perhaps 10 or 11 took Guy Pauker's hand, and with tears in his eyes,
implored, "Please sir, help my country!"
The three of us made our way around to the trouble spot, as did an
NBC film crew that was also there. The confrontation was developing
between some NAMFREL volunteers and the police guarding the building.
Since there were no windows in the building where the ballot boies were to
be stored the citizens were concerned that further cheating might take place
inside the closed building. They were highly suspicious, and wanted
admittance to oversee the situation. Since the tally sheets had already been
removed I didn t see the problem, and asked a man about it. Their fear was
that after the election results were ail counted the government, if it should
be losing, would protest the election and this would necessitate an automatic
recount. In the meantime, if not watched, the ballot boxes would be
reopened and fake ballots substituted. In the recount there would then be a
clear majority for Marcos. Thus their paranoia about the closed building.
I moved up towards the door to the building and asked the policeman
if I could go in, but he was emphatic that no one but workers could enter.
There was no arguing with the policeman. I had to watch that I did not make
any moves which might later be construed as intervention. By the time we
were ready to leave there had been a change of policy and the citizens were
being allowed in. two at a time, to see things. Eventually we had had enough
and called it a night. The citizenry, which included nuns, priests, students,
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housewives and business men, literally encircled the building through the
night and for the next week.
Upon returning to the hotel I learned that the Lugar statement had
made as much of an impact in the embassy as it had at the Aquino
headquarters. The press office was still trying to track down the exact
statement that the Senator made, and was anticipating a second statement
specifying the many instances of election fraud that had been observed.
At the hotel I had dinner with Mark Brown, and it was then that he
told me he was with D.H. Sawyer and Co.. I took the opportunity of this one
-
on-one dinner to press on Mark my strong conviction that Cory must show
restraint and wait until Senator Lugar had had time to meet with the rest of
his team. I was convinced that alter he had talked to people like Larry
Niksch he would issue another statement, and modify his comments to state
clearly that the fraud was predominately on the government side. During a
very satisfying conversation I believe I got across the following points:
1
)
premature violence was not in anyone's interest; if there was to be an
Aquino-led insurgency, or civil disobedience they must have ail their
ducks in a row. My advice was to wait at least 24 hours to let the
election process take place before acting. To fail to do this would give
Marcos all the reason he needed to crack down and reinstitute martial
law.
2) that U.S. national interests were not served by keeping Marcos in power,
that we cannot run the bases as another Guantanamo, and if we lose our
friendship in the Philippines we have lost it all. Additionally, I thought
our actual direct influence was very limited, and I felt very strongly that
if it were not for the present U.S. and international interest in the election
process there would never have been the news coverage that had
developed. The Philippines certainly got a far fairer shake with the
terrific news coverage that the media had given the election.
3) finally, that I believed Cory's impulsive damning of the U.S. Embassy
was a cheap shot, worthy of a Khomeini, but not the future leader of the
Philippines. She knew it would get press coverage, but she also had to
know that the embassy couldn t really respond.
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Mark took all this in and said he would make sure that the ideas were
aired with Cory. At least he had had an American viewpoint, albeit a
personal one. After he went back to the Aquino headquarters I lock .1 last
swing through the lobby bar and saw Guy and Stan Karnow, who waved me
over. While we discussed the events of the day we were joined by Stanley
Roth, who is Representative Stephen Solarz's aide and staffer. He was out to
assess whether his boss should come out to Manila, or wail. The general
concensus was to wait, since an ill-timed visit would oniy muddy (he waters
His well-known anti-Marcos stand would surely complicate matters if he
showed up too soon.
While the ballots were being assembled and deposited ai the
Municipal Halls, a further critical step in the election process was about 10
begin at the Namfrei Headquarters, at the COMELEC, and finallv at the
National Assembly.
The votes were now cast. An equally critical portion of the election
was ahead. The counting.
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VI. THE CALM BEFORE THE STORM
The day after the election began slow. Election returns would be
coming in for several days, unlike an American election where you remain
glued to the TV set as the returns come in. Here there was a tremendous
sense of the anticlimactic. At the Aquino media room the impression was
that although they had expected cheating all along, it seemed a greater
indignity now that they were actually faced with it. The election returns
came in steadily, if slowly, and there was growing evidence of massive fraud.
Senator Lugar amended his initial statement and was now confirming thai
there was fraud and cheating throughout the election. The international
media was just waiting for something to happen. There was a feeling of
tense anticipation in the air.
Our luncheon meeting was with Inday Arcenas, niece of Vice
Presidential candidate Doy Laurel. Stanford educated, she is extremely well
spoken, and had a level-headed assessment of the situation. Inday was
hopeful that they would overcome what looked to be a sure Marcos victory--
(through cheating). As we spoke I was somewhat alarmed at what seemed
to be indications that tnere was less than perfect communication between
the Aquino and Laurel staffs, and she confirmed this. Later I would make a
point to tell Teddy of my observation, and though each side gave lip service
to bringing the staffs together, it has not changed substantially following the
victory.
1 returned to the Cojuangco Bldg. for Cory's two o'clock press
conference. The room was jammed, and full of TV cameras. The press
spokesman, Rene Saguisag. made a few prefatory remarks, and then Lupita
Kashiwahara stepped up to read Cory's prepared statement:
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My fellow Filipinos,
I want to share with you the results of the votes counted thus far. I
know that some of you are concerned because the COMELEC count is
coming in suspiciously slow. Let me reassure you. Every report that
comes in confirms my victory, the people's victory. So, to the people out
there, who are courageously defending the ballot, I say, keep it up, make
sure that no further cheating nibbles at our impressive lead. You are not
fighting a defensive action, you are solidifying a sweeping victory. Do not
believe the count being broadcast by the govenment controlled media.
These are the lies of desperate men. Their ridiculous claim this morning
that 24 million votes have been counted in their media poll count is
propaganda, not journalism, and it is intended to condition the people to a
theft of the election. Well, it won't work.
Of the 6 million votes so far counted by NAMFREL, Radio Veritas, and
our own opposition poll watchers, I am leading with 3,469,714 votes. Mr.
Marcos is trailing badly with 2.569,498 votes. So I already lead by
900,000 votes. No wonder the COMELEC is taking so long counting the
votes! I said it before, numbers will break the Marcos machinery of
fraud. Even the COMELEC count has me leading.
Doy Laurel is also well ahead of Tolentino. Despite all the cheating,
fraud and terrorism that has taken place, my eiperts are projecting that 1
will win by 55% of the vote. This is confirmed by an independent foreign
media projection which arrived at a similar projection a few hours ago.
Not all the Marcos fraud and terrorism has been able to stand up to our
landslide victory. And believe me, he pulled out all the stops. I said it
was going to be a battle of attrition: our numbers against his cheating and
terrorism. Well, we got the numbers and we have beaten him.
We are winning in 1 regions of the country. Marcos is leading only
in region 1 and 2 in the north. But even there I am vigorously chopping
off his lead. The once solid Marcos North has gone soft under the force of
People Power.
I want to thank the brave people of Mindanao. Region XI has given
me a lead of 249,938 to 168,273 for Marcos. In Regions 10 and 9, I lead
by almost a third. I have two times the number of votes of Marcos in
Region 12. Marcos has tried to break our overwhelming support in the
South and he has failed.
84
We must also salute the bravery of our supporters here in Manila
and in Tarlac, who stood firm in the face of eitreme intimidation and
ballot stuffing.
In the National Capital Region, I am leading by 274,889. In lioiio
and in Cebu city, I have swept the Marcos machine aside. In Pasig, fraud
and intimidation ate into my projected lead of 80-20 and the final count
gives me 60-40.
We are winning. It is a glorious victory. Stay strong. Be vigilant
and stay with the ballot boies. Marcos won't stop trying but we won t
stop fighting. A new Philippines was born last night because we all stood
firm. To Mr. Marcos, I say: With much sacrifice and suffering, the people
have given me their mandate. I shall protect it with my Life.
This statement acknowledged one of the most crucial problems that
had developed, the inordinate delay in the COMELEC count. They lagged far
behind NAMFREL and the government-sponsored media poll count. This was
viewed with alarm. The supposition was that the slowness would both
condition the public to a Marcos continuation in power and allow time for
more sophisticated ballot substitution/numbers manipulation. Senator Lugar
made a statement acknowledging the delay in the count with concern.
My next stop was to^the Philippine Cultural Center to observe the
COMELEC in operation. The building was outwardly impressive, as was the
entire COMELEC setup. There were banks of gleaming personal computers,
all with uniformed operators, and everything was very Madison Avenue. It
provided a glossy, polished image for the media. Following the tour of the
COMELEC facility I was invited by Inday to ride along with her group as they
investigated potential election incidents.
We arrived at a safehouse in Makati and had a quick dinner, cooked
by a volunteer. There were four or five others in the condo and each was
involved with the grassroots support of the Laurel campaign. The driver and
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I left in a hurry after getting a call that there was suspected trouble in a
particular school district. We jumped in the car, which had been radio
equipped, and while he drove he told me about their code system. It was a
simple code based on a numerical scale, then modified with various
conditioning statements. For example, a code 7 Winter would express a
fairly serious confrontation requiring personnel backup including firearms.
We proceeded to a parking lot to await the convergence of other cars, and
after about 30 minutes four cars and crews arrived. They were both male
and female, and uniformly young; Inday and I were probably the oldest.
The first alert we received was to a school which had been used as a polling
place. The report was that goons"—the accepted word for pro- Marcos
enforcers—were preparing to cause trouble with the Namfrel volunteers that
were there. In reality, there was utter peace and tranquility at the school,
and it was to be that way all night as we travelled about the city. The only
location where we saw real tension was at the Makati Municipal Hall, and
here the clergy—low ranking nuns and priests—had surrounded the building
the ballots were being stored in. There were literally thousands of people up
and in the streets*? and there were many documented incidences of violence
and of ballot boxes being snatched by "goons'". None occurred where we
happened to be. I was dropped off at the Manila Hotel at about 1 30 in the
morning, and the others continued their vigil. They would be tired in the
morning.
The next morning Dr. Buss gave Stan Karnow an on-screen interview
for his special. Afterwards we went to Santo Domingo cathedral, in which
mass was celebrated by Bishop Teodoro Bacani. The cathedral, in Quezon
Gty, was a mass of humanity. Every seat was taken. Every square foot of
standing room and any horizontal surface had at least one person occupying
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it. The crowd was thrilled because Cory was to come, but in the end it was
Doy Laurel who arrived, in his characteristic green polo shirt—the official
color of his UNIDO party. The crowd was jubilant, and he was clearly in his
element. He and his wife CeUa glowed in the limelight.
The Bishop gave a very lighthearted sermon, wholly political in
nature. In relating how a nun had used her own body to protect the sanctity
of a ballot box he quipped, "..it is lucky that she didn't find it necessary to
protect my body— I might have lost my sanctity!" The crowd loved it.
Leaving the mass early we travelled to Baclaran Cathedral where
Cardinal Sin would celebrate the Thanksgiving mass. He was less
lighthearted, and spoke continuously and clearly on the need to remain free
from violence. His concern was that the pro-Cory forces avoid initiating
violence. There was a common feeling that this was all the excuse that
Marcos would need to come in swinging.
Cory did show for this mass, and the crowd was hysterically happy.
The everpresent, "Corree-Doy, Corree-Doy". filled the air and everywhere
there were smiles, yellow t-shirts and dresses, and children.
At 8:00 P.M. on February 9 the International Observer mission held
their end-of-trip press conference at the Manila Hotel. The statement was
given by the Irishman. Mr. Hume. He was adept with the audience of
professional journalists, never allowing himself to be led in a direction other
than that of his own choosing. The groups prepared statement was quite
strong, and they were unequivocal in their identification of and distaste for
the "observed, massive election fraud committed by the ruling party".
This would put the Lugar people in a somewhat easier position. Now
that the precedent had been set it would be easier to observe something that
the U.S. administration might not have wanted to acknowlege initially. The
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Lugar press conference was the following morning. Some of the members of
the Lugar team were sitting in front of me at this press conference. A
woman joked to the two men with her that it would take a hell of a lot of
work to get a statement out by morning, since they could not even agree on
what they had seen. I suspect that they had a long night.
There wasn't a seat in the house the neit morning. There were two
microphones set up on opposite sides of the audience for questions following
the statement. In fact, when the Lugar group did arrive most of them looked
beat, and probably had little trouble sleeping on the plane when they left.
immediately following the conference.
Senator Lugar read the statement, and it was clearly a compromise.
He delivered it well. It started with a very innocuous couple of paragraphs
describing their mission, the way in which they split into groups, and then
went into a very positive recanting of all the good democratic actions that
they had seen being taken. The only controversial part was included in the
following two paragraphs:
Sadly, however, we have witnessed and heard disturbing reports of
efforts to undermine the integrity of that process, both during the voting
and vote counting process which is still underway. Even within the last
twenty-four hours, serious charges have been made in regard to the
tabulation system.
The count is at a critical moment. We share the concern, expressed
to us by government election officials and citizen monitors, that the
remainder of the COMELEC and NAMFREL Quick Count Operations proceed
to a credible conclusion without further delay. We join ail Filipinos of
good will in deploring all incidents of election related violence and
intimidation.
Following this bit of carefully worded diplomacy it went on to a really soft
section on the friendship between our two countries, and on the hopes for a
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good election in the end. Not the concise and direct stuff of which the
International Team's report was made. This would not be particularly
satisfactory to the majority of Filipinos, nor to President Reagan. It was
simply too wishy-washy. I hoped that there was something substantial to
tell the President. He couldn't do much policy formulation with this
statement
As we left the press conference we ran into an old "Philippine hand",
Al Ravenholt. Stories abound of Al's exploits; now he is a planter down
south, although his business card lists him as a correspondent. Whatever
other connections he may have—government intelligence or otherwise—are
speculation, but he is interesting and extremely well informed on the
Philippines. An observation by Al made a strong impression on me. From
looking at his own area he noted that the NPA is strong in areas that do not
have any local government structure. Not just bad government, or weak
government—no government. And according to him there are vast areas of
the country that are in just such a situation. This was a new consideration
for me. In my previous study of the NPA I had assumed that they stayed up
in the mountains during the day and came down at night when the CHDF 1
,
barangay captains, and army were in. Al pointed out that in much of the
country there is no CHDF. no barangay captain, and certainly no reliable
army. In these areas it is the NPA itself which provides social justice and
^vilian Home Defense Forces, a civilian para- military organization
organized under President Marcos' direction. They were issued arms, little
training, and unsupervised authority. Much of the violence reported by
innocent civilians has been laid at the CHDF's door. President Aquino
reduced their numbers by 1/3 prior to her first 90 days and intends to .
disband them altogether. The military has been largely unsuccessful,
however, in recalling their arms.
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limited medical attention. And the people literally have no alternative.
Clearly this will be a big challenge to the new government.
The afternoon was spent at the family home of Helen Benitez, one of
the foremost women in Filipino politics, and a National Assembiyperson. We
were joined by Jolly Benitez' wife and Mrs. Benitez godson. Boy, a banker.
Jolly was one of Mrs. Marcos closest worker/strategists, and the real author
of most of Imeldas famous "thoughts on life". Later we were joined by
retired Colonel Anthony Quinto, and Emma Vaieriano. This was definitely
Marcos country. Lunch was an interesting discussion, mostly centering on
the election, but also touching on the future "after Marcos wins", and the
probability of needed reforms. I brought up the question of a
Marcos/Laurel ticket—at this point in the count very much a possibility, and
they were very receptive to the idea. Obviously, they thought Laurel was
someone that they could work with—one of their own. And of course Marcos
would still be on top so that the status quo would remain.
The National Assembly was opening that afternoon to officially count
the tally sheets, and "legally" decide who would be the neit president. Mrs.
Benitez had arranged seats for us^in the gallery. The session opened amidst
a radically polarized audience. Speaker of the Assembly Yniguez cautioned
the crowd that there would be little tolerance of rowdy behavior or noise.
this was greeted with grumbling and hoots. As the session got underway the
various assemblymen came in and immediately began to caucus.
There was loud applause from the Marcos side when I mee Marcos, the
Presidents daughter, and an assemblywoman, came into the hall . She is
young, and wearing a bright red dress, stood out amongst the dark business
suits. She turned and waved to her side of the audience with evident self
confidence. As the Speaker brought things to order the rules were
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explained. Challenges and protests began immediately. The first major piece
of business was whether protests would be taken precinct by precinct, as the
opposition members wanted, or together at the end, as the pro-government
forces wanted.
As the opening dragged on and on we slipped out.
At evenings end Emma and 1 stopped for a nightcap prior to calling it
a night. As if by some pre-arranged signal she began delivering a message,
and she made it clear that she was speaking for Imelda. She told me in very
direct terms, with a clear implication whose ears this was for (the U.S.
government via Dr. Buss), that the key element in the acceptance of a
Marcos/Laurel ticket by the U.S. would be for there to be immediate
improvement and change in the Armed Forces of the Philippines. To
accomplish that. General Ver would have to be removed. This in turn, would
require Imelda's direct intervention. The First Lady would get President
Marcos to send the General to the U.S. in a retired status j£ the United States
would find a job for him that would be sufficiently face-saving. One
possibility mentioned was as a security consultant. (Where I thought, to
Nicaragua?) General Ver would obey orders. Emma told me, and then Ramos
could move up and make the reforms that the U.S. wanted.
This was clearly and unmistakably a political offer, and after we called
it a night, 1 immediately went to my room to write it down in detail. The
next morning I relayed the message but Dr. Buss was apparently
insufficiently impressed with the idea to pass it on to the embassy, and it
died. Just as welL It was interesting to see Imelda trying to find her own
way out of the increasingly sticky situation she and the President were in.
The morning found me enroute the Mandarin Hotel for a breakfast
meeting. We passed a slum section, and the contrast with Makati was
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startling. The driver informed me that this was the AJikbayan Compound,
but that he had never been there and did not know much about it. Even
passing by the twisted walkways, and the cardboard and plywood houses
was unforgettable, as were the people, people without expression in
adulthood, but with the smiles and laughter as children that made the scene
even sadder. This scene was good preparation for our breakfast
conversation, for over the starched linen, the silver, china, and crystal we
talked of economics, and of reform.
The breakfast guest was Flor Orendin, and like Ditos, he was associated
with the Ministry of Human Settlements. From the start he was very open
about the failure of the Ministry to address problems that have a real impact
on the people that need the housing programs. During this far-reaching
discussion some of the points that he aired were:
• the Philippines should look north towards Taiwan as an example, for the
Philippines has even greater natural resources, and equal manpower.
Being island nations there is enough similarity that if they could achieve
successful industrialization, the Philippines should be able to.
• the coconut and sugar industries should be diversified so as not to be
handcuffed to the vagaries of the world pricing system.
• let the government act as the catalyst for business, not the business
itself.
• major exports which are value added at a rate of 15-20% are a major
problem.
• possible growth industries of interest would be the conversion of copra
to diesei fuel, and sugar to polyethylene.
• the Philippines should look within the Pacific Rim for investment. In
particular both immigration and foreign investment policies should be
loosened. Possible sources of income for the Philippines might be
foreign retirees. Orendin cited a ratio in monetary expenditure within
the country indicating that 5000 retirees spend as much as 1,000,000
tourists. People that might be induced to retire in the Philippines are
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the upper classes in the PRC, and workers from Japan. Arrangements
could possibly be made through Japanese corporations for their cradle-
to-grave employees who would consider such a move (incentives could
be offered as a result of the savings the company would have in
retirement in the Philippines vs. Japan.) Other sources of non-traditional
investment capital were persons emigrating from Hong Kong prior to
1997, and those in Taiwan looking for new places to put venture capital
.
• hoping against hope, he offered the observation that more markets were
needed than aid, and that if Philippine companys were guaranteed a
percentage of the U.S. market it would be of great utility. We assured
him that there was presently little chance of getting that through.
His final statement could have been the economic epitaph of the
Marcos regime. "There's free enterprise available as long as you are ready to
pay for it..".
Our next appointment was with the President and owner of the
Liberty Flour Company, and an ex-Secretary General of the Chamber of
Commerce, Felix Maramba, Jr.. An avowed oppositionist, Felix was both
candid and humorous. He also had very sound and workable ideas for
improvement to the private sector in the Philippines. Among his ideas were
the funneling of USA ID funds into the Philippine Volunteers Foundation.
These funds would be utilized by the volunteers in providing technical
assistance from Manila, and would go to the outlying rural areas in small and
medium industries. He spoke of last year's Philippine Chamber of Commerce
and Industry (PCCI) project theme, which was regional development within
the Philippines. It consisted of indigenous assistance to small projects, such
as crocodile farming, integrated meat processing, and leather manufacture.
This work led to the development of the PCCI Foundation for Economic
Development, which will carry on these programs. Another PCCI initiative
was the National Economic Development Agency, which the USA ID funded
after demonstration of viability by PCCI. Felix felt strongly that agriculture
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in the Philippines was lagging it's potential, and that, "...no government
agency has the know-how or interest in startup, marketing, and financing of
agriculture, only production...", so the PCCI was setting up a conference to
address those problems with an eye toward practical and achievable
solutions.
I was most impressed with his grassroots approach towards solution
of problems. This seemed to be the most successful strategy, as the
infrastructure is insufficient to support large amounts of money in big
projects. Furthermore it is the large projects which provide the rakeoff that
make the cronies rich. Felii cited crony Bobby Ongpin (brother of Cory
Aquino's advisor Jimmy Ongpin) as loving the large international project,
with it's glamour. But where steel mills and dams offered little to the
average Filipino, Felix pointed out that privitization of small and medium
enterprises would provide jobs and money in circulation. Additionally:
• he would like to see the Center for International Private Enterprise fund
a $US 150,000 grant to develop Chambers of Commerce throughout the
Philippines.
• there should be improvement in the local purchase practices of Clark
and Subic. Most of the necessary supplies for the large bases are U.S.
made goods which are shipped to the Phiippines. They would far prefer
to see this procured from the local economy. This would help far more
than would direct aid, which is siphoned off by high level corruption.
• with the present system there is no way to service the $2 billion per
annum interest on the country's $27 billion debt.
• even if you had good ideas it was impossible to get direct access to
President Marcos; you had to go through either Bobby Ongpin or Caesar
Virata.
• small projects are the most effective precisely because they are too
small for the crony's to notice, take control of, and thus screw up.
• prior to Marcos the usual front end profit looked at by those putting up
venture capital (for buildings, etc.) was 5 %. Now it is 50
V
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• aid should be run as the Australians run it. Administer it yourself. If
you cant do that, send it directly to private agencies, not through the
government.
• most of those aligned with the NPA are bandits, drawn for economic
reasons, not communists.
• coordination between local governmental officials and private industry
is close, it is at the regional level that it breaks down.
• a total of 53 rural proposed projects were presented to General Ramos
for approval. 27 were turned down under the general heading of not
law and order feasible". The 26 approved had no specific differences,
nor was any explanation given.
A couple of his memorable statements were, "Small is beautiful", and
"You can't be in business and politics at the same time". Felix has sound
ideas, knows how to get them organized, and is seemingly honest. My hope
that he be involved after the election process runs it's course was granted.
Felix is now hard at work on the aforementioned projects. He is very happy
with his new President. He is less happy with the Minister of Finance.
This interview had taken us up to lunch time. When we arrived at the
PCI Bank we took a private elevator up to the executive dining room, The
Sign of the Anvil, named after the bank's logo. It's an impressive room, all
mahogany, deeply carpeted, with lush foliage and a gleaming contemporary
look. Looking about one would never suspect that the economy was in a
shambles. Waiting for us was our host, Dr. Placido Mapa Jr.. Dr. iMapa was
the president of the Philippine National Bank (PNB), and has had a
distinguished career in banking and government service. Among other
things he had served as a past president of the World Bank . As we began
the discussion he stated that he saw the major priorities in economics to be:
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1)
Trade and export increases.
2) Increased and diversified investment within the
Philippines.
3) Improvement in the Bases Agreement, to allow for
more "rental", and greater local purchasing.
Dr. Mapa was considerably more reserved than most of the people we had
seen to date, and seemed the epitome of the careful banker. While agreeing
that reforms were needed in general terms, he would not be drawn into
declaring the present government at fault. In fact, he established a historical
record of economic need that predated Marcos as Chief Executive. Likewise,
he was not willing to give concrete suggestions for improvement, other than
to say that crop diversification was needed, particularly with respect to
sugar land, and that privatization would be difficult. In the choppy waters
of international finance this man would provide a steady hand on the tiller
no matter what storms should arise, but I had reservations about his
imagination.
Following lunch, and at Dito's suggestion, he arranged to have us
shown the PCI president's private office. An armed guard escorted us down,
and we were let onto an entire floor done in a museum-like rough stone
motif. The floors were covered in an expensive wool carpet, but the walls
were hand-hewn stone. As we wandered through at least 2500 square feet
of rambling, interconnected rooms in this distinctive motif we viewed
hundreds of mounted trophy animals. Every few feet there was another,
from small antelope heads to entire bears. It seemed that the president.
Cesar Salamea, was quite a hunter, and in the small office that was tucked in
the middle of all this there were blown up photographs of him with various
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guides, animals and rifles. Outside the office door there was a small blank
wall, and our host joked that among those going in to see the president on
business the word was that the wail is reserved for the head of the one
bringing bad news, it was all very impressive, but macabre.
In a strange counterpoint Ditos showed us another facility at the bank,
this in the basement. Here they had built a beautiful, contemporary, and
lavishly decorated chapel. On the wall as you enter the following bas relief
exists:
GOD
ABIDE WITH US PCIBANKERS
YOUR GRACE
LIGHTFOR OUR MINDS
STRENGTH FOR OUR WILLS
LET US AL WATS BEMINDFUL
THAT WEARE TOUR SONS AND DA UGHTERS
ENTRUSTED WITH MISSIONS




Stirring words, but they rang hollow, just as the modern, quietly
flamboyant chapel seemed hollow. I could not help but compare the
Alikbayan Compound of the morning with the hundreds of stuffed animals
staring glassily into space a few stories above us. The people in the slums
had much the same blank, unseeing eyes. There is so much to be done, and
it is not all difficult, or a matter for the World Bank. A great deal could be
accomplished if only those in positions of influence and wealth could see
about them. Certainly there were substantial challenges within a few miles
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of this bank. Travelling to Alaska to shoot a bear and drag it back to a bank
in Manila seemed the ultimate in aloofness.
The remainder of the afternoon was spent independently, and after
dressing for dinner we were picked up by Ditos for a dinner in a private club
with some very special guests. Dinner was at the Nielsen Tower, a club that
is in the old tower for the long-gone Manila airport, Nielsen Field. Inside it
was all wood paneling, red velvet, and very quiet. No rabble here, or even
any middle class. We were escorted into a private room, and the rest of the
party joined us there. They were Mr. Prud Europa. a personal assistant of
President Marcos. Judge Hector Donato. the President's financial advisor, and
General Barrangan, Commander of the Presidential Security Command. This
then was about as close to the Marcos inner circle as you could get.
After we sat down, having made the introductions. Ditos read a copy
of a just-received Reagan statement. In it the U.S. president called for both
sides to work together in trying to form a viable government. Further, it
indicated that there was evidence of a strong two-party system in the
Philippines, and that there had been clear indications of local support for
both sides. This group seemed quite satisfied with the statement, which
appeared to me to be carefully worded in an effort to remain clear of any
real commitment. I was sure that it would not sit well with the Aquino
people, as it really made the Lugar mission superfluous. In spite of the
Senator s comments upon leaving the Philippines it seemed to have had little
effect on the President.
Conversation was pretty much of a general nature for the majority of
the evening. The Judge is an animated and outgoing man, the General just
the opposite. We tried to draw the General into a discussion on the
insurgency, the NPA, and military needs. His stiff military bearing never
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slipped an inch, and he was quite sure that the NPA could be defeated in less
than a year, if they just received the Presidential go-ahead and adequate
communications/ logistical equipment from the U.S. No other help needed or
desired. When I posed a question on the viability of additional helicopters
he initially deferred to the Judge, who asserted that the answer was in
schools and roads. When these were in place the army could respond in a
timely fashion, and the government could fight the ignorance and poverty
that were the root causes of the insurgency. The General was not of the
same mind in this, and with a wave of his hand assured us that NPA growth
was the result of dedicated communist recruitment. I then asked him if
helicopters weren't perfectly suited to this type of warfare. Possibly sensing
a potential good deal—for they didn't know why we were 'really'' there— the
General roused himself to very forcefully insist that new helicopters would
be the ideal way of fighting the guerillas, and that the Army would
definitely be interested in aquiring some. He was less impressive in
addressing himself to matters outside his own area of expertise—which was
protecting the President and Malacanang Palace. I asked him what he
thought were the regional/strategic implications of the Soviet buildup in Cam
Ranh Bay. and he never did answer the question, just changed subjects.
Other items that the group discussed were:
• the role of the Philippine Navy: not much really, which was reflected in
their low priority in the budget process. They allegedly have done a
good job in restricting gun smuggling.
• the U.S. bases: definitely a key to regional stability and the maintenance
of the balance of power.
• President Marcos: the only one that can effectively fight the NPA, as his
own war experience allowed him to conduct the overall campaign. (This
was the General's point.) When I asked if, in fact, the general staff was^
not the informational base for decision- making in the war against
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insurgency, not the Chief Executive, the General was stuck. He didn't
want to underrate his own importance, but he also didn't want to lose
the point he was making. He solved the problem by not answering the
question.
He asserted that when President Marcos was announced as having
been reelected, the llocanos (the President's own ethnic group) would lead
the resignation of the cabinet in a show of faith, allowing the President to
keep those that he wanted.
Shortly after dessert the General said goodbye, claiming that he had to
get back to his post. I have no real way of assessing his influence on ihe
others, but after he left the Judge, who had been fairly* quiet, made a
staggering change in his position. Dr. Buss opened the conversation with four
themes, which he posed as questions:
1
)
What was the President's view of himself--did he have a sense of his
role in history/how he would be remembered, and did he worry about
this?
2) Was there anyone in the President's family who could follow him—any
sons, daughters, or sons-in-law that were capable of carrying out the
family line in power?
3) What should be done first if the President received his mandate to
remain in office?
4) What could the U.S. do?
Remember that we considered ourselves to be in the company of the
most dedicated of Marcos supporters possible, and conversations subsequent
to this evening demonstrated that this was not an erroneous assumption. As
the Judge, who was now very clearly the "senior" Filipino in the room,
answered the first question I thought he had misstated himself in relative
unfamiiiarity with English. When he repeated himself in clarification his
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statement was staggering in it's implication. His response was that when the




that he was the man who imposed martial law, illegally and in the
absence of any real communist threat, and that
2) everything he did afterwards was a failure, specifically the New Society.
He went on to say that a third line was looming— that
3) he had failed to recognize that reforms were mandatory after not
getting any mandate from the people. He asserted that after Marcos did
win--the implication being that this was assured—he would get only
"peanuts'" in the electoral difference, no more than 1 or 1 1/2 million
votes out of 26 million.
These statements were made with such vehemence, such emotion, that
I was incredulous. As I listened I said to myself that Marcos was finished.
If the people that were closest to him, and very highly placed in the KBL,
were this angry, and this demoralized, then the KBL would self-destruct.
The process was obviously well underway.
His outburst left the table totally silent for a few moments, and I was
watching Prud and Ditos. Both were uncomfortable, and were looking down
at the table. Significantly, however, neither made any attempt to take an
opposing view.
Judge Donato went on. He said that the President heard only "good"
news, and that in keeping with Ilocano tradition a younger man must ask an
elder's opinion of a matter prior to stating his own view, and thus the
President always gave his ideas first, and no one would then contradict him,
right or wrong. The Judge asserted that he knew two people who had the
capability of approaching the President with the message that after re-
election he must make the following reforms:
I) Fire the crooked, incompetent cabinet members/hangers-on around him
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(I thought this an incredible statement from a self-admitted 20-year
hanger-on...) He included the family in this category.
2) Free the media, especially television.
3) Get lmelda out of government. She was never supposed to have control
over the President, she was not bright or astute enough, and she never
had been.
These comments accurately reflected the viewpoint of the opposition,
and were put both succinctly and emotionally. Coming from a man that was
said to be in the absolute innermost circle of Marcos compadres it was an
astounding commentary, and one that we were totally unprepared to hear.
There was little to say other than to ask questions of clarification on the
various points, and the evening ended shortly thereafter. As soon as Dr.
Buss and I got into the car I made the following comments: 1) that I thought
this was a stunning revelation, 2) that Ditos and Prud may have looked
uncomfortable, but they didn't object, and 3) that Ditos had expedited every
one of the interviews we had been having, and this evening in particular was
no accident. The inclusion of the General, and his time of leaving was
speculative, but in my view it had to be taken as important that we had
been made available for this forum of extraordinary candor. My final
comment was that I thought that this information was too hot, and too vital
not to pass on, and that it should go to Ambassador Bosworth.
Dr. Buss was in total agreement.
The next day started with a breakfast meeting with Hezel Gacutan,
and the discussion centered largely on the changes that were going to have
to be made if the Philippines was going to avoid more serious problems.
Hezel's agenda was as follows:
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• Conversion of the media to private enterprises; insistence on impartiality.
• Reform of the Judiciary, and a free, non-partisan legal system.
• Creation of a true bipartisan or non-partisan Commission of Elections.
• Cleaning out of the Cabinet.
• Economic reform/ privatization.
• Law and order.
• Creation of infrastructure to bring government to the outlying areas.
I found it interesting that since the election had occurred everyone
was in agreement that there was immediate need for reform. Even
President Marcos used the word reform, indicating a tacit understanding that
the existing situation was rotten and needed revamping. My feeling was
that those in government realized that they would probably win closely, and
then only through deceit, and that they would have to make immediate and
meaningful changes to keep the people out of the streets.
Our afternoon appointment was at the Sign of the Anvil with one of, if
not the, leading economists in the Philippines. Jesus "Jess" Estanisiao. The
discussion started with a question. What is your overall feeling, now that
the election has taken place? The answer: aggravation. His basic
aggravation stemmed from the needless amount of manipulation that had
taken place prior to and during the election, and the fraud that had been so
widespread and expensive. He believed that if Marcos had just conducted an
honest election, and spent more time on substantive issues instead of
attacking Cory, that he would have won anyway. The following points were
made by Estanisiao:
103
• There had been an unprecedented level of good citizen " involvement in
the election.
• The public institutions had been the big losers in the campaign fraud.
• There was no valid reason for the delay in the COMELEC Operation Quick
Count. There was a precedent for it in the Macapagal- Marcos election,
and the count was done rapidly; the estimate turned out to be extremely
close to the final tally. He had taken part in this earlier effort.
• The substance of the Lugar mission was correct, but the first statement
was too quick and too positive, while the later statements were too
negative.
• The great question post-election was. now what? He feared that the
institutions necessary to remove the old guard were not available.
• Culturally Filipinos root for the underdog (another inherited American
value?) and Marcos made a serious tactical error when he blocked the
media to the opposition.
• Marcos' attacking Cory as being soft on Communism was a cheap shot, as
she had no record of any such position.
• There was so much paranoia and one-man control at the top that he
could not even release national inflation figures without the President's
O.K..
• It was vital that the media—particularly television—be made non- ?
partisan.
» There would not be any substantive reform as long as President Marcos
remained.
• The moderates in positions of governmental influence --like Ditos and
himself—would try to cooperate with the government after a Marcos win,
but most would not. Many upper level persons were having doubts
about their ability to continue to work for Marcos. The example given
was Alex Melchor, Governor of the Development Bank of the Philippines.
Jess said that such people would present a lower and lower profile, and
would, "cooperate the minimum possible, but won't be gung-ho."
• Many people saw the election as a test, and would have stuck with
President Marcos had he given it an honest try.
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In summary he said that there would be protest after Marcos was
announced as the winner, and this would take the form of boycotting crony
businesses, such as San Miguel beer, boycotting the crony press and TV, and
by not paying taxes on April 15th. Further, he said that the President was
aware of these possibilities. The point of such a non-violent protest would
be to pressure the President to step down. Then a new election would be
necessary. If the protest became violent, he saw the possibility of a coup d
etat becoming greater.
The point was made that the country and it's electoral processes were
stronger for having had the election, and that a boycott of the election, as
some had called for, would not have produced these results. Jess was urged
by Dr. Buss not to play into the President's hands by forcing the meeting of
violence by violence. Instead, fight him with those things he did not
understand: finance and industry, peaceful non-violent confrontation (non-
Marxist). Jess was asked. Could you work within a new Marcos
government?'" The answer was an unqualified no, that such a new
government would have no legitimacy.
As far as the U.S. position. Jess asserted that we must take two paths:
moral indignation and economic measures. He said that we would alienate
the Filipino people for a "long, long time'" if we were seen as propping up
Marcos. No doubt in such a scenario Marcos would be very grateful, as that
would be the only support he would get, but it would only buy us trouble in
the long run. The longer that Marcos stayed in power, the larger the
insurgency would grow.
Dr. Buss recalled that in Korea, when we wanted to topple Syngman
Rhee, the signal was the halting of all military aid to the country. This
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stiffened the students' backbone, and brought them to the streets. The U.S.
Congress had already voted to halt aid if the election was not clean.
Returning to his personal involvement in the current crisis, Jess told
us that there were two watersheds in his conversion to the anti- Marcos side:
1) he was appalled when the President made his statement that violence
would be met with violence, because the government held all the cards, and
2) when the 30 women computer operators walked out of the COMELEC
count. This had occurred the day before, and was in response to their being
expected to accept rigged numbers in the incoming "vote". Jess was
emphatic that the walkout was legitimate, and not a political ploy by either
side. In answer to a query by Dr. Buss on the utility of a Philippine-
American academic conference Jess was very enthusiastic. He named the
following potential invitees to represent the Philippines:
Pepe Miranda— Univ. of the Philippines
Jose Marivelas—representing the Left
Rene Agissez—UNIDO
Alex Melchor—representing the Right
Cecil Buenaventura
Roy Navarro-SGV
Ed Angarra—NAMFREL and education
Boy Hererra-NAMFREL and labor
As we left, Ditos told us that Jess is single, and a member of Opus Dei,
an extremely committed element of the Catholic Church. Like others I had
met, 1 hoped he would be able to serve in the future in a more influential
post.
At 2:30 we attended the afternoon press conference at the Aquino
headquarters. Press spokesman Rene Saguisag told the assembled
journalists that Cory was biding her time until the National Assembly made
it's proclamation of a winner. He then read a statement deploring the
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murder of opposition figure Evelio Javier, killed in Antique. The murder had
already been linked to National Assembly Majority leader and Marcos
henchman Arturo Pacificador, and was the worst example of election
violence to date.
This day had also seen the announcement of the sending of
Ambassador Philip Habib to the Philippines by President Reagan. Cory
released a statement acknowleging the visit, and it was fairly strong. She
would welcome him, but could not forget that his last posting was to
Lebanon. The implication seemed to be that he had little success there. In
talking to Teddy Locsin it seemed that what they were really upset about
was the supposition that Reagan was sending him to get Cory and Marcos to
kiss and makeup". Presumably after Marcos was announced the winner.
Campaign workers in the headquarters were furious. Teddy told us
hotly that Cory would not see Habib when he came. Allegedly Cory had said,
"the hell with ail Americans!" in a fit of pique over what they saw as the
mission of the Habib visit. We were particularly upset over this. What
ensued was practically two hours with Dr. Buss, Teddy, and Mark Brown in
an effort to defuse their anger and tell them something about the man.
Ambassador Habib is a close personal friend of Dr. Buss' and it was
somewhat providential that he was there.
What we tried to point out to them was that the Lugar mission had
most likely returned with somewhat of a mixed report, as at least some of
the delegates were at precincts where no fraud was observed. Since any
statement that the American president makes has the potential of radically
infuencing events--by virtue of what it says or doesn't say--he must be
extremely careful. That being the case, one could see that the statements
that President Reagan had been* making, which admittedly were non-
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controversial, were an effort to maintain a holding pattern until he could get
some solid, trustworthy information on which to base a plan of action. Then
too it was known that there was a serious split between the White House and
the State Department over Cory Aquino's abilities.
Philip Habib was the perfect man for this sort of mission. He is vastly
experienced, has the respect of the world's leaders as a negotiator, and never
takes a mission unless he has a clear understanding of his motives and his
authority. He would be empowered to speak for the President, or he
wouldn't have come. Further, and perhaps most importantly. Dr. Buss told
Teddy and Mark—for Cory's ears— that Ambassador Habib absolutely could
not abide Marcos personally. In the past several years he had had probably
twenty trips to the Far East, during which he would normally have stopped
in the Philippines several times. In every case he deferred coming because
he would be expected to pay a courtesy call on Malacanang. and this he
would not do.
This bit of background made a difference to the Aquino strategists,
and I could see that they were reassessing their position. We went on to
stress that it was absolutely vital that they not close the door on a friend as
potentially powerful as the United States, and that it was critical that Habib
get the real picture, and thus be in a position to convince President Reagan of
what must be done. He must cut the ties to Marcos.
My feeling was, and I tried very hard to get it across, that i£ the U.S.
showed support for Cory, or even withdrew support from Marcos, much of
the KBL higher and middle level circles would defect. Should this occur, the
structure propping Marcos up would crumble. This could precipitate his fail
much faster than boycotts, etc.
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It was vital to get across to Cory that the U.S. position was not yet
firm, and that she needed to let Habib assess things firsthand. He could not
do that if one side in the struggle would not see him. Dr. Buss finished with
a plea—see him once at least. If you think you are getting the run-around,
then walk out. But see him once. With this Teddy and Mark went back
upstairs to see Cory.
She would see him.
We returned to the Manila Hotel and as we entered the lobby we were
waved over to a table by Rev Gregorio, who was with about 7 or 8 of his
friends, mostly university professors. I had to drop some things in my room.
and when I returned Dr. Buss was gone. I sat next to Rev and asked him if
he knew where Dr. Buss had disappeared to. A finger pointed through the
glass that separates the bar from the Roma Ristorante Italian restaurant.
Looking through. 1 spotted Dr. Buss at a table with several others, including
Emma Valeriano. Then I noticed that the center seat at the table was taken
by the First Lady. Imeida herself.
Suddenly several things became apparent: the three maitre d's. the
body guards at the door to the restaurant, the pat-downs as people with
reservations entered, and the large number of very high-ranking Army
officials in the near vicinity. I laughed in wonderment at Dr. Buss
connections, and went on to have a drink and talk about the day's events.
The table was split along Marcos/Aquino lines, but they were first and
foremost friends and peers, and the banter was lively and very good
natured. A few minutes later Emma came out into the lobby, looking for
someone, and when she saw me came directly over, a smile on her face.
Come ", she said, taking me by the arm, "you must meet the First Lady.
"
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We waltzed by the guard and she escorted me up to the table, where
she introduced me to the First Lady. Imelda looked me over politely, but
very reservedly, as if to say, who is this person, and why is he here? Emma
explained that I was here with Dr. Buss, (who was grinning at my
centerstage position), and the First Lady indicated the only empty chair at
the table and pronounced, "you must join us for dinner. " Could one say no?
The table consisted of Emma, Dr. Buss. Roy Rowan from Fortune
magazine, the wife of the Philippine Ambassador to Italy, the First Lady, and
Paul Mountfort and Matt Freeman, of the Stone, Mountfort and Kelly PR firm.
Shortly after I sat down. Paul Mountfort, who was very slick, in a 600 dollar
suit, and manner to match, had to leave, and this left the place next to the
First Lady empty. I moved over and filled it. Luckily none of the guards
took offense at my initiative.
Dinner lasted five hours and consisted of five courses, two wines.
capaccino, and the world according to Imelda'. The First Lady was, in a
word, holding court. After sitting through this performance the word
sycophant took on new meaning. It was undeniably fascinating, hearing all
the stories and anecdotes for the first time, but as Dr. Buss later confirmed, it
never changed, and quickly became tiresome. It was obvious that those in
her circle had heard all of the stories many times, and they prompted her at
appropriate times and laughed rather too loud and too long. Mrs. Marcos
had a habit of telling most stories, and punchlines, two or three times, as if
they were so clever that we would enjoy them several times in succession.
They weren t, and we didn't.
She really had the patter down. Key phrases and concepts were
delivered with a smoothness that can only come with practiced repetition.
The same was true of her strategic/sociohistoric lectures. She gave me quite
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an education on the pivotal role of the Philippines in the world, complete
with charts, maps and graphs. These were drawn by her on a pad of paper
that magically appeared as soon as she started down this conversational
path. Three pens and markers were provided of different colors and widths,
but all proved unsuitable, and a mass search by the guards ensued.
Eventually they found one she liJced. I had her sign the last masterpiece.
Later Dr. Buss told me I should entitle it, "I earned this."
Some impressions drawn from the dinner:
• her pensiveness when discussing the President, whom she asserted was
the most capable and far-seeing man in the world today.
• honest delight in telling of her negotiations with Muammar Khadaffy,
who she labelled as "a momma's boy."
• imperious indulgence when a Scandanavian journalist literally barged his
way into her presence, introduced himself (uninvited by Emma, whose
function it was to do such things), and then went on and on about his
need for an interview with her. Emma literally took him by the arm and
dragged him out of the room.
• her genuine pleasure at hearing my observation that daughter lmee in
person had surpassed any photographs I had seen of her, and how
beautiful she was.
The overall impression I received, however, was one of detachment, as
if she really wasn't totally with us. Dr. Buss said he thought she saw the
sword of Damocles hanging over her head, and this may very well have been
the case.
One can see that she must have been a figure of great beauty and
charm at one time, but that time is past, and she looked to me to be the
product of too much of the good life. She was still mentally sharp, and no
doubt dangerous when threatened, but I did not think she was a match for
Cory. Imelda seemed to me to be out of touch with reality, or had lied to
herself and the President for so long that she could no longer distinguish the
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truth. She stated to me that NAMFREL and UNIDO had cheated and were
trying to steal the election.
She was practically rabid on the subject of the "clerical fascists'—of
whom Cardinal Sin was the chief troublemaker. Repeatedly she referred to
her countrymen as, 'my little people.' She was visibly agitated on the
subject of Mrs. Aquino. The audacity of this Mrs. Aquino, thinking she could
run the country. "Imagine— a housewife!!!" Her final comment on the
election was that the people had been cheated, not by Marcos, but by those
who would cheat the Philippines out of his leadership. It was an incredible
evening, and it ended for our table at 1:30 in the morning. As we got up to
say goodbye a group of men came to take our places, Rey among them.
Imelda said now it was time to see "her boys." Rey later told me they were
released from post-campaign strategy at 4:30 A.M.
The next day, the 13th, we met with Doy Laurel. The meeting was in a
study in the back of the Laurel home, and seated at the table were Inday
and myself, Dr. Buss, Vice Presidential candidate Laurel, his wife Celia, his
sister, a son-in-law, and ex-Vice President of the Philippines Manny Pelaez.
The meeting started off with Doy noting that their perception of the
U.S. attitude was that Reagan wanted to solve the problem in the Philippines
simply, and was saying, "why don't you guys kiss and makeup." We were
back to the Habib mission again. Doy went on to say that if that was the
attitude of Reagan and Habib, then Habib would fail. Why?
1) the U.S. must be more definitive, and realize that this is a decision-
breaking point for the Philippines. To date, the Reagan statements had
been platitudes, and the Filipino people would no longer sit for
platitudes.
2) the close relationship between our two countries could easily change.
3) the hard evidence was available on the election rigging, but they felt it
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should not be necessary to close the book on Marcos, the U.S. should
recognize him for what he is. And has been.
As to what the U.S. should do, it came down to deciding where we
stood. The fight was between the Filipino people and the Marcos regime.
We had to publicly choose, and choose carefully.
If the election announcement was for Marcos as expected, there was
every expectation that he would not be able to govern effectively. To
"assist" in this decline in efficiency there would be bank strikes, work
slowdowns, black outs, noise barrages, tax withholding, general strikes, and
boycotts. In other words, civil disobedience. The dilemma that the U.S.
found itself in was that it must either:
1
)
do nothing, and Marcos would continue. Things would worsen at an
accelerated pace, or
2) do something, and risk being criticized for intervention. There was the
possibility that even if the best of outcomes was achieved, the
intervention angle would negate the good.
Basically, then, Reagan had to pick: Marcos, the Moderates, or the
Leftists.
Dr. Buss asked Doy about his chances of winning, and he conceded that
there was speculation that a Marcos/Laurel victory might emerge. This was
a problem for him, and he first stated that he would honor the mandate of
the people. I then asked him specifically if he would serve under Marcos,
and in answer to the direct question he said, "I will not serve under Marcos."
This still left the question of which was stronger, the mandate of the people,
or "I will not serve under Marcos."
Vice President Pelaez stated that in his opinion the best thing for
Ambassador Habib to do was to tell Marcos to concede, and then work on
Tolentino, offering him asylum in the U.S..
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Their bottom line was that Marcos could not govern. He would not
have any legitimacy, and should not expect the people to adhere to the law.
Furthermore, if he continued in power he would create enough new
communists that eventually they would take over. No one wanted to see
that. Should it happen people would never again trust an election.
The son-in-law spoke up to say that already educated middleciass
youth were organizing assassinations of people like COMELEC Chairman Jaime
Opinion. No one looked askance at him, and it was just another indication of
the extent of feelings there.
Dr. Buss then reviewed these points and went on to give Doy the same
reasoning for seeing Ambassador Habib that we had given Teddy the day
before. Doy showed us a statement he had ready to release that afternoon.
In it he said he would not meet with Habib. He told us that it had been
written in response to telegrams he had received from six of his regional
campaign chiefs advising him not to see Habib. After listening he ripped '.he
statement up. Once again it seemed as if the timing of our visit could not
have been much better.
I was impressed that this was very much a family affair. Often the
wife or sister made comments, and they were given equal weight. Thi:: was
also true of Inday. I had also been impressed with Doy's apparent
commonsense and the organisation that appeared to be at work. There did
seem to be that breakdown in communication between Doy's and Cory's
people.
Prior to our leaving Dr. Buss made a good point. When Ambassador
Habib saw President Marcos he would be presented with a detailed brief on
the legality of the election and on all incidences of fraud perpetrated by the
opposition. (Whether there were any or not.) It seemed only good planning
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to have something concrete and unemotional to give Ambassador Habib
outlining how the government cheating had been accomplished. It did not
have to be discussed with him, just presented for him to look at later. There
must be lots of opposition lawyers around, put some of them to work. Vice
President Pelaez replied that it was an excellent idea, and that he would take
care of it.
Lunch was with Alex Melchor, and Inday dropped us at the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). where Alex is the banks
Governor. I knew Alex only by reputation, because he was an Annapolis
graduate. His ties to Marcos went way back, but he was characterized as
basically an honest, hard working man by most accounts. According to Ditos.
Alex had been Executive Secretary to President Marcos in 1972, and it was
he that actually oversaw the implementation of martial law. He found that
the government was so corrupt and inefficient that he started planting
people he personally knew in positions throughout the various ministries, at
middle levels. He did this in order to complete projects that he was working
on. Basically he just wanted to get things done. Unfortunately, this was
interpreted by the First Lady and Kokoy Romualdez, her brother, as being a
method of preparing for an eventual takeover. They considered him a CIA
plant to bump off Marcos.
One of his major positions was head of the Philippine Aerospace
Corporation, which he put into operation under the President's authority.
The President directed him to make helicopter gunships, and he put two
together, being primarily interested in developing an indigenous aircraft
manufacturing capability. The First Lady seized on the gunships as proof
that he was preparing to storm Malacanang, and Alex was called into Marcos
to account for these accusations. He played them down, but apparently
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Marcos wanted to clip his power, while leaving him in his position. Allegedly
Alex said no, just abolish the position. Subsequent to this he became the
Director of the Asian Development Bank, and then the Governor of the DPB.
He had served as a special envoy to the United States, and in 1983-1984 was
the President of General Services.
Lunch was served in his office, at the largest table I had ever seen. It
was at least twelve feet across and forty feet long. There were six guests,
three on each side, and there was l&Ls_ of space between us. The conversation
was the standard election variety. Alex was absolutely convinced that
reforms had to come immediately if Marcos stayed in power. He told us that
his wife and daughters were very pro-Cory. He struck me as essentially
honest, immensely capable, and as a person with a wealth of personal
experience. After the luncheon Dr. Buss made the suggestion to Ditos that
Alex would make the perfect Philippine Ambassador to the United States.
Instead, after the following remarkable week, and Cory s victory. Alex
accepted her offer to be the Philippine Ambassador to the USSR.
Our next stop was at the U.S. Embassy, where we gave Mary Carlin a
quick brief on what we had heard from the various people, and our efforts to
calm Cory/Doy and urge them to see Ambassador Habib. We gave her our
impressions of the meeting with Laurel, and the absolute necessity for
Ambassador Habib to get the straight word as early in his trip as possible.
Dr. Buss made an offer/request to stay past his scheduled departure date to
speak to him if possible. Mary said she would pass this on to Ambassador
Bosworth immediately.
At dinner later that night Dawn Fowler told us how she had observed
military helicopters flying over their neighborhood in formation, and
thinking this to be unusual, called Dennis. He got in a car at the embassy and
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followed them to Malacanang, where they appeared to be making practice
emergency extractions. Interesting.
It had now been a week since the election. Ditos Bondoc was in
agreement that there was much dissention at the top of the present
leadership, and the KBL was on shaky foundations. We made the
observation that there were presently three groups of people with choices to
make: the Marcos group, the Cory Group, and the Laurel group, and it was
important to differentiate between them. Once again we reviewed our
observations on the apparent distance between Cory's people and Laurel's.
Lunch was with Rev Gregorio. and this was the first time we had seen
each other since the night with the First Lady. He told us that he made a
suggestion to the First Lady that she disestablish the Ministry of Human
Settlements, and split it's funding up to the other ministries that are in place.
In this way perhaps more of the money would trickle down to the needy.
Apparently she didn t comment on his plan, and judging from her glowing
comments to me on her many good works I seriously doubted that she
would ever willingly disestablish her power base.
Rey made the point that it was time that she went back to being a
sweet, pretty, symbolic First Lady. She wasn't elected, and it was ridiculous
for her to be the Governor of MetroManila, which she was. Dr. Buss and Rey
were in agreement that the time was ripe to implement reforms, not prepare
new studies of what needs to be done. There were scores of well done
studies gathering dust.
Later that night I decided to see a film. The movie Delta Force was
playing at the huge Luneta theater, and I purchased a ticket in the balcony.
The movie was very much an anti- terrorism "Rambo". in which the might of
America was able, through superior moral fortitude, intelligence, technology,
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and sheer courage, to overcome the vicious and cruel Third World terrorists.
Chuck Norris was decked out in black stretch nylon, and every member of
his team was adorned with a patch of the American flag on their sleeves.
With the current vacillation in the Reagan administration over Marcos
I thought that it would be very interesting to observe the Filipino reaction to
this movie. It might provide a very good clue as to the depth of any anti-
American feeling in the city. I needn't have worried. Chuck was everyone s
hero, and the Americans were roundly cheered as they kicked the inept
Palestinians around.
Much later that night 1 got a call from Teddy and Mark Drown, into
their second or third drink as 1 joined them, and somewhat down. 1 think
they were getting worn out by the campaign, and specifically by the waiting
that was now going on while the National Assembly played with the
numbers. They had scheduled a large rally at the Luneta for Sunday the
16th, and earlier had made the decision to have Cory publicly pro-claimed as
the President, with opposition members of the National Assembly in
attendence. 1 had been opposed to this because I thought that it left Marcos
with no options except a crackdown, and possibly her arrest. Mow Teddy
told me that the rally would not include the proclamation. She would initiate
the civil disobedience program, and would refer to the recent Bishop's
pastoral letter calling for the same. There would be only two speakers. Doy
and Cory. I told them that I thought it was extremely important that Cory
put herself over as a statesperson. and remain measured, dignified and
powerful, not emotional or strident. Other nations were sizing her up as a
potential leader, and as someone that they had to decide to deal with or not.
A key person would be Ambassador Habib. and he would be looking. I
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thought, to see if she was the future leader of 57.000,000 people that the
U.S. could work with and depend on to adequately represent those people.
We spoke of the many clergy figures on her advisory staff, most
notably Father Joaquin Eernas, and 1 asked Teddy about their willingness to
step down should she assume the Presidency. He told me that they were
already making jokes about working themselves out of jobs, and that he
didn't think it would be a real problem. And as it turned out, he was right.
The following morning we had a discussion with Carl Lande, and Carl
was very positive that the Reagan administration had to make a strong
statement, and now. He thought it should include the following:
1) The elections were witnessed, and included massive fraud by the
government.
2) The Filipino people have expressed their choice for Cory, and
3) Marcos can no longer govern effectively.
In Carl's own words the U.S. needed to make, "a bold step, tor
tremendous gams.' We had to derecogmze the Marcos government.
"Equivocation is seen as betrayal.'' Then followed a discussion on the merits
of various strategies of backing away from Marcos. The announced
suspension of further military aid was still his favored method.
Dr. Buss and 1 had a subsequent appointment at the embassy with
Scott Hallford, the Counselor for Political Affairs. He is a very likeable
person, and has that undeniable spark of intelligence in his eye. He toid us
that they had learned that President of the University of the Philippines Ed
Angarra and Cory advisor Jaime Ongpin were among those who found
themselves disenfranchised in the election. The embassy had discovered
that Ronnie Zamora had masterminded the project for Marcos, and it
involved a very sophisticated computer study of voting patterns from the
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1984 national election. This established the names and areas targeted for
deletion from the registration roils.
Hallford then outlined the following scenarios that he saw possible:
1) a military coup that Marcos would engineer himself. The military would
then split and he would control the loyalists in power from behind the
scenes.
2) a valid military coup as a result of the Cory rallies/civil disobedience.
3) trying to make do with Marcos as had been the status quo. A continued
deterioration in the Philippines, increase of the NPA, decline in the
economy, and the further radicalization of the middle class.
4) Ambassador Habib expediting an agreed-upon nullification of the
election. Cory agreeing to it, with the understanding that Marcos would
step down in 1987.
As to the U.S. actions necessary, Scott agreed that "equivocation is no
good." He mused that dealing with a dictator was acceptable as long as the
man kept his end of the bargain, that is, maintained a stable government.
Marcos had lost that capability. It seemed that even in the world of
realpolitik Marcos had gone too far. Hallford agreed that it would be good if
Dr. Buss could see Ambassador Habib, and would let him know what they
could arrange. »
When Ambassador Habib did arrive they met. Dr. Buss had thought
long and hard on the message that he would deliver, it would have to be
short, direct, and carry the essence of what we had seen. What he finally




2) Cory Aquino was a force in her own right, and not just an opposition
figurehead.
3) It wasn't over yet.
Truer words were never spoken. It wasn't over by a long shot
120
VII. THE REVOLUTION
By Friday, the fourteenth of February, election returns from 97% of
the precincts had been tabulated by the National Assembly. They gave
Marcos 53.8 % of the vote, with 10,184,710 votes to Mrs. Aquino's 8,73 1,999,
or 46.2 %. The NAMFREL count was reporting only 67.5% of the precincts,
but it held Mrs. Aquino ahead 52.4% to Marcos' 47.6%.
Perhaps the most telling statistic of all was the vote in Manila. Within
the city, which was certainly the most politically active area of the country,
and a known center of opposition strength, only some 2.5 million of 4.3
million possible votes had been cast The conservative estimates were that
at least a million voters had been effectively disenfranchised.
As the results became known the Church took an unprecedented step.
The bishops released a statement at a news conference in which they said
that a government which "assumes or retains power through fraudulent
means has no moral basis"'. They urged all Filipinos to "a non-violent
struggle for justice."' The moral basis for civil disobedience had been laid,
next would come the political basis.
Shortly before midnight Saturday the National Assembly finished its
dirty work. As the opposition members of the Assembly filed out in protest
of the tabulation Assembly Secretary-General Antonio de Guzman read the
proclamation reinstating Marcos as President. Tolentino was announced as
the winner of the Vice-Presidential race. The final figures gave Marcos
53.8% of the vote, winning by a margin of 1,515,481 votes. Daughter Imee
led the packed Marcos house in cheers, and the chanting of "Marcos pa rin!"',
his campaign slogan. Indeed, it did seem like it might still be Marcos.
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Two hours alter the proclamation. Ambassador Habib arrived for his
briefings. Dr. Buss met Air Force One at the runway. Had Marcos presented
Habib with a fait accompli?
Cory held her largest rally since the election the following Sunday It
was a sunny day, and once again the gigantic Luneta Park and grandstand
were full to overflowing. As Teddy Locsin had anticipated, she called to the
throngs assembled before her and those listening on Radio Veritas, to begin
an immediate program of civil disobedience. The active breakdown of
Marcos' power over the Philippines had begun.
Listeners were urged to boycott crony owned businesses, like the
popular and modern Rustan's department stores. The call to boycott the
Cojuangco-controlled San Miguel Corporation had more personal impact for
most Filipinos. It produced both San Miguel beer and Coca-Cola. Even Cory
had doubts that political fortitude would reduce the consumption of these
two popular drinks. The announced boycott of seven major banks had a
more immediate effect. Though he claimed that it was only a matter of
coincidence, Central Bank Governor Jose "Jobo" Fernandez raised interest
rates the following day. The economy was already in a shambles, and with
foreign investors frightened by political instability the announcement would
surely drive further capital away. Domestic savers heeded the boycott, and
long lines formed at the crony banks, like the Coco Bank, as withdrawals
were made. In an effort to slow the process, the bank instituted a new
procedure in which the investor would have to come to the bank in person to
make their withdrawals. To the bank's surprise they did.
This same day Habib met with both Marcos and Mrs. Aquino. In the
separate meetings he kept his peace, and primarily listened. While Marcos
later claimed "he was not here to render judgment on the conduct of the
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election, nor to make any suggestion on the running of Philippine internal
affairs", Habib did pass on President Reagan's concern over the election
fraud.
The meeting with Cory was particularly cordial, and the two got along
from the start. Teddy Lccsin. who sat in the initial meeting to take notes and
act as a witness, characterized their relationship as one which became
progressively warmer. It was evident that Habib was not in Manila to
reconcile the implacable foes, but to see things for himself. Just the same
Mrs. Aquino assured him that she intended to prevail, the only solution
being "a swift and orderly transition to the Aquino presidency that the
Filipino people had chosen overwhelmingly at the polls.' She had now
clearly made the point that she considered herself the legally elected
president, based on the NAMFREL count.
The following day the peso fell over 10% in value, and the boycott
seemed to be having an effect. This same day. in a speech before Congress.
Senator Jim Stasser (D-Tenn.) asked that all U.S. aid to the Philippines be
halted in order to "withdraw U.S. taxpayer support for the corrupt,
authoritarian regime'' o"? Marcos. The White House quickly moved to issue a
statement calling such an action premature. It was clear that they would not
be embroiled in further characterizations until Habib had returned with his
report.
Marcos was becoming less and less sure that his audacity would
prevail once again. He made pointed references to what he claimed was
foreign intervention in the internal affairs of our people.'' More alarmingly,
he began to cite bases for smashing the civil disobedience movement, calling
it sedition. Fears for Cory's safety rose, and yet she strode forth into
mammoth crowds, like one in Angeles City, outside of Clark Air Force Base.
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She used the public forum to urge foreign governments not to recognize the
Marcos presidency.
To date only one had. The Soviets. This in itself was seen as
politically embarrassing for Marcos, an avowed anti-communist, and as a
windfall for the U.S.. Even though the Administration had yet to publicly
and officially comment on the presidency, the Soviet proclamation made U.S.
silence look like a positive action. In the Congress matters were taking a
more direct path. Representative Solarz announced that his Subcommittee
on Asian and Pacific Affairs had voted 9-0 to halt direct U.S. aid to the
government of Ferdinand Marcos, and to channel future humanitarian aid
through the Roman Catholic Church and other private groups. Tellingly, four
of the nine voting members were Republicans. Mrs. Aquino quickly put her
stamp of approval on the action.
The real question shaping up was what could the U.S. do? There was
no way of direct intervention, and it was universally agreed upon that
intervention would be the worst thing the United States could do. No matter
who won in the end, charges of neo-imperialism would kill any future role
the U.S. might want to play. Commentator James J. FCirkpatrick made the
point that even if the U.S. could somehow give the presidency to Mrs. Aquino
she would be labeled an American puppet. This was a problem that the
Filipinos had to solve. Either get rid of Marcos or live with him. The choice
was a Filipino choice.
In the United States the mood of the Congress, the media, and the
general public was now almost entirely anti-Marcos. Demonstrations led by
exiled Filipinos outside Congress, the White House, and the Philippine
Consulates around the country called for an end to all support of Marcos.
The mood of the voting public was unmistakable, and politician after
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politician rose to make speeches denouncing Marcos and praising Mrs.
Aquino. The Philippines had not occupied the American consciousness to
this degree since 1393.
On Saturday. February 22 the spark was struck which ignited People
Power.
One of the men supposed to be closest to Marcos, Defense Minister
Enrile, considered his options and deserted the ship of state. He was
associated with the RAM—Reform the Armed Forces Movement—and early
on Saturday he had received word that some 400 RAM officers associated
with him had been ordered picked up and placed under military arrrest.
Further inquiry showed that General Ver, supposedly retired by Marcos
after the election, and subordinate to the Defense Minister in any case, had
ordered the arrests. This could only mean that the orders were actually at
Marcos instigation.
Enrile alleges that he had received information earlier in the week
outlining a Marcos/Ver plan to round up the upper circle of Cory's advisors,
including among others Rene Saguisag. Dante Santos, Joe Concepcion, Tin^
Paterno. Jaime Ongpm. Father Dernas and presumably Teddy Locsin. and
have them killed. The deaths would be blamed on the communists and
Marcos would reimplement martial law. Taking advantage of the chaos, Ver
would have Enrile. Ramos and all of the RAM officers arrested and
liquidated. Complete control of the military would again be assured.
It seemed, then, that this wild scenario might have validity, and Enrile
felt he must move quickly. He telephoned Ramos at home with a
straightforward question. "Will you support us. will you lead us 7 " The
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answer was an unhesitating, "I'll be with you all the way!" They
immediately left Tor Camp Aquinaldo.
The huge camp, home of the Army General Staff Headquarters as well
as the Defense Ministry, sits across the multi-laned EDSA highway from
Camp Crame. the Headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary and National
Police. By 3:00 Enrile had moved into Camp Aquinaldo and through the
leadership of one of the future popular heros of the revolution. Colonel
"Gringo" Honasan, had encircled both camps with armed troops loyal to the
RAM. At 6:00 Enrile and Ramos called the press to assemble. The die was
cast.
"1 cannot in conscience support President Marcos, who thwarted the
people's will in the last election", said Enrile. He went on to assert that in his
home territory, the Cagayan Valley, Marcos had cheated by over 350,000
fake ballots. In a startling revelation he also admitted that the 1972 attempt
on his life had been staged as a reason to implement martial law. For Ramos
the matter was one of professional ethics, and he had never been
demonstrated to be anything but a totally professional soldier. The move
had been a hard one for him. "The armed forces have ceased to be the
armed forces of the people. Soldiers are now the servants of powerful
politicians ", he said.
The RAM movement had already begun to take positive steps prior to
the Enrile-Ramos split. Following the COMELEC computer operators walkout
on Sunday February 9 it was RAM members and RAM vehicles which had
spirited the 30 young women to safety from the COMELEC to Baclaran
Cathedral. And of late they had taken to wearing a patch of the Philippine
flag on their uniforms. The position it was to be worn was changed daiiv and
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passed between members guardedly. This became the method of knowing
who to trust.
At the end of the press conference Enrile and Ramos pledged their
loyalty and support to Cory Aquino, hailing her the "duly appointed
President of the Republic.'' In turn the future President called from Cebu to
find out what was happening. Assuring her that they were all right Enrile
asked her to pray for them.
They ended the press conference with an appeal to the fair, the
dedicated and people-oriented" in the military to come join them in their
crusade. As it stood now they were a tiny force in an indefensible position.
Help came from an unexpected source.
Cardinal Sin had heard the press conference and he went on Radio
Veritas and appealed directly to the people of Manila. "Go to Camp Crame
and Camp Aguinaldo. Lend your support to Enrile and Ramos and protect
them. And bring them food, they have nothing to eat. " In moments peopie
were flying out of their houses with rice pots, sandwiches and soft drinks to
take to the soldiers. And having arrived at EDS A. they stayed. The four day
vigil had begun.
It took very little time for Marcos to react to the news that his Chief of
Staff and Defense Minister had mutinied. He made several attempts to
contact them, first asking that they come visit him at Malacanang. which
they refused, and then speak to him over the telephone, which they also
refused. Enrile did agree to speak to Ver. General Ver expressed surprise at
the actions of the two defectors, and indicated that all of Enrile s fears had
been misplaced. There had been no orders for arrest, he said. Come home,
all is forgiven was the message. Enrile knew better, and ended the phone
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call with a suggestion that they wait until the morning before making any
moves.
Marcos had another trick up his sleeves. At around 11:00 that night
he produced a young Captain, Ricardo Morales, who on camera read his
"confession": "I am a participant in a plot to attack Malacanang Palace and to
kill the President." Marcos went on personally to say that the plot had been
uncovered in the nick of time, that both he and Imeida had been targeted for
death, and that Enrile and Ramos had been integral to it. Unfortunately for
Marcos there had simply been too many instances of stage-managed history,
and people simply would not buy it. Instead the crowd at EDSA continued to
grow throughout the night. Later, at about 1:00 a.m. Marcos changed his
story and brought out yet another "assassin'. He claimed to be one of five
teams which had planned to kill the President and First Lady. Based on this
new information Enrile and Ramos were innocent. Marcos urged them to
"listen to reason and stop this stupidity." As yet no shots had been fired, and
both sides were tense with anticipation. Each time that the President
appeared on television he looked more tired and drawn. The drama was
taking it's toll on an already sick man.
Others within the government had begun to defect. The first was
General Ramon Farolan. then Commissioner of Customs. (Now the Head of
the Air Force). He was quickly followed by the Postmaster, General Roilo
Golez, and Justice of the Supreme Court Nestor Alampay. Media personalities
that had been associated with Marcos came over too. Film superstar Nora
Aunor was the most famous, and she had to make two attempts at getting
into Camp Crame, against a hostile crowd.
Within the opposition media the new star was radio personality June
Keithley, an announcer on Radio Veritas. Having been in on the original
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breaking of the Enrile-Ramos split she stayed on the air virtually throughout
the next four days. To most of Manila she was the voice of the revolution.
On Sunday morning much of the holiday festivity that had blossomed
Saturday night had faded. The people at EDSA were tired and
uncomfortable, though still committed. Discomfort took a backseat to fear
when the word was relayed that tanks were rolling their way. Undaunted,
the people in the streets barricaded the way at the Ortigas Boulevard
intersection using anything they could find, including their own automobiles.
As the tanks (and armored personnel carriers) approached the intersection
people kneeled and lay down in front of them. Flowers were offered to the
soldiers and rosary beads and crucifixes were draped around the gun
barrels. The tanks stopped. After tense moments of confrontation the
Marine Tank Commander ordered his column through a brick wall and into a
grassy field. As they started to turn away the immense crowd be?an
chanting in one voice to the Marines, "WE LOVE YOU. WE LOVE YOU. WE LOVE
YOU !" No shots had been fired, no lives lost.
In talking to people who were there over that fateful weekend one
theme comes up again and again. The EDSA revolution was not as much a
political experience as it was a religious one. There were those that claimed
to feel the presence of God. But even those less mystically inclined will
affirm that the spirit was alive within the crowd, and certainly the Church
was everywhere. Rosaries were said continually, and the priests explained
the mysteries to the surrounding crowd. Hundreds of nuns mingled
throughout the crowd, and talked to the young soldiers, both rebel and
undecided. Images of the Christ child and various saints appeared in the
military compound at easily seen vantage points. At the center of the area,
on Camp Crame across the gate from Camp Aquinaido, a new church is
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already in the progress of being built, on ground consecrated during the
revolution—Our Lady of EDS A.
On Monday emotions were kept on a tight string. Maiacanang had
ordered two jet aircraft to maintain a tight orbit over the area and they did
so. making repeated low passes over the camps. Unknown at the time to the
pilots, even if they had been ordered to strafe the crowd or the military
camps they would have been unable to. The enlisted ordnancemen had
spiked their guns prior to takeoff.
This same day the Navy and most of the Air Force defected, and the
balance of the military was on the rebel side. A tense moment occurred
when an abortive teargas attack was launched simultaneously with the
arrival of helicopter gunships overhead. But the wind shifted miraculously.
blowing the gas back into the attacker's faces, and the helicopter crews flew
low and flashed the LABAN sign. They too had turned.
The bleakest moments of the revolution came when it was discovered
that early reports that Marcos had left were in error. Wild jubilation had
swept the crowd. Ramos leaping into the air at his headquarters in Camp
Crame. June Keithley had announced the good news over RV and was
crushed when she had to get back on the radio and retract it. The
disappointment simply reinforced the EDSA crowds resolve. They would
stick it out to the end. whatever that might be.
A humorous incident occurred when the second group of Armored
Personnel Carriers lumbered up to EDSA. One young man drove his
Volkswagen alongside them as they approached, and before they reached
the crowd he swerved in front of the approaching column and formed a
barricade. The APCs, with their young Marine crews, stopped, and the crowd
gathered. Again the women approached and pleaded with the soldiers to
130
leave them in peace. Again the crucifixes were draped over the .50 calibre
machine gun barrels, and again the Marines, combat hardened from NPA and
MNLF campaigns, went to turn away. This time, however, there was a
problem. The Volkswagon had gotten a flat tire from debris on the road.
The tough Marines dismounted, helped the young man change his tire and
then drove away.
Throughout the weekend the President had had a monopolv on
television. Channel Four was being used as his personal forum, and live
filming from Maiacanang showed the grandchildren cavorting as Marcos and
his generals conferred on the next course of action. At eight o'clock Monday
morning fighting broke out at the television station between rebel and
loyalist troops. When the people heard they ran towards the fighting, and
by one o'clock women volunteers had talked the remaining loyalist troops
out of their holdout positions. At 8:45, in the middle of another Marcos
plot " confession, the station went off the air. Within hours the station was
again transmitting, but the hated Marcos spokesmen were gone, and in their
place was the New Channel Four team. June Keithley now had some
competition.
A rebel F-76 made an attack on the Palace grounds, firing six rockets.
It was following this attack, which deliberately avoided firing on the Palace
itself, that Marcos declared that he and his family were "cowering in fear."
Ail about the city Filipinos were coming to the conclusion that their 20 year
strongman, guerilla fighter, and scourge of communism was actually a
coward, that Cory had been right all along. As this last measure of respect
was stripped away Marcos lost his hold over the Philippines. The Filipinos
had eiorcised their own devil.
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In Washington it was becoming evident that a public statement had to
be made, that the situation in Manila must be acknowledged. Ambassador
Habib met with President Reagan, Caspar Weinberger, the Deputy Director of
the CIA, and Undersecretary of State Mike Armacost. Habib s message to the




2) Anything Marcos did could only worsen the situation.
3) The U.S. should act to prevent the use of force at EDS A.
President Reagan demanded that Marcos receive better treatment from the
U.S. than had the Shah of Iran.
The message was passed to Marcos from Mike Armacost via Labor
Minister Bias Ople, in Washington with Alei Melchor in an effort to stabilize
the Marcos position with the U.S. government. Ople phoned the gist of the
message to Marcos. He was not happy. His response was to issue an
ultimatum to the rebels. Give up now, or he would lead the troops routing
them out himself. Ver begged him to attack, saying that he still had a
massive firepower advantage . But Marcos refused, to everyone's surprise.
Later he was to explain that he was afraid that all of family would be killed
in the counterattack that would surely follow. His lack of action was the
most decent action of ail. Instead he attempted to rely on his own brand of
people power. He asked all of his supporters to come to Malacanang. and
bring their legally owned" weapons. This was later amended to include
illegal weapons as well. Finally the offer was made to supply weapons. A
pitifully small group appeared.
Early on Tuesday morning Marcos placed a call to Senator Paul Laxalt,
whom he considered a friendly witness, and one that had the President s ear.
He asked Laxalt if the President would support a sharing of power until he
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stepped down in 1987. The earlier Reagan statement had read. "Attempts to
prolong the life of the present regime by violence are futile. A solution to
this crisis can only be achieved through a peaceful transition to a new
government.'" Laxalt would not speak for the President. He told the old
dictator that he would confer with President Reagan and call him back.
After conferring with the President and Secretary of State George Shultz he
called back to Malacanang. saying that the President could not advise him
what to do. Marcos then inquired, "Senator, what do you think? Should I
step down?" laxalt's answer was one of the most famous of the revolution.
"Mr. President, I'm not bound by diplomatic restraint. I'm talking only for
myself. I think you should cut and cut cleanly. The time has come. " The
phone went dead for several minutes. Finally Laxalt said. "Mr. President, are
you still there?" Marcos answered in a small voice. 'Yes, I'm still here. I am
so very, very disappointed." 1 It reaily was all over.
Knowing that there was no recourse other than leaving, imeida and
Ferdinand still went ahead with their inauguration ceremony. From the
balcony of the Palace they tried to put on brave faces, and even sang a duet
as in their campaigning days of past. But it was no use. All around
Malacanang, in the university district, preparations were being made for a
siege of the Palace. Burning tires sent plumes of noxious smoke in the air.
and barricades were up everywhere in case the tanks came again.
Following the inauguration ceremony Marcos made one last attempt to
hold on. He telephoned Enrile with an offer that he put together a
provisional government, with Marcos as "honorary" president until 1987.
Enrile refused to be bought, and told Marcos that he and Ramos had already
iNick Joaquin, The Quartet of the Tiger Moon. (Manila: Book Stop, Inc.,
1986).
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declared themselves in support of Mrs. Aquino. Marcos urged him to discuss
the matter with Mrs. Aquino, but again Enrile. who had served Marcos for 2!
years, was aware of his tricks. He would not be led into the kind of
suspicion-arousing inquiry that Marcos wanted. Instead he told Marcos that
he and his family would not be harmed.
Cory came out of sanctuary on Tuesday morning to be sworn in
herself. As of 3:00 a.m. they were frantically attempting to organize the
ceremony. Cardinal Sin was not available to give the invocation and Bishop
Federico (Just call me Freddie...) Escaier was phoned. He had been in Manila
on a visit from Mindanao when the revolution started. "But I don't have j
habit", he explained to Father Bernas. "We'll look for a Jesuit habit in the
house", replied Bernas. The ceremony was held at the Sampaguita Room of
the Club Filipino in Greenhiils. As usual everyone wore yellow, and it was a
happy, effervescent crowd that cheered her as she took the oath of office.
The bible resting under her left hand was held by Ninoy's mother, Aurora,
and she took her first salute from Chief of Staff of the New Armed Forces of
the Philippines. General Ramos.
At Malacanang arrangements were being made with Ambassador
Bosworth and the embassy staff to airlift Marcos and his contingent out of
Manila, to Clark Air Force Base, and out of the country. Contrary to Marcos
claims that the U.S. had "kidnapped" him out of his own country, he knew
where he was headed every step of the way. In a press conference at USIS
Cebu, on May 19, Ambassador Bosworth stated for the record that Marcos
had been totally informed throughout the move. In fact the departure was
carefully choreographed between Marcos, the Aquino people, and the U.S.
Embassy. There was never any doubt. Marcos, his family, and some 90
hangers-on left Clark at 5:12 a.m. Wednesday, February 26th.
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The treasure they left behind in the palace was now public property
The treasure they took with them was to be the subject of long law suits on
behalf of the Filipino people. In a moment prior to the departure Marcos
was heard by one of our embassy personnel to say to Imelda, "This is all
your fault!'" His place in history was assured, but it was nothing to be proud
of.
A festival was underway in the streets of Manila. The impossible had
happened, the dreamed was achieved.. The future was now open to
improvement. They were saddled with a huge debt, and an economy on
tottering legs. But as Teddy Locsin had observed weeks before, in hoping
that they could pull the election off. if successful, the Filipino people would
finally have no one else to blame, and would have to put up or shut up.
The ultimate challenge of Filipino nationalism had arrived.
The future was theirs to shape.
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VIII. EPILOGUE
On May 24, 1986 we returned to Manila. The purpose of the trip was
to assess how the new government was faring, what the prospects for the
economy were, and most importantly to personally guage the temperment of
the people.
Some of the people we had interviewed at election time were now
gone. Judge Donato was in the. States, General Barrangan fled with Marcos.
Others in the KBL camp were finding their way around a new social and
political order. Ditos has found himself the subject of a hold order, and while
presently "in between positions" is attempting to set up a foundation for
development assistance and simultaneously expedite the case between
Vincente Chuidian and the new government. Prud Europa is still in Manila,
not working, but looking for a home within journalism, his pre- Marcos
avocation.
Teddy Locsin remains close to Cory. As the Minister of Information he
immediately alienated much of the press with his straight talk and refusal to
play the old boy network. There is little doubt that he is the most sniped at
Cabinet member, but by and large the complaints are petty, and only make
the news because he is in daily contact with the media. By the time this is
published he should have accomplished his goal of abolishing the Ministry of
Information with it's 4000+ employees. This legacy of Marcos' news
manipulation will be replaced with a small Office of the Presidential Press
Secretary. Teddy, who remains one of Cory's closest advisors, anticipates a
position as her Chief of Staff. His real desire is to get back into active law
practice; he is a partner in a firm just opening it's doors. Since working in
the campaign Teddy has developed an interest in the NPA. He sees a role for
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himself as an advisor to the President on the ongoing insurgency. The
military may have something to say about that.
Inday Arcenas, Doy's niece, is working in the Vice President's office.
She is not a regular employee, is not drawing salary, and tries very hard to
reduce the family image in the office. There is little doubt, however, that
she has carte blanche to crack the whip when necessary. Her present task is
to organize the office, a formidable task as it is starting up from scratch. She
is anticipating a trip to the United States in which she hopes to speak to both
Filipino- American and foreign affairs interest groups. Like Ditos she is
working on a foundation which will assist development for the very poor
and those starting up businesses.
The immediately noticeable change in Manila this second trip was it's
cleanliness. Locals claimed not to see it, but it was obvious to me that the
streets and alleys were much cleaner, swept and picked up. And not just
Roxas Boulevard. Wherever we went it was apparent. Windows and shop
fronts seemed cleaner as well. The difference is pride. Pride in being
Filipino. Talk to anyone and you get the same impression. "We did it. We
removed the boot from our necks, and no one helped us." This is a very
potent psychological force which can make a difference.
There are gigantic problems to be overcome. They fall into four major
categories: economic, political, the insurgency/Armed Forces, and societal.
They are interrelated, yet have individual requirements, and somewhat
individual agendas.
A. THE ECONOMY
There is nothing more incumbent on the new President than improving
the economy. In a country where the average daily wage is less than US
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$3.00, jobs and pesos in circulation are vital. The massive US$28 billion
foreign debt is a millstone around Cory's neck, yet she has shied away from
talk of repudiating the debt. Almost US$1 biJlion in foreign aid has been
pledged, but relatively little has been actually received as yet. Much of the
delay has been a failure of the Manila government to put forth either
proposals or requests. While a frustrated Doy Laurel stated to me "we're
getting a lot of sympathy, but we need some lea!." he was countered by an
equally frustrated Felix Maramba. Jr. Felii explained how he had arranged
to receive over 1/3 of the total 1987 wheat requirements of Filipino food
manufacturers through U.S. assistance. There was P$l billion in U.S. PL 480
assistance available, it only needed to be asked for. Having ascertained this
from the USAID people at the U.S. Embassy. Felix approached Minister of
Finance Jimmy Ongpin. Minister of Agriculture Mitra. and National Economic
and Development Authority (NEDA) Minister Winnie Monsod. All that was
required was a letter on government stationery requesting release of the
funds. Then bids would be opened for wheat suppliers in the United States.
Felix, representing the Miller's Association, would go the Washington for the
bid opening, and the ships could roll. After a month of waiting he still had
no letter, and no commitment. When he continued to contact the Ministers
he finally got a response from Assistant Minister of Finance Earnest Leung.
The hitch was that Leung wanted the National Food Authority to act as the
middle man. Felix balked. His previous attempts to deal with the
bureaucracy had been less than ideal, and the transaction was ready to be
concluded. A new player would only complicate and slow the process. The
deal is still in limbo, and the wheat remains in the United States. Yet Cabinet
level Ministers continue to complain in public about the lack of received aid.
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At least one country, Australia, is taking a very firm stand with their
aid. After a series of meetings with key government officials, capped by a
meeting with President Aquino, Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawks
announced that the aid would be increased by A$9 million for the year, up to
AS25 million. He added, however, that after a two week visit by the
Australian Aid Mission it had been decided to implement the aid in three
phases. The first phase would introduce community assistance, but
primarily centers on Australia providing key commodities. Phase two would
see a decrease of commodity assistance, and phase three would be fully
implemented community assistance. Hawke spoke of the warm and cordial
relations that he and Mrs. Aquino had shared, but Cory has made no secret
of her desire that foreign governments trust the new Aquino government to
properly administer aid. Clearly, a high priority for the government is going
to be specific and realistic programs to utilize aid that has been promised. In
many cases it will first be necessary to eliminate interagency rivalry.
A positive economic note has been sounded in small business. The
Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry has established a Foundation
for Economic Development. The Foundation will administer the projects that
have been accepted by the Philippine Business Conference. Examples of
projects are:
• strawberry processing • gold small scale mining
• goat raising • mushroom production
• prawn production • furnace type kiln dryer
• peanut growing and processing » fabrication of farm machinery
There are many others, but the direction of the effort should be evident.
Rather than the large, government sponsored and administered development
projects of the past, this is an effort to build the poor into self-sufficient
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middle class members. The intent is to develop new products for the
Philippines, and first and foremost to put people to work. The Foundation
will seek equity for the projects from international donors, as well as grants
from other private sources.
The leader in all of this industry is Vic Lim, a banker, investment
consultant. Chairman of the Board of two textile firms, and member of the
PCC1. Lim is convinced that the restoration of the economy cannot wait for
the government, but must be led by private industry. To that end he is
enroute Washington to talk directly with USAID executives. He brings with
him specific proposals, and moderate budget requests. I would rate his
potential for success as very high.
The most alarming measurement of the economic future has been the
poor rate of investment in the country. American investors have taken a
bad rap in Philippine cities for their hesitancy to invest, but as Ambassador
Bosworth has pointed out. the Filipino investor has yet to make a move as
well. At a press conference in Cebu on May 19, 1986 he was asked, "We
would like to know from you. Sir, as to the perception, perhaps, of the
American investors in helping reawaken the sluggish business activity in the
Philippines.'" He answered. "Well, my sense is that the American business
community is showing evidence of some reawakening of interest in the
Philippines. There has been very little investment here over the last couple
of years, either from American investors or other foreign investors, or I
might add. from Filipino investors. And we now find in Manila in particular
that we are receiving three or four inquiries a day from American companies
who are now beginning to come to the Philippines again to look at the
situation. I think it's too early to say that there is a new surge of actual
investment. I think that's probably at least a few months in the future.
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I would also say that I don't think anyone should expect that
American investment or foreign investment in general is going to lead this
economic recovery. It can help; but the impetus for economic recovery in
the Philippines, in my judgment, is going to have to come from Filipino
investors. It will only be when foreign investors see evidence that domestic
investors have regained confidence and are beginning to put money into the
economy again that you will see some significant interest on the part of
foreign investors including Americans."
Secretary of State George Shultz urged American businessmen to
reconsider the Philippines early in June. "I am bullish on the Philippines' . he
declared. "I believe that the American investors who come in early and for
the long haul will reap large benefits", he told the New York Foreign Policy
Association. Continuing. Shultz told the audience, "If stability and
development in the Philippines are to be attained, however, the American
private sector must get off the dime and look agressively at investment
opportunities. In light of the Philippines' abundant human and natural
resources, there is no reason why the Filipinos cannot now enjoy the same
economic success achieved by many of their Asian neighbors.
"
It is too early to tell whether endorsements like this will increase the
flow of capital into the country, but they should.
Then there is the subject of recovery of the ill-gotten wealth. The
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) has made substantial
inroads in identifying, sequestering, and recovering monies accrued during
the Marcos years by cronies, but there must come a time when the
investigation will be over. Chairman Jovito Salonga's Executive Director,
Colonel (retired) Feliciano Cruz. Jr.. indicated to me that he expected the
Commission to be active for 1-1 1/2 years. They had initially estimated that
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the monies under consideration were in the range of 2-3 billion pesos
domestically, and 1-2 billion dollars abroad. They have since revised their
figures upwards to 10-15 billion pesos at home and up to 10 billion dollars
abroad. To date they have recovered 1.5 billion pesos which has been
turned back to the government. Another 4-6 billion pesos in property has
been sequestered and is awaiting the action of the courts.
Colonel Cruz put the recovery process in perspective by pointing out
that total government expenditures for the year before had been 95 btilion
pesos. If they continue to recover significant amounts it will have a
substantial impact on the ability of the government to continue services.
Although there is little real hope that enough will be recovered to affect the
foreign debt, operating capital is another story. Perhaps the best reason Tor
the PCGG effort is it's deterrent value. If basic changes are going to be made
in the way Philippine business is conducted it will take a carrot and stick
approach. This is the stick.
Developmental assistance is another side to the economic coin. One
school of thought holds that increased business and jobs will bring Filipinos
out of their poverty. Another claims that developmental assistance is
necessary to break the longstanding chains that have bound a large segment
of the society to poverty. Of the latter, probably no one is doing better work
than the Catholic Church.
One very committed individual is Father Rollie Dizon, a Lasalle
Brother. He ran the Operation Quick Count at NAMFREL Headquarters at his
school, and has now shifted back to his primary emphasis on development
through education. He and Sister Luz. the President of Assumption College,
explained many of their programs to me. One is modification of existing
curricula. They have asked the 1222 parochial schools under their purview
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to carve niches out of the curricula for students to address ways of making
the country's future better. The new course segments stress economic and
developmental factors. By making time for students to verbalize their
concerns and hopes for the new political environment they hope to foster a
greater awareness and responsibility in youth.
The Assumption alumnae and their husbands have succeeded in
building a satellite school in San Simon, Pampangas. In this primarily rural
area, the school serves as a 'magnet" for local farmers, teaching the adults as
well as the children. The adults learn agriculture and business techniques
A total of 350 families take advantage of this community support. Sister Luz
hopes that by educating the farmers they can help make any future land
reform a success. In the past farmers given land they had previously been
tenanted to quickly ended up back in debt to a landlord. Within the new
system the community, rallying about the school, has formed a cooperative
and now owns it's support facilities—silos, warehouses, and tools.
Additionally, this school is acting as a training center for farmers from other
depressed rural regions. As feasible, new satellite schools will be built.
A telling comment that Father Dizon made is that prior to the current
crisis there was a tendency for the Catholic schools to stay within their own
walls". Now they are agreed that the need within the community as a whole
is too large, and they are committed to helping. Aside from projects initiated
by the Catholic Educational Association Philippines there are new programs
like the Service Contract Scheme. In this, Catholic schools share their
facilities with less fortunate public schools. The goal has become much more
nationally, much less parochially aimed.
The hitherto silent middle and upper middle class has come out of the
wails of their posh Manila residential compounds and really looked around
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at their country. The thousands of women of such upbringing who united in
People Power will not all go back to man jongg and afternoon cocktails at the
Polo Club. They have once seized political power, wrought a tremendous
change, and seen their dreams become reality. Now the dream is for a
prosperous and economically dignified Philippines. They feel as if it is
within their grasp to make positive changes in that too.
Two women 1 met started a handicrafts export business in one of their
houses. The basketry that they now export around the world supports 150
families. They are committed to remitting a fair portion of the profit back to
the artisans, and are anticipating growth. Others were involved in school
lunch programs in the slums, taking turns cooking for children that
otherwise wouldn't eat. It is this level of commitment that will make a
difference in the end. if only the numbers of the committed continue to
increase.
B. POLITICS
In less than a hundred days Cory has found herself in the midst of world-
class political maneuvering, intrigue, and dissention. She faces the fractures
of old and new parties, the realigning of political forces. Ministerial prima
donnas, allegations of Marcos-era hidden wealth within her cabinet, a hostile
and leftist young press corps, and a military hierarchy leary of her
intentions toward the insurgency and their role in combatting it.
Her problems with the Cabinet run the gamut. Teddy Locsin is the
favorite target of the press; Minister of Local Government Aquilino Pimentei
has been roundly criticized for his appointments of "officers in charge" to
replace Marcos-era local officials. Residents point to some OIC's who
allegedly failed in election attempts in their areas two or three times, but
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who are now in leadership positions by virtue of appointment. Minister of
Labor Sanchez is so blatantly pro-labor that the entire business community
is up in arms. According to a source close to the President, at one point she
told Sanchez just to "shut up" in public. Minister of Finance Jaime Ongpin. a
close advisor during the campaign, has come under fire as it has become
known that a majority owner of his Benguet Corporation was Benjamin
"Kokoy" Romuaidez, Imeida Marcos' brother. Ongpin claimed not to have
known this, but that has largely been met with skepticism. A second matter
of controversy in Ongpin's case has been his insistence that Central Bank
Governor Jobo Fernandez remain in his position. Many see the Marcus
appointee's position at odds with the aims of the new government.
The most dramatic potential split in the cabinet would be between the
President and her millionaire Defense Minister, Johnny Enrile. His key role
in the revolution made his remaining in office a certitude, and his avowed
allegiance to Mrs. Aquino rang true during the four fateful days in February.
Now, however, there is less certainty that he will be willing to remain in the
backseat to her for the next six years.
Recently, on the American news show. West 57th. he was asked what
would happen if xMrs. Aquino were to ask him to leave the government. He
must have raised eyebrows in Manila when he answered. "She'll have to talk
to my boys.'*
The answer would seem to indicate that he feels the military backs
him. It is probable that many of the officers that were close to him
personally in the RAM movement are loyal, but it is far less certain that the
majority of troops would desert their new. and popularly chosen president.
The public expression of People Power which won the military over will not
be soon forgotten. 1 have been told by a competent source that when the
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Enrile-Ramos defection occurred, and negotiations with the Aquino faction
were made, it was agreed upon that Enrile would serve the new president if
she met two conditions. First she was to leave uninvestigated his personal
wealth and it's sources, and second, human rights violations that occurred in
the military under his leadership were to be quietly forgotten. As the man
who personally determined when and for how long she and her family could
visit Ninoy in prison, he no doubt has few illusions of her admiration for him.
It remains to be seen if he has reassessed her strength. My guess is that she
will continue to consolidate power based on her popular appeal and he will
be forced to seek a more definitive political role through election. The first
step in achieving that will likely be the reconsolidation of the Nationalists
Party (NP).
The subject of political parties is very much alive in the Philippines
today. The UNIBO coalition is falling apart without the need for unity as in
pre-election days, and Pimentel is leaning away from the Aquino wing of the
PDP-LABAN. threatening it's fracture. The KBL is a shadow of it's old self.
In a meeting with members of the KBL executive committee, ex-Marcos
Presidential Assistant Joaquin Venus related how Marcos had recently
telephoned the KBL executive meeting in Baguio to speak to principals of the
party. In the conversation he told ex-Speaker of the National Assembly
Yniguez, Arturo Tolentino and Ronnie Zamora to keep the fight up for a
return of democracy to the Philippines." Later the group related it's new
platform--the return of the rule of law. Venus related how his house had
been searched on February 28, presumably for hidden wealth. "I was one of
the first to suffer violation of human rights under this government ", he said.
If they hadn't been so serious the conversation would have been laughable.
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These men, who are certainly among the most committed to the "old"
KBL, mused over the breakup of their own party. They bemoaned the
departure of Bias Ople and his new Partido Nationaiista ng Pilipinas (PNP) as
well as members which left the ranks to form the Independent KBL (IJCBL).
Even these new parties are having problems. When Mrs. Aquino announced
the appointees for the Constitutional Commission (Con-Corn), she left five
spots open for "the opposition". Marcos made one of his daily phone calls
from exile in Hawaii to Ople, instructing him to boycott the Commission.
When Ople refused, 1 1 members of the PNP left to join the NP.
In the Liberal Party the Salonga and Kalaw wings have begun an
effort to mend their fences. It appears that they will be able to coalesce
their members into a unified party.
There is more intrigue within the Nationaiista Party. As UN1D0 loses
strength it looks as if Doy Laurel is headed to a takeover bid of the NP,
taking most of UNIDO with him. In an opposing move Johnny Enriie is
aligning himself with Former Deputy Minister Renato Cayetano. nominal
head of the NP as it is now structured. Rumors are thick that Enriie looks
toward eventual leadership of the NP, with himself as it's next Presidential
candidate. If that is the case there will be a tremendous power struggle
between him and Doy. During the KBL discussion former Governor Lorenzo
Teves was asked if they could see themselves as supporters of Doy Laurel.
His comment was, "We'll see--live and let live!" The variations are endless.
The key to these scenarios is probably the Con-Corn's decision on the
type of government that will be adopted. If the present parlimentary,
unicameral system is maintained there will doubtless be a plethora of
parties. But if the U.S. style, bicameral system is returned to. the parties will
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probably merge into two major forces. If this occurs the parties will likely
be the Liberal and Nationalista.
C. THE INSURGENCY/NEW ARMED FORCES
The new government and the New Armed Forces of the Philippines are
dancing a cautious dance with each other. The insurgency has not gone away
and the need for a strong military is evident. This need is balanced in Cory's
view by the military's poor human rights record, corruption, and to some
degree, her memories of Ninoy's years languishing in military camps. The
surprise defection of Enriie and Ramos to her side at the crucial moment
produced the proverbial strange bedfellows. Since then she has warmed to
the military. An insider described her as loving hierarchy—the generals
and the bishops are her favorites.'' Indeed, she has been at home in
attending military functions, such as the graduation of a recent class at the
Philippine Military Academy. While she proudly trooped the line, and
saluted snappily, she also reminded the cadets in her address that it had
been a soldier that had fired a bullet into her husband's head.
The greatest rift between Aquino and her generals has been over the
handling of the insurgency. She first exposed herself to their ire by seeking
advice from civilians, when clearly the military considered themselves to be
the experts on the NPA. Next she disregarded the advice of the military
leadership in the release of political prisoners. It was one of her campaign
promises, and she was urged by close advisors Executive Secretary Joker
Arroyo and Press Spokesman Rene Saguisag (both human rights lawyers) to
expedite the releases. The military wanted her to wait and reconsider the
cases of known communists and NPA sympathizers. In the end, she followed
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her own conscience and released all. including Jose Maria Sison. the old head
of the Communist Party, and Commander Dante, a reputed NPA leader.
While the military maintains that this makes it difficult to keep the
front line troops motivated (for every one we catch, she releases one...), the
President may have been way ahead of them. During the years that Sison
and Dante have been in prison the communist leadership has changed. With
the old leaders free the struggle for power within the party is all the more
vigorous. It has developed serious internal rifts. By removing strong central
leadership Cory may well force the NPA into an even greater regional
orientation than it now has, thus further defusing it's power.
A more pressing problem is that of NPA reconciliation/surrenderees.
The crux of her solution to the insurgency was that by removing Marcos the
dictator, and the corruption that he engendered, the economy would
improve. As these two things occurred many of what have been labelled
NPA would voluntarily come out of the hills. She acknowieged thai the
hardcore would require a military solution, but wanted to reduce military
action until her program had an opportunity to work. The lack of a formal
ceasefire led to increased military casualties, and the military leadership was
understandably upset. Shortly after the Aquino government had begun talk
of reconciliation the NPA in northern Luzon ambushed a convoy in which
press members were riding. The deaths that resulted seem to have
hardened a previously middle-of-the-road press into a firmer get-tough-
with-the-NPA attitude.
The administration is working on schemes to devote unused lands to
cooperative agricultural land reform for surrenderees. In addition to land,
they would receive protection from NPA reprisals as well as farm training.
The benefit of such a program is that it would provide a positive reaction to
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the insurgency while blunting criticism of the poor efforts towards land
reform.
A key question from the start of the Aquino movement has been her
ability to make the military decisions that will be needed. The softness"
with which Marcos attempted to label President Aquino does not appear to
have been accurate. One aide characterized her as "the perfect fascist- -if she
had her way it would be she, the generals and the bishops running the
country!" There is every reason to believe that she will make the hard
decisions when the time comes. For now she will press forward with her
plans to talk with the CPP/NPA. Insiders stress that she has a deep seated
hatred of communists and communism, and is well aware of the threat that
they pose to the Philippines.
The United States position will have to remain fluid. While a certain
level of military assistance will always be useful, it is questionable how
much is at the present time. The NAFP--emphasis on the New '--has stated
a desire for assistance in replacing the basics—uniforms, canteens, boots, and
vehicle spare parts. Economically, it will probably be in their best interests
if such requirements are eventually locally produced. However, in the near
term these are exactly the types of non-lethal assistance which will easily
win the approval of congress.
One measure of the change in the NAFP has been their move out of
Manila. Under President Marcos a large proportion of the troops and their
generals were located in and around Manila. Tanks and support vehicles
were likewise close to Malacanang. Since the revolution Chief of Staff Ramos
has ordered most of them out into the countryside where they belong. The
Marines, for example, are primarily west of Davao. in Cotabato. This signals
a greater interest by the military in meeting the insurgency at its source,
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and confidence that the President does not require protection from the
people she represents.
In bolstering their image, the military has begun greater efforts at
civic action. This has already produced increased morale in the NAFP, and a
much improved reception by the general population. There are two major
problems with the program. First, it will require some determined
leadership reform to ensure that the supplies—primarily medical— are not
diverted to the black market. Secondly, there has already been interference
from newly appointed members of government. Minister of Agriculture
Ramon Mitra, for example, has attempted to direct the form that such action
takes. The military will require freedom in reasserting itself as a medium
for positive change. The other branches of government, while exerting the
civilian control over the armed forces that is mandatory in a democracy,
must allow them room to improve, function, and grow.
D. SOCIETY
Filipino nationalists have traditionally recognized the inroads that colonial
powers have made on their culture. The roots of the contemporary Filipino
are taken primarily from the Malay, Chinese, Indio (indigenous), Spanish.
and American influences on the islands. Each has left a legacy, and each has
been the subject of critical analysis, the Spanish and Americans receiving the
brunt of the criticism. Centuries of travelers to this Pacific crossroads have
left their mark on the Philippines. The society shares the negatives that
colonialism brought with the positive social factors of a wide gene pool, a
lack of serious racial tension, and strong religious and family commitments.
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There are popular notions, voiced even within Manila, that the
Filipinos are unlikely to ever achieve the efficiency and productivity of the
Japanese, Koreans, or Americans, that they are victims of tropical paralysis".
If the Democratic Revolution has proven anything, it is the falsehood of such
a belief. The modern and bustling finance center in Makati can be a
blueprint for the future. Agriculture can flourish in this resource rich land.
Person after person pointed out that the country may be poor now. but
everyone can eat. With changes to the wav that business is done many more
can climb the economic ladder.
A more serious charge might be that Filipinos are culturally
conditioned towards acceptance of a government that is based on favoritism,
nepotism, corruption, and autocratic control. The roots of this cultural
inheritance reach well before the coming of Ferdinand Marcos. The real
challenge to the Aquino administration is to provide government that is
representative of the needs of ail Filipinos, and to ignite latent skills and
talents into economically recognizable productivity. Beyond the
susceptibility towards governmental corruption and favoritism, there arc
twenty years of paternalism to overcome. The corner is just beginning to be
turned.
E. CONCLUSION
As I review the campaign, the election, and the revolution, I am struck by
the extremes in contrast that emerged. The freshness of Cory Aquino as she
spoke to hundreds of thousands and the grimness of a defeated Marcos
imprisoned in Malacanang during the last week. The youthful exuberance of
the NAMFREL volunteers and the uncomprehending other-woridliness of the
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FCBL executives. The empty, dirty fCBL national election headquarters and
the frenetic bustle of the earnest Aquino volunteers.
The imposing contemporary ediface of the Philippine Cultural Center
across the street from cardboard and plywood hovels barely four feet wide.
The faces of child street beggars being coached in the morning by the old
matriarch in rags and the earnest, serious concentration of a Forbes Park
youngster demonstrating her newest computer achievements. An entire
bank floor of stuffed trophy animals, and the barefoot salesman in Rizal park
selling sparrows in tiny baskets for a few pesos each. Finally, the sight I
shall never forget: the gleaming black Mercedes limosine, with its tinted
windows and anonymity, honking in indignation at the four laughing
children taking a bath in a particularly deep pothole, their mother holding
the towel at the side of the road.
I do not mean to imply that the extremes between the haves and the
have-nots were in any way exclusively Filipino. They were not. There are
said to be 50,000 homeless in New York City alone. But the contrast is more
poignant, more shocking, during a period of time in which the government is
boldly and blatantly selling itself as the answer to the country's problems,
and ignoring it's responsibility as the reason. An outsider was forced to ask
himself, how long will the people allow this to continue? When will the lies
become too shallow, and the logic too convoluted for even the uneducated to
accept? Why will they not rise up to protect the children?
The answers came with a rapidity that no one could have expected.
Those that faced down tanks can face down corruption. The many
who said enough! to the few can be the watchdogs of the new society. And
the Philippines can again be the Pearl of the Orient.
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